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The thesis examines the case of Barrow-in-Furness through the period of the First 
World War.  As a town dominated by one of the UK’s most important armaments firms, 
Vickers, Barrow experienced the full force of industrial mobilisation and government 
intervention.  In analysing the responses to these events, the thesis provides insights into 
their impact on a town and population dependent on industries stimulated by war.    
Barrow had special problems arising from its geographical isolation and large 
munitions population.  Vickers, the work force and the town at large were used to negotiating 
their own difficulties, but these were severely tested by the impact of war.  Industrial relations 
in a heavily unionised but strategically important town were complicated by the different 
positions of Vickers, unions, shop stewards, rival government agencies, and the role of 
women, yet ultimately all parties found ways of working together.  The knock-on effects of 
the war on industry were extensive and far reaching.  The life of the town was intimately 
bound up with the war industry and the changes in war requirements ultimately affected its 
population through housing, health and welfare and the need for utilities and transport.  
Addressing these difficulties posed some of the greatest problems.   Political implications of 
wartime in a working-class town led to a split in the Labour Party and ultimately the return of 
a Tory in 1919.    
While historians have considered how the nation met the demands of the war, a focus 
on the regionality of the home front highlights more precisely the impact on specific places 
and how the war effort was sustained in practice.  The experience of the town of Barrow 
throughout the period of the First World War is therefore invaluable for demonstrating the 
complexity and inter-relatedness of how the war affected people, industry and infrastructure 
on the home front.    
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 The First World War opened up a Home Front that stretched into all parts of British 
life and touched almost every citizen regardless of age, gender and class.  The impact of the 
First World War on the Home Front has been much debated and widely interpreted but there 
is a lack of studies of the home front amongst the literature.  This study looks at one particular 
place, the industrial town of Barrow-in-Furness and its people.  From its geographical position, 
its peculiar situation and abnormal growth of population resulting from war work, Barrow 
provides a particularly valuable case study.  With relatively few comprehensive studies of how 
national policies and organisations operated locally, this thesis can inform debate in what it 
can tell us about how broader matters concerning State control of industry played out in 
practice and the effects it had.  The work is therefore particularly valuable in countering an 
overemphasis on national perspectives and important in what it can tell us about how broader 
matters played out in practice.   
The following review of the literature on the home front, sets out the key themes, 
issues and debates considered by historians and will also serve as wider context to the specific 
study of Barrow.  Works of originality and importance have been produced on a diversity of 
specific topics, social, political and cultural, in an attempt to understand the First World War 
as it affected Britain’s civilians.  Though this body of endeavour has vastly been outweighed 
by military histories, it has a long lineage.  Post Second World War the literature was 
revitalized through the injection of fresh ideas and changing interpretations occasionally 
overturning familiar debates.  There has been a tendency towards revisiting long-established 
debates, especially about the consequences of wartime developments in technology and 
change in industrial work practices and the wartime housing crisis and drink legislation.   
Furthermore examination has been made of the various aspects of increased and sustained 
munitions production essential for the war effort.  Predominantly the literature mainly 
considers issues at a general level on a national scale while much less exists at a local level.    
The following sections take the key themes in the historiography in turn to review the 
main lines of debate.  Each section concludes with a brief indication of the line of argument 




State Control and the Ministry of Munitions 
First it should be said that the Government was given the task of cajoling into 
acquiescence a population which had become accustomed to Free Trade, private enterprise 
and minimal government interference.  It was only when the pressures of war were brought 
to bear that the Government gradually abandoned its laissez faire principles in favour of direct 
control.  The goal was to fight a war whilst simultaneously preserving the living standards of 
civilians so as to uphold morale on the home front and in the factories needed to supply the 
military front.  Bourne suggests that the nature of this interference was characteristic 
involving a series of ad hoc responses to specific problems.  These were made of necessity 
and not through choice, there was no overall plan and no philosophy of action.1 
The main area of focus is on the production of munitions and the upheavals created 
by a massive expansion of demand.  The first objective of the war was to complete naval ships 
and submarines while providing naval ordnance for the Fleet.  For the Army the supply of 
arms and ammunition was critical to the war effort and it was failure in this area, particular 
the shell shortages of 1915 which played a major part in the fall of the Asquith government.  
From the outset the need was seen to scale up production, enhance efficiency and reduce 
costs, which related to issues around the direct state control of industry, and of labour 
relations.  On the formation of the coalition government, Lloyd George moved from the 
Exchequer to the newly formed Ministry of Munitions.  Adams provides an account of Lloyd 
George and the history of the Ministry of Munitions and its administrative politics.2  The study 
complements Dewar’s early work explaining the transfer of responsibilities from the War 
Office to the Ministry.3   
 The Ministry’s intention was to liberate the munitions industries from military 
direction and restrictions of established official routine, handing over the task of guiding and 
coordinating these developments to prominent businessmen familiar with industrial 
problems.4  Hinton notes the larger firms loaned over ninety directors and managers to the 
Ministry for the duration of the war, many remaining on their own payrolls.5   The influence 
of these large employers he says was directed against unions by employing the state to 
                                                     
1 Bourne, J. M., Britain and The Great War 1914-1918 (London, Edward Arnold, l989) 
2 Adams, R. J. Q., Arms and the Wizard: Lloyd George and the Ministry of Munitions, 1915-1916, (Texas, 1978) 
3 Official History of the Ministry of Munitions 12 Volumes (1918-22); Dewar, G. A. B., The Great Munitions Feat 1914-1918, 
(London, 1921) 
4 Beveridge, W., Power and Influence, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1953) 
5 Hinton, J., The First Shop Stewards’, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1973) 
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strengthen employer’s positions.  Davidson disputes this arguing the Ministry was formed to 
facilitate labour due to the bottleneck in the supply of munitions workers and failure to obtain 
maximum output from existing labour, thus measures lacked repressive intent.6  Rubin 
contends while both interpretations possess a degree of merit, neither succeed in fully 
justifying the complexity of wartime labour control.7  Rubin further argues that effort was 
directed towards achieving a controlled and disciplined workforce and a regulated network 
of employers to achieve increased output.  Regarding Vickers, Todd argues their management 
took full advantage of the Munitions Act to force the re-adjustment of the workforce to new 
methods.  Technology, Todd says, generated long-lasting trade union and employer 
confrontation, and throughout the war animosity continued to characterise industrial 
relations.8   
 The image of the Ministry as a smooth functioning organisation is misleading 
Simmonds argues, as it lacked central coordination.9  Morley elaborates, noting ‘there was no 
time to present the theoretical case for direct State action, controlled economy was not seen 
and planned as a whole, but grew piecemeal as required agreeing with Bourne.’10 Pope 
believes the introduction of progressive controls accounted for their acceptance.11  The first 
part of Morley’s statement Marwick argues needs amending saying ‘as war progressed more 
publicists put forward a theoretical case for direct state action and by 1916 there was an 
informed public opinion, of which a majority were in favour of such action’.12  Meanwhile 
DeGroot maintains Lloyd George’s approach was neither systematic nor coordinated, reacting 
to perceived emergencies with appropriate alacrity, thus complicating labour relations and 
manpower issues.13    
 To boost productivity and recruitment Lloyd George imposed a number of controls 
which, falling short of industrial conscription, severely restricted munitions workers’ rights.  
Throughout the war the crucial issue facing the Ministry was labour supply, it was not 
integration with business but continuity with existing institutions of labour control that was 
important.  Wolfe points out the Labour Exchange was the basis without which wartime 
                                                     
6 Davison, R., The Myth of the Servile State, Labour History Society Bulletin, No. 29 (Autumn 1974) 
7 Rubin, G. R., War Law and Labour, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987) 
8 Todd, N., A History of Labour  in Lancaster and Barrow-in-Furness, 1890-1920, unpublished PhD, Lancaster University, 1976 
9 Simmonds, Britain and World War One,(Abingdon, Routledge, 2012) 
10 Morgan, E. V., Studies in Financial Policy, 1914-25, (London, Macmillan, 1952) 
11 Pope, R., War and Society in Britain, 1899-1948, (Harlow, Longman, 1991) 
12 Marwick, A., The Deluge, British Society and the First World War, (London, Macmillan, 1965) 
13 DeGroot, G. J., British Society in the Era of the Great War, (London, Longman, 1996) 
4 
 
controls would have been impossible.14  Initially production was channelled through the 
existing armaments industry, dominated by Vickers and Armstrong Whitworth on one side 
and government arsenals, dockyards and naval bases on the other.  Scott says that huge shell 
contracts created a chaotic situation which Vickers accepted on the assumption essential 
labour would be secured.15  Complaints by some manufacturers over supervision, inspection 
and restrictive union practices, Simmonds argues led to the introduction of National Factories 
where the whole process, including labour could be brought under one management.16  
However National Factories were required for the massive expansion of war material. 
 Analysing the Ministry’s wartime record Wrigley concludes it was an innovatory 
department, receptive to new ideas and a vital force in securing the nation’s logistics supplies, 
of which Adams agrees.17  Dewar contends the munitions feat was a lesson to peacetime 
industry by example of changed production methods using economised labour and 
resources.18  What is clear, DeGroot maintains, is Lloyd George changed established labour 
practices to maximise output, driving industry to exhaustion causing the need for careful 
handling for the rest of the war.19  Van Emden adds with the relaxing of Home Office rules 
governing factory work, long hours, shift-work and shorter mealtimes became the norm.20  
However, the retreat of government at the end of the war reverted much of industry to its 
pre-war condition, an issue central to the debate about the permanency of war induced 
change.    
One of the central factors in this study is the nature of Barrow’s industrial and 
geographical position that made the relationships between the local and central powers 
particularly important.  The main parties, Vickers and Unions, the Admiralty, Ministry of 
Munitions and other government bodies largely concluded that it was better if there was self-
regulation.   Despite the role of the State, which often caused more problems than it solved, 
it will be argued that the town mostly sorted out its own difficulties.   
 
                                                     
14 Wolfe, H., Labour Supply and Regulation, (Oxford, Oxford University Press,1923) 
15 Scott, J. D., Vickers a History, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1962)  
16 Simmonds, Britain and World War One 
17 Wrigley, C. J., The Ministry-of-Munitions an innovatory department, in Burke, K., (ed.), War and the State: The 
Transformation of British Government, 1914-1919, (London, 1978); Adams, Arms and the Wizard 
18 Dewar, The Great Munitions Feat 
19 DeGroot, Blighty, (New York, 1996) 
20 Van Emden, R., Humphries, S., All Quiet on the Home Front: An Oral History of Life in Britain During the First Word War, 
(London, Headline, 2004)  
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Labour Relations, Unions and Organisation of Labour 
With regard to organised labour, the co-operation and identification of the trade 
union leadership with both employers and the State, together with their acting within narrow 
constitutional limits severely restricted the scope of industrial conflict.  As a result, Hinton 
argues the official leadership failed to defend the interests of its rank and file in the face of 
tightening controls, becoming increasingly unrepresentative.21  The rift was heightened by 
government policy seeking to strengthen the leadership by refusing to negotiate with 
unofficial local bodies.  This ignored traditions of local collective bargaining and existing 
workshop organisation which had developed in some industries from the late nineteenth 
century.  Hinton further argues national (and some local) leadership sought to use collective 
bargaining to increase their own power and authority, becoming peace agents and 
negotiators rather than organisers and leaders.22  Additionally, Cronin identifies a tendency 
for trade union leadership to become a caste in its own right with vested interests, 
increasingly distrusted and unable to control mounting unrest, stimulating the growth of an 
independent rank and file movement as the true representatives of labour interests under 
leadership of the shop stewards.23  
Indeed Hyman describes the shop stewards as standing in the front line of resistance 
to industrial compulsion as a result of the wartime extension of national collective bargaining 
and rank and file independence driving the struggle for job control down to the workplace.24 
However rank and file militancy assumed different characteristics according to local 
conditions and at Barrow, Hinton argues an independent workers' committee failed to 
emerge during the war, and as a consequence the revolutionary left lacked real leadership 
remaining relatively isolated and powerless.  This pattern however does not emerge in Todd's 
study of the development of Barrow's labour movement, who asserts they became a power 
of some significance during the war years.25   
Interpretations of the extent and nature of change to class structure and social 
perceptions are diverse.  McKibbin asserts middle-class perceptions of the working-classes 
                                                     
21 Hinton, The First Shop Stewards 
22 Ibid. 
23 Cronin, Labour and Society in Britain 1918-79, (London, Harper Collins, 1984) 
24 Hyman, R., Rank and File Movements and Workplace Organisation 1914-1939 in Wrigley, C. J., (ed.), A History of British 
Industrial Relations 1914-1939 (Aldershot, Gregg Revivals 1993) 
25 Todd, A History of labour 
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were shaped by powerful and often hostile stereotypes.26  Winter argues middle-class 
assumptions about the poor particularly that their condition was the product of weakness of 
character, was undermined by the visible effects of higher wartime earnings.  McKibbin 
maintains the severity of the middle-class wartime experience simultaneously increased their 
hostility towards the more affluent working-classes.27  This, together with Cannadine's 
assertion that the war undermined the hierarchic view of society and working-class respect 
seems to suggest considerable social antagonism was stimulated.28   
With regard to longer term social change, Kirk argues whilst enduring divisions were 
created by wage differentials, there was a parallel tendency towards greater uniformity as a 
result of the commercialisation of life and leisure patterns, strong attachments to family and 
neighbourhood networks, together with technological change in the workplace.29  Whilst 
McKibbin argues technical developments reduced the proportion of skilled workers to the 
semi-skilled, Waites contends change resulted in the emergence of new skills rather than a 
reduction in the number of skilled workers.30  A body of opinion however argues against 
greater working-class homogenisation Reid claims the narrowing of pay differentials between 
skilled and unskilled, and the tendency towards social homogenisation have been 
exaggerated, a view supported by Cronin, who argues distinctions were blurred rather than 
reduced.31 Griffiths goes further, and argues internal working-class hierarchies were 
becoming increasingly important and the strength of influences outside the workplace was 
undiminished.32   
When we come to consider labour relations in Barrow, for the most part, they were 
maintained through self-regulation.  The town was a strong union place where all men were 
well organized, the shop stewards' movement however failed to evolve into a permanent and 
effective organisation as on the Clyde and at Sheffield.  According to this interpretation, 
Barrow's revolutionaries remained isolated and the Shop Stewards Movement never 
                                                     
26 McKibbin, R., The Ideologies of Class: Social Relations in Britain1880-1950, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1990)  
27 McKibbin, R., Classes and Cultures: England 1918-1 951, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000 edition) 
28 Cannadine, D., Class in Britain, (London, Penguin Books, 2000) 
29 Kirk, N., Labour and Society in Britain  
30 McKibbin, Classes and Cultures; Waites, B., The Effect of the First World War on Class and Status in England, 1910-20', 
Journal of Contemporary History, 11 (1976) 
31 Reid, World War One 




achieved a position of mass leadership.  However, a considerably more complex situation 
existed suggesting their power and influence should not be underestimated.   
 
Politics 
The majority of historians have viewed politics from a national standpoint rather than 
at a local level.  With its well organised labour movement militant trade union tradition and 
predominantly working-class population Barrow provides a valuable case for the analysis of 
political change.  Todd's study is therefore of considerable importance regarding the rise of 
the Barrow labour movement and its development.33  In pre-war Britain the Labour Party 
along with the trades’ union movement truncated the growth of political socialism, and so 
tied Labour to the material interests of the working-class, more than to a radical and 
reforming ideology.  In 1914, Labour was split between pro-war and anti-war supporters, but 
according to Pugh the former far outnumbered the latter.34  In fact, the National Executive 
Committee voted in support of the war, although the Independent Labour Party (ILP), 
remained opposed.   
Political matters are stressed in their relation to social trends with particular emphasis 
on the Labour movement.  Questions of political identity and allegiance, and the Left’s rise 
have been subjected to various interpretations.  Whilst some historians describe the rise of 
the Labour Party as the inevitable consequences of social and economic changes, others hold 
the war to be a significant influential factor.35  Wartime says Pugh generated material 
grievances, and such issues reinforced the conviction of the movement to concentrate on its 
influence to defend working-class conditions.36  Kirk describes the labour movement and its 
institutions as consolidated by the War.37  The War accelerated, if it did not cause the political 
advance of the Labour Movement.  It is argued by McKibbin and Wrigley that trade union 
membership increased and expansion of the engineering industries at ‘established places’ 
strengthened the unions making negotiations with them imperative.38  Some historians 
                                                     
33 Todd, A History of Labour   
34 Pugh, M., Speak for Britain, A New History of the Labour Party, (London, Vintage, 2011) 
35 Butler, D., Stokes, D., Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice, (London, Macmillan, 1969); Dangerfield, 
G., The Strange Death of Liberal England 1914-1918, (New York, Perigee Trade, 1961); Pelling, H., The Origins of the Labour 
Party1880-1900, (Oxford, Oxford University Press)   
36 Pugh, M., Speak for Britain, A New History of the Labour Party, (London, Vintage, 1911) 
37 Kirk, N., Labour and Society in Britain and the USA Vol. 2 – Challenge and Accommodation, 1850-1939, (Aldershot, Scholar 
Press, 1994), 
38 McKibbin, R., The Evolution of The Labour Party 1910-1924 (Oxford, 1974); Wrigley, C. J., David Lloyd George and the British 
Labour Movement, (Brighton, 1976) 
8 
 
describe the rise of the Labour Party as the inevitable consequence of social and economic 
changes, others hold the war to be a significant influential factor.39   
Wilson argues the inadequacies of the traditional governing classes and realization of 
the possible contribution of working-class leaders encouraged Labour activists to approach 
the post-war period with optimism and enthusiasm.40  While much of Labour’s advance can 
be ascribed to an increase in candidates and a changed-electorate, Pope says the 1918 
Conservative-dominated coalition victory was largely due to their intent to restore the pre-
war economic and social order and divisions in the left.41   There is consensus that Labour was 
helped by Liberal Party disorganisation following the establishment of Lloyd George’s 
government.  Although there is little evidence that war service changed attitudes towards 
women’s political rights, their votes in some areas proved crucial to the post-war election.  
Labour’s gains in local elections further underlined their increased strength.  Although the 
work of local authorities during the First World War are largely overlooked they would play 
an important part in support of industry and the population.  
Politics in Barrow were based on local interests and the outcomes were not always as 
would be expected, particularly at the end of the war when a political fall-out between the 
far left pacifists and those supporting the government in full prosecution of the war was seen.  
With regard to local government, although the town was initially ruled by an industrial elite 
with a greater interest in new industrial projects than welfare, representatives of middle-class 
professional, trading and business interests filtered onto the town council.  Nevertheless, at 
the outbreak of the First World War, the prevailing attitudes remained those of the 
nineteenth century, although the labour movement, strong and well-organised, was steadily 
increasing its municipal representation.  Although the spilt in the Barrow Labour Party caused 
an improbable outcome at the 1918 General Election, it will be contended that municipal 
politics provided the main arena for the political struggles of this period.   
 
                                                     
39 Butler, D., Stokes, D., Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice (London, Macmillan, 1969); Dangerfield, 
The Strange Death of Liberal England; Pelling, H., The Origins of the Labour Party 1880-1900 (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1965)  
40 Wilson, T., The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935, (London, 1968) 
41 Pope, War and Society  
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Women and girls 
There is a thriving literature on women’s history and the issue of the change or lack of 
change in gender roles.  A great deal of attention has focussed on the role of women, with 
most writers on women’s experience sceptical as to the extent of change seeing the war as 
leading to further debate rather than any real progress.  Concerning the early part of the war 
the women’s socialist reformers Elizabeth Hutchins and Clementina Black addressed the 
question of how far women’s employment was of value to themselves, their families, 
economy and society.42   More recently social and political historians saw the war as liberating 
for women because of their novel roles, their partial right to vote and greater assertiveness, 
all of which it was contended had lasting impact.  Marwick takes the improver’s view seeing 
the war as a positive force Mitchell following on Marwick puts forward a similar view while 
Abrams says women became independent and self-reliant because they were required, or 
allowed to be.43  While some writers suggest management in the home had always been a 
female prerogative others stress the liberating effect of such responsibilities.44  Elizabeth 
Roberts adds that many women worked because of financial needs, but the majority still saw 
their place in the home.45   
 Revisionists argue the war changed nothing for women, to which Marwick notes male 
prejudices needed to change before women’s rights and social status were recognized and 
improved.46  Those taking this position argued the war was a victory for patriarchy, which 
resisted the challenge of women performing a multitude of different roles and tasks by 
hardening the distinction between men and women’s work.47  Braybon examines men’s 
attitudes towards women war workers, presenting an overall picture of the shifts in women’s 
employment.48  She considers that women's role in the labour force could not be separated 
from their primary role as wives and mothers, underscoring the power of patriarchy.  
Elsewhere she emphasizes the positive liberating aspects of the war for women.49   
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 Underlying this debate are common assumptions that the war was a powerful force 
bearing on women’s roles and women’s attitudes.  Thom focusing on women workers in 
London argues the extent to which women's employment and experiences were affected by 
their wartime jobs was limited.50  What changed about women's work during the war, she 
suggests, is how government organized and represented it.  Thom identifies women workers 
in relation to men and their wartime employment as ‘for the duration’.  Women were 
‘meantime’ workers Macarthur concludes pre-war they worked between school and 
marriage; in war they were workers for the duration.51  It was thus representations of 
women's work rather than diversity of jobs that informed public policy and debate.   
The majority of studies addressing women’s work do not formally distinguish 
munitions workers from other female workers.  Woollacott moves beyond previous debates, 
to look at what was of significance to women as munitions workers’ viewing their lives from 
‘their perspective’.52   Differing opinions exist regarding women’s wartime gains, depending 
on whether a historian is optimistic or pessimistic.  There is some consensus that gaining the 
vote was a success, not a failure, Pugh has doubts, describing the process as calculated to 
exclude enough women to ensure they were a minority.53  Robb believes there was a deeper 
meaning to the war for many women; some being politicized through union membership, 
anger at demobilization and interaction with middle-class factory officials.54  Simmonds 
succinctly states ‘in the immediate post-war period the emancipation culture was the 
prerogative of a fortunate few’.55    
 Woollacott argues the war acted as a catalyst for change, providing awareness that 
would bring women’s economic and social status closer to men’s.   Braybon disagrees saying 
the extent of women's war work was exaggerated, as at the end of hostilities they returned 
home or went back to traditional pre-war jobs.  She emphasises as the munitions industries 
were closed down women were conspired against limiting any economic war gains.56  Robbins 
suggests that there was an expectation amongst women that their war work was a temporary 
measure, and this probably suited many women who wanted to return `to normal` as soon as 
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possible.57  Alternatively, Downs contends, ‘numbers’ of women emerged from munitions 
industries ideally suited to mass production.58  Thom and Braybon both agree that Edwardian 
social reform debates fashioned policies towards women workers, adding that categorizing 
women’s wartime labour determined their future.  Wightman consolidates this saying while 
new industries allowed standardisation, trades producing ships and heavy guns prevented 
repetitive production using semi-skilled machinists.59  
An important aspect of working-class Barrow was the limited amount of waged 
employment open to women, and as a result, the proportion of women in the town's 
workforce was small and below the national average.  The dearth of work for married women 
further reduced the earning capacity of many working-class families.  The First World War 
however brought unprecedented opportunities for women, chiefly in the production of shells.  
With the arrival of thousands of predominantly single females in Barrow came the problems 
of management, wages, accommodation, health and welfare, and unwittingly in an attempt 
to introduce extended dilution, unrest.  It will be argued that union strength was a key factor 
in the question of dilution, determining how far its expansion was allowed into other areas of 
engineering and the shipyard.  Consequently upon the demobilisation of women, and with 
heavy industries remaining the chief employers, there was little change to Barrow’s 
occupational structure and therefore women once again represented a small minority of the 
workforce.   
 
Health and Welfare 
 In response to matters affecting personal health and efficiency in the factory the 
Health of Munitions Workers Committee (HMWC) was established.60  Government’s 
approach however was mainly bounded by women’s physical limitations, the double burden 
of industry and family life, and as producers of the next generation.  Harrison argued that the 
primary objective of state intervention was to ensure social control and reproductive health; 
consequently married women were targeted, despite the predominance of young unmarried 
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women in the workforce.61  Similarly, Malone characterized the legislative restriction of 
women's work, prompted by the press and enacted through the dangerous trade’s legislation, 
as a policy of foetal protection which sought first and foremost to preserve women's 
reproductive health.62  Harrison and Malone's research supports a larger historiography 
which argues women's health became an issue of State concern tangentially through the 
development of maternal and child welfare policies.63  
 At a time when the economic labour of young wage earners, particularly young 
women took on new significance the need for supervision was essential.   Marwick points to 
juveniles in munitions factories earning from £1 to £2 per week.64  For factory work 
undertaken by girl workers there were fears it could exert ‘a damaging influence on health, 
mind and morals’.65  Hendrick's analysis of the male youth problem suggests the concerns he 
identified associated with young working-class men largely applied to young working-class 
women.66  While most studies explore the effects of war work on women there was concern 
about the impact of industrial work on the health of boy labourers.  A boys’ journal warned 
amidst war production demands, ‘the boy was in danger of being overlooked as a future 
workman, citizen and father’ and expressed concerns about boys’ low morale and juvenile 
crime.67  
 The HMWC made far reaching recommendations on welfare supervision, its findings 
being encapsulated in two reports and a series of memoranda.68  Records of the Factory 
Inspectorate, meanwhile, provide snapshots of isolated examples of welfare work and 
indicate how lady factory inspectors urged the amelioration of workplace conditions to 
promote health amongst working women.  Independent-minded women however were 
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frequently resentful of welfare supervision, seen as a paternalist attempt to maintain their 
efficiency as units of labour in the sum of production.  Welfare, observed Woollacott was an 
area of professional employment for middle-class women, although ‘what it did for the 
women was another matter’.69   
  Important as the morale and efficiency of the labour force was, there was the long 
term problem of loss of life due to the war consequently the preservation of the rising 
generation became important.   According to Marwick this had nothing to do with the desire 
to make good the loss of life but was a consequence of the heavy demand for labour.70  To 
Braybon the war was a time of great potential, offering an opportunity to make industrial 
work enhance health generally.71  Winter demonstrates an important effect of the war was 
the elimination of the worst aspects of urban poverty.72  Paradoxically, despite a nationwide 
improvement in health and life expectancy Winter argues movement of rural dwellers to 
urban areas, long hours in industry and deteriorating housing conditions increased respiratory 
diseases, particularly amongst women.73  Harris adds, although female health generally 
improved, death rates for women, mainly of working age, rose during the war.74  Bryder 
challenges many of Winter’s assumptions.75  Additional to a general rise in living standards, 
she stresses the importance of improvements in the quality of food in raising standards of 
nutrition, arguing Winter's assertion that nutrition had little influence on the incidence of TB 
should be regarded with suspicion.   
 Early in the war it became clear there was a need to constrain and regulate drinking 
habits.  The first step taken under the Defence of the Realm Act was to prohibit the carrying 
of alcohol in dockyards and restrict opening hours in naval and military areas, Marwick notes 
this regulation was purely military in purpose and soon superseded.76  In civil areas, the 
Intoxicating Liquor (Temporary Restriction) Order was passed to maintain good order and 
suppress drunkenness allowing local powers to limit opening hours.  Following investigations 
into bad time-keeping in the shipbuilding, munitions and transport areas further prohibitive 
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steps were taken through increasing prices, decreasing potency, reducing output and 
introducing taxation and restrictions on spirit sales.    
 During the war and its immediate aftermath, three works were produced about the 
Central Control (Liquor) Board (CCB) and the drink problem.77  The Reverend Carter, a 
teetotaller, yet not a total prohibitionist, argued the CCB was essential because drink impaired 
industrial efficiency leading to loss of life abroad.  Carter’s appraisal of the CCB’s performance 
calls into question his assessment, especially as members of the board co-wrote and edited 
his work.  Nonetheless his account offers valuable factual information.  Less tainted by 
association or participation in government agencies is Carver’s work which provides a 
comparative piece on the subject.  Carver concurred with Carter and D’Aberon the CCB 
Chairman that optimisation of national efficiency and prevention of waste were prime 
motives behind drink legislation.  The social reformer Arthur Shadwell, like D’Aberon believed 
drink regulations were responsible for a reduction in consumption, since elements of the 
community particularly the working-class were incapable of exerting self-control.  These 
contemporary accounts however were produced for a distinct political agenda relying on the 
restricted resources available. 
 The CCB has been subjected to modern historical research.  Rose argued the Board 
provides a demonstration of how control of an important and sensitive area of social life in 
wartime was carried out in a positive and purposeful fashion.78  While providing a valuable 
account on this aspect of the Board’s success, the article is limited in scope.  Gutze carried 
out an ambitious review of the progressive nature of pub reformers, underlining the reforms 
taken in Carlisle.79  He argues that a transatlantic progressive movement emerged heavily 
influencing the course of alcohol reform in Britain.  Jennings and Nichols also discuss the 
Board’s work in historical reviews of the drink question.80   Duncan in his monograph describes 
the controversies surrounding the CCB’s establishment, its successes and failures and how, 
once hostilities ceased, it was seen as an illiberal body whose reason for being had passed.   In 
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his broad study, notably on political aspects of the drink question, Greenaway argued the 
moral framing of Victorian temperance mutated into a dialogue on industrial efficiency once 
the war broke out.81  Duncan adds to this observation while demonstrating ‘efficiency’ and 
morality were never totally separate concepts.  Duncan’s central thesis is that by promoting 
temperance the CCB was engaged in an unwarranted attack on working-class culture.  This 
underplays the social diversity of the temperance movement and the strong socialist wing of 
temperance agitation and the repeated claims by middle-class brewers that in protecting 
their trade they were defending the working man in the face of reformist zeal.82  There was a 
beneficial result as convictions for drunkenness fell and the fact the reduction was apparent 
amongst women as well as men suggests decline was not only a consequence of the absence 
of men on military service.  Elizabeth Roberts notes the decrease in working-class drinking 
made it more socially acceptable for respectable women to drink with their husbands.83  
Roberts points to the cinema as an alternative to the pubs and music halls with their 
disreputable reputations of which women took advantage.84    
 Disruption not only took the form of the curtailment of employment and social 
liberties but the interruption of normal infrastructure development, including housing.  
Marwick makes the broad statement that bad and inadequate housing was a serious cancer 
and became worse in the First World War.85  Yet this was not always the case.  While 
acknowledging there were inadequate levels of accommodation, model towns like Barrow for 
example had high housing standards.  Before the war there was a shortage of housing and 
the enormous influx of workers into munitions areas imposed further strain creating billeting 
shortages, overcrowding and increased rents.  As the building of workers’ housing became 
totally uneconomical the need to house munitions workers forced the Ministry of Munitions 
into limited house-building and the provision of hostels; alternatively government subsidies 
were made available to local authorities or private firms.   
 The war brought a slackening in the activities of Local Government Board (LGB) 
Inspectors, rent controls and a response in the form of rent strikes and unrest, while building 
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costs and interest rates increased.  The disturbances on Clydeside as described by Hinton are 
the best known outcome of a domestic crisis exacerbated by the war.86  Swenarton however 
says that smaller places experienced greater pressures.87  Englander also argues the 
introduction of rent control represented the conjunction and culmination of several pre-war 
struggles and the growth of tenant militancy presented an added dimension to labour 
unrest.88  In the face of evidence that industrial unrest in some areas was linked to housing 
shortage, the government offered to build temporary and later permanent housing.89  The 
State however only intervened when inadequacy of housing had a direct relation to unrest 
and consequently war production.  Swenarton says during the war housing policy 
announcements were used by the government as a pawn in its complex relationship with 
labour.90   In the wake of the Armistice, the ‘homes fit for heroes’ campaign was adopted as 
the major weapon of the state on which it was believed, the future of social order depended.91  
In both cases government action was determined less by housing per se, than by the uses to 
which housing could be put for wider political and ideological ends.   
In Barrow formal health and welfare provision may only have reached a limited 
number.  Much attention has been paid to women workers in the production of shells 
regarding health and welfare but little given to the men in the foundries, workshops and 
shipyards where conditions were far worse.  While women’s employment remained constant 
in the munitions shops, men’s was variable.  This was largely caused by a shortage of 
manpower, longer working periods and the loss of young fit men to the military only to be 
replaced by older, unfit and less efficient men.  Conditions of housing and accommodation 
affected almost everyone.  Increasing discontent caused the Government to set up a 
Commission of Enquiry which identified poor housing as the major cause of unrest.  As a 
result, the Ministry of Munitions embarked on a housing programme to relieve pressure on 
housing stock and defuse the industrial and social crisis, but this may be regarded less as a 
welfare measure than a compelling necessity.  The wider decline of working and living 
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conditions caused by the increase in the production of munitions it will be argued, was not 
given enough attention by the responsible government departments until unrest threatened.   
 
Social Impact 
The social impact of the war has received considerable attention and been subjected 
to much debate, the diversity of society making generalisations difficult to sustain.  Whilst 
some assert the war changed everything it touched, its greatest impact being on the working-
classes and their relationship to the rest of society, others maintain the war bolstered rather 
than undermined pre-war social reforms.92  Marwick, saw war as a stimulus for social change, 
asserting it served to activate processes to transform some aspects of society, although not 
necessarily for the long-term and not always beneficially.93  Accordingly, the disruptive and 
destructive impact of war can stimulate rebuilding and generate new patterns of behaviour 
and attitudes whilst testing a nation's institutions needing to adapt to war needs.   Further 
Marwick argues the greater the population participating in the war effort, the greater impetus 
for social reform and gains for under-privileged groups.  
Reid supports Marwick’s view, arguing legislative and political change resulted from 
the need for stable industrial relations, which strengthened organised labour and generated 
higher incomes, better living standards and improved health. Additionally, working-class 
institutions were reinforced by the increased strength and bargaining power of the trade 
unions and greater government intervention and consultation with the representative bodies 
of the working-class.  However, he maintains the war generated less change than previously 
thought, much of its impact being temporary.  He argues an assessment of the advances made 
must take account of 'the relationship between what was offered by wartime governments 
and what was given by way of social reform in the changed context of the post-war period', 
concluding if emphasis is placed on working-class bargaining power, it becomes clear how 
wartime advances could be reversed in a changed economic climate.94  In a different vein, 
Hinton analyses the impact of the war in terms of class struggle, the government and 
employers combining to strengthen their hand against the working-class and labour 
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movement.95  According to Hinton’s interpretation, social reform (which began before the 
war) was a means of increased state control, wartime legislation being an extension of 
repressive state activity and part of a full-scale offensive on working-class culture and 
autonomy.   
The study will examine the impact of the war on Barrow-in-Furness.  Despite industrial 
and political upheaval it will be seen that Barrow society closed ranks and acted in unison 
against both the problems posed by the war, and the interventions of higher, centralised 
authority.  Analysing the changing social and economic context of the period, will therefore 
interpret the impact of war in terms of the pressures placed on industry, the local authority 
and the wider population, giving attention to methods of working-class self-sufficiency.  It will 
also provide the context in which ideology and social attitudes evolved, enabling analysis of 
their implications for political alignments and the composition of the local authorities. 
 The central themes of the literature review are based on what it was like to live in 
Britain whilst total war was being waged through examining the sequence and causation of 
social changes that took place, indicating their importance in the evolution of British society.  
The main focus concerns the impact of the war on Britain as a whole and whether its effects 
were shorter or longer term, matters on which there is little consensus.  There is little work 
on how the various themes interacted, how they came together to sustain the needs of 
society and of how the home front actually operated.  In fact the issues of transport, materials 
and utilities which the shipbuilding, munitions, armaments and iron and steel industries relied 
are generally ignored.  The literature is complex, with most aspects debated to a greater or 
lesser degree but there is a danger that the interpretations allow of no general conclusion, 
and the situation nationally is such that it allows of few general statements, so a closer look 
at a local level could in fact well yield more concrete conclusions.   
National level debates take little account of local circumstances, and a deeper analysis 
through regional case-studies puts existing interpretations to the test and provides a deeper 
and more convincing understanding of the war's impact.  The literature paints an extensive 
picture of the Ministry of Munitions and the effects of war production and manpower which 
are useful in setting the framework for investigation into local conditions.   Diverse and often 
complex relationships of key issues and contradictory opinions, particularly industrial 
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relations, social class and attitudes, income levels, living conditions and social reform draw on 
inter-relationships which inevitably create considerable regional variation.  The complexity of 
these issues therefore demonstrates the importance of analysing the inter-play of these 
factors to provide an understanding of changing values, attitudes, and relationships within a 
given community such as Barrow-in-Furness.      
The town of Barrow, an important munitions centre, dominated by a single industry, 
experienced naval rearmament, the full force of industrial mobilisation, government 
intervention and reconstruction through the years 1910-19.  Analysis of the responses to 
these processes will give insights into their impact on a town dependent on industries 
stimulated by war.   Barrow’s situation was particular and isolated at the north-west corner 
of the Lancashire coast.  Between the town and the Irish Sea lies Walney Island a treeless 
barrier reef, inhabited by Vickerstown in the centre and connected to the mainland via a 
bridge.  The town itself is centred on Vickers shipyard and engineering works but it owed its 
origins to the exploitation of the Furness peninsulas high quality haematite iron ore deposits 
in the second half of the nineteenth century.  This development was assisted by the railways 
connecting the Furness district with Carnforth and Whitehaven.  However, the transition of 
the local economy from the export of primary raw materials to large-scale steel manufacture 
transformed Barrow from a small town in 1849 to a large industrial town by 1881.  The town 
gained the Parliamentary franchise in 1885 and County Borough status in 1889, but whilst the 
predominantly broad ethnic working-class population continued to expand, its level was 
unstable and fluctuating.  Despite the construction of new docks in anticipation of continued 
growth, there was no immediate influx of shipping and few new industries were attracted to 
the town due to the inability to compete with Liverpool, the region's lack of natural resources 
and its geographic isolation.  By the late nineteenth century the outlook seemed bleak, and 
although the expansion of the local shipbuilding and armaments industry halted this decline 
superseding the iron and steel industry as the main employer, the town remained dependent 
on unstable industries.  Barrow was vulnerable to fluctuations in the trade cycle and therefore 
the town passed through periods when streets of houses were boarded up and soup kitchens 





Figure 1 - Local Area Map 
By August, 1914, the town contained some 70,000 inhabitants  where at the Vickers 
works for three years previous a steady average of 18,000 workers were employed on building 
Foreign and British warships and submarines.  The next largest employer was the Barrow 
Hematite and Steel Works where some 1500 men were employed, followed by the Paper and 
Pulping Works.  It is therefore incontestable that the numbers employed, the wages paid and 
the house rates paid and the houses built by Vickers were so greatly in excess of similar 
engagements by other firms or by the Corporation itself as to make the firm even under 
peacetime conditions, a dominant influence in the conditions at Barrow.   
How has Barrow been treated by historians?  There is some work on the town during 
the war which offers useful material.  Three major works appertain to Vickers.  Richardson 
provides an earlier insight into the Barrow firm, its range of products, processes, company 
housing and factory layout.96  Trebilcock writes on the formative years of Vickers included the 
take over the Naval Construction and Armament Company at Barrow in 1888, although 
providing useful background information it concludes in 1914.97  Importantly he says the 
dependency of the armaments industry on widely fluctuating market conditions, together 
with the government's non-interventionist policy which abandoned arms suppliers to their 
problems of over-capacity and trade slump is particularly relevant, as are the management 
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strategies within the Vickers group.  Further he described Vickers as run by a talented Board 
of Directors with mutually enforcing spheres of expertise not fitting any contemporary 
entrepreneurial model’.98  Scott supports this view in his general history and asserts Vickers, 
aided by the versatile entrepreneurial skills of its experts, was able to meet the periodic crises 
of the industry with advanced technological solutions and more significantly, were able to 
anticipate the economic downturn and over-capacity following the Armistice.99   
Consequently, Vickers looked towards expansion into post-war markets unconnected with 
wartime products and entered the post-war period with confidence.  
The most detailed work is Marshall’s work on Furness essential for understanding 
Barrow’s pre-war industries and development.100  Transport was vital in the moving of men 
and materials and in this regard Robinson has provided articles on what he calls the wartime 
crisis on the Furness Railway.  Andrews writes similarly on the subject pointing to the 
competing needs of the different government departments for train pathways.101  Little has 
been written on the tramways and omnibuses during this period, however Cormack and 
Postlethwaite provide useful information on their operation.102  Barrow housing has 
influenced local studies predominantly by Trescatheric, but while providing a useful overview 
they are of limited use regarding the period of this thesis.103  Elizabeth Roberts’ work in 
contrast provides good examples of working-class life and housing conditions provided 
through oral and documental evidence.104  In addition to Roberts’ published works, previously 
unpublished material contained in the transcripts of interviews with local residents, are 
particularly significant and provide unique insight into factory work and social perceptions.105  
Mansergh’s recent publication work on Barrow-in-Furness during the First World War, 
appeals to a general readership but fails to provide a comprehensive picture of the town 
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during this period.106  Caroline Anne Joy’s dissertation examines the socio-economic context 
of the war with particular emphasis on health and housing, while taking into account the 
impact of the war and the depression in terms of the pressures placed on industry, the local 
authority and wider population.107  This appears as a fair amount of work on Barrow during 
the First World War, all helpful but it still only deals with specific aspects.  
The thesis draws on a range of familiar sources.  The Barrow Records Office holds 
diverse and extensive archive material on all aspects of local authority business, industry and 
military records.  In addition to the wealth of information contained in the published 
Corporation Accounts Books of the period, the statistics of the Chief Medical Officer provide 
details of health while the Chief Constable’s Reports provide useful statistics on the subject 
of drink.  The abundant official primary source material and published statistics are used in 
conjunction with local studies to provide a comprehensive analysis of developments.  An 
examination of the local press has shown the key issues regarding the war.  Examination of 
the national and regional press have been used extensively, the National Newspaper Archive 
providing a particularly useful source.  This archive allows the comparing and contrasting of 
the reporting of the particular issues and events across the breadth of the press.  Notably, 
Barrow is reported on by the local press in many and varied parts of the country, presumably 
reflecting its importance in the war effort.  Newspapers provide a mass of evidence for the 
social history of this period, as the regional and popular press always sought to reflect popular 
culture and stay in touch with public opinion concerning the war, labour disputes, women’s 
rights and work, and the human issues of the period.  ‘The Press’, says Tosh is the most 
important published primary source for the historian.108  Newspapers are an indicator of 
public reaction to the conditions on the Home Front particularly industry and were also used 
by the War Cabinet to gauge reactions to the war.  However it is realised there are potential 
problems with newspaper materials including those of biased, misleading and non-reporting.  
The 1917 Barrow Commission on Unrest commented ‘for the fact Barrow lies in an isolated 
position and it is inadvisable to inform the public through the Press of the evils of industrial 
life, we cannot believe the facts set down could so long remained actual conditions of 
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domestic life in England during the twentieth century’.109  War Cabinet Papers published on-
line for the period 1916-1919 are particularly useful in furnishing weekly labour reports which 
give light to understanding government reactions to threats of unrest.  The Official History of 
the Ministry of Munitions is used mainly as a source of primary evidence forming the 
cornerstone of the study regarding the Home Front and production of munitions during the 
First World War.  Although the Official History is predominantly based on the Ministry’s work 
it includes the large private firms of Vickers and Armstrongs while also providing useful 
information regarding the production of iron and steel.     
The impact of the First World War on the Home Front has therefore been much 
debated and widely interpreted.  The thesis contends that to focus on national issues is to 
miss the thrust of local antagonisms, and that despite political upheaval and economic crisis, 
Barrow closed ranks and acted in unison against both the economic problems posed by war, 
and the interventions of higher centralised authority. Discussions on voluntary recruitment, 
family and society, women’s work and cultural life test the extent to which interpretations 
derived from the secondary literature hold true for the case of Barrow.  At the same time this 
thesis attempts to throw new light on areas which have not been fully accounted for in 
existing works.  By analysing the changing social and economic context of the period, the 
thesis will interpret the impact of the war in terms of the pressures placed on Barrow’s 
industry, transport, the local authority and the wider population, paying particular attention 
to their interlinking dependencies.    The intention is therefore to take the established general 
and themed studies and apply them along with new elements obtained from research to 
provide insight into how Barrow, its industries and population were able to function and 
therefore contribute to the war effort.  This is not a comparative work, although it could 
provide a foundation for other such studies.   
A broadly chronological approach is taken, with each chapter dealing with a specific 
phase of the war but, within that, each phase highlights a distinctive set of themes.  The first 
chapter is intended to establish the complex industrial, socio-economic and political situation 
which characterised the town of Barrow from 1910 until the outbreak of the First World War.  
It will review the administration of shipbuilding, munitions and armaments supply and 
provide comprehension of the character and significance of Vickers, in national military 
                                                     
109 Drake, B., Women in Engineering Trades: Trades Union Series No.3, (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1918) 
24 
 
planning and provision.  The industrial structure of Barrow and its relations between 
employers and workers with an examination of wage schemes and their relationship to 
output and social standing.  The political alliances will be discussed while it will be 
demonstrated that industrial strife was seen for the four years preceding the outbreak of war.   
Chapter two discusses the outbreak of war and how the call up and uncontrolled army 
recruitment affected Barrow’s industry, population and infrastructure.  The two main themes, 
are the need for the Admiralty to complete warships and increase naval ordnance and the 
building, preparation and populating of workshops for shell and armaments production for 
the War Office.  Emphasis is placed on the disruption caused during the period between the 
outbreak of war until the formation of the Ministry of Munitions.  In an unrestrained, 
competitive and diminishing manpower market it will show how industry went about finding, 
retaining, protecting and accommodating labour.  Having shown the response to recruiting 
and provision of labour it will move on to the need for industrial regulation to improve 
efficiency and complete munitions contracts.  Discussion will focus on dilution and relaxation 
of trade rules and Government intervention in the interest of improving bad time-keeping.  It 
will be argued that only through Government control and regulation with the assistance of 
the Trade Unions and employers could Admiralty and War Office needs be fully met.    
The third chapter looks at how Barrow turned totally to war production, examines the 
effects and considers government methods of retaining workers and increasing efficiency 
following on the formation of the Ministry of Munitions.  The effects and implications of 
Barrow turning to total war and the problems of accommodating additional workers are 
discussed.    It will demonstrate the far reaching implications of mass production of shells and 
guns especially on transport, utilities, materials and the introduction of large numbers of 
women workers.  In the process of facing the actualities of twentieth-century warfare it will 
be seen deep tensions emerged between traditional and modern approaches to the conflict, 
tensions sharply exposed by the growth of an interventionist State.  In the interest of 
increasing industrial efficiency the Leaving Certificate which is generally seen by historians as 
a drastic restriction of normal liberties and a most powerful instrument is put under the 
microscope.  Examination of the Barrow Munitions Tribunal will provide insight into its 
workings, analysing the needs of employers and workers, while showing it was in the Trade 
Unions interest to discipline miscreants.  This early period it will be argued is one of 
unpreparedness and disruption with a huge changes of emphasis and a reduction and 
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rebalancing of key workers, while extended shell and guns programmes caused long hours 
and continuous work with little rest or leisure time.   
 The principal thrust of the fourth chapter is the response to the demand for increased 
production of armaments and the conflicting needs for manpower for both industry and the 
Army.  The position of the Admiralty, Vickers and the engineering unions concerning further 
dilution and the debate around it, and the agreements reached are all addressed.  In the 
conflict between industry and the Army for men, evidence will be provided that attestation 
and voluntarism under Lord Derby’s scheme was opposed by Vickers.  The end of voluntarism 
and introduction of compulsion under the Military Service Acts hardly avoided occasions of 
trade union grievances in view of the promises made concerning the protection of skilled 
men.  Whilst almost all Military Tribunal records were destroyed, newspapers provide insight 
into their work at Barrow demonstrating skilled men’s representatives’ position regarding the 
substitution of their men.   This chapter therefore shows the continuing and ever-increasing 
demands, and competition from the Army, leading to ever more drastic changes, notably in 
the resort to women workers, which in turn prompted increasing concerns about welfare.  
State Control of working conditions and workers surroundings on the outbreak of war were 
firmly established under the Factory, Public Health and Housing Acts, but the reality it will be 
argued was different and it will be shown the conditions in the shipyard and the iron and steel 
works were the opposite to those in the munitions and armaments workshops.   
The fifth chapter firstly addresses the unrest of 1917 and the part played by the shop 
steward movement which filled the vacuum left by the taking away of the right to strike 
greatly removing the influence of trade unions.  This is followed by examination of the Barrow 
Commission on Unrest which received testimony on the special problems of the town from 
which a subsequent report was produced.  The main cause of concern was Barrow’s housing 
which is generally held as a point of discussion by historians.  However it overshadows a 
crucial point, that of the relationship between the Local Ministry of Munitions and Admiralty 
representatives with those in authority in London.  The fact that bureaucratic methods did 
not work in Barrow, whereas common sense methods did and failure to understand these 
problems by Government departments and react to them rather than letting things drift it 
will be argued was a common cause for complaint and unrest.  This poses the question should 
Barrow have been treated as special case.  On the question of political extremism it will be 
argued it was not just about pacifying extreme men but preventing moderate men moving 
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towards extremism, in discussing this it will explain why Barrow never saw the same troubles 
as on the Clyde.  This chapter is therefore pivotal and reflects Barrow’s situation caused by 
the war and goes some way to explaining the causes of unrest and the attempts of 
government to put things right.   
  Finally Chapter six briefly turns to the aftermath of victory, political, economic and 
social problems ensuring a return of peacetime conditions was not a soft landing.  The chapter 
looks at what gains were made and who gained them and asks if the town as a whole 
benefitted.   It examines the changeover from war to peace products and asks how Barrow’s 
industries, workforce and the town were affected following the withdrawal of the 
government with regard to the halting of naval orders and ceasing housebuilding which can 
be seen as betrayal of industry and people.  It examines the political position following the 
post-war election and the return to pre-war union conditions and its effect on the shop 
stewards.  Analysis of demobilisation and the return of men from the forces and their impact 
on the workforce will be examined and of whether non-war industries were revived or new 
industries provided.  The widespread desire for a shorter working week with no lessening of 
wages existed, although evidence bears out that shorter hours produced more output, 
employers were not convinced particularly Vickers who needed to push ahead with work on 
new orders.  The move to supply the commercial market was a new challenge for employers, 
employees and the unrestrained trade unions alike and its outcomes will be seen.    
Thus the years between 1910 and 1919 were a period of economic, industrial and 
political change, and interpretations of the effects of and responses to these changes vary 
considerably among historians.  Change caused by the war had massive implications which 
differed markedly in Barrow to elsewhere due to its mainly isolated position. Thus by 
understanding the makeup of the town, economic, social and political changes of the period, 
the impact of war in Barrow will be interpreted in terms of the pressures placed on industry, 








CHAPTER 1:  BARROW-IN-FURNESS BEFORE THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR – 
ESTABLISHING THE INDUSTRIAL SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL CONTEXTS  
Introduction 
This chapter will examine the complex industrial, socio-economic and political 
situation which characterised the shipbuilding and marine engineering town of Barrow-in-
Furness from 1909 until the outbreak of the First World War.  These years were driven 
predominantly by foreign and British naval orders which provided a large and continuous 
work programme from which the town and all classes of the community prospered.  A thesis 
intended to review the administration of munitions and armaments supply during the First 
World War demands comprehension of the character and significance of Vickers in national 
military planning and provision.  Explanation will be provided to establish Vickers and its 
products and the necessity for expansion while recognising other industries existed in the 
town mainly based upon iron and steel.  Examination of the shipbuilding and engineering 
trade unions, their customs and employer relationships will demonstrate how the major 
industry operated.  
An important and underlying issue is that of the demands made by industry on 
Barrow’s infrastructure and utilities.  It will be seen that by Barrow’s geographical isolation 
and its industrialisation it was vulnerable to external unrest by its dependence on fuel supplies 
and reliance on food imports.  There was no national shipbuilding and engineering strikes 
throughout this period however the immediate pre-war years saw the working-classes launch 
successive waves of mass strikes which extended rapidly across the different sectors.    
Barrow's labour movement it will be seen was typically rooted in diverse political, 
industrial and consumer organisations; institutions that provided a firm base for popular 
support in the growth of the Labour and socialist parties.   In a competitive market the skills 
needed to produce such highly technical products could only be achieved by offering good 
wages and through the provision of adequate decent housing.   Workers housing is therefore 
a key theme and it will be argued that a proactive approach was made by Vickers and building 
syndicates while a limited effort was made by Barrow Council in its provision.   The nature of 
Barrow’s industries meant the workforce was predominantly male with a structured social 
hierarchy determined by workers’ occupations which influenced men’s earnings, health and 




Industrial Structure  
The internal structure of the British engineering industry contained numerous 
specialist sections, amongst the largest were shipbuilding and marine engineering.  Although 
the state had a long term history of purchasing goods from the private sector, particularly in 
wartime, it was the contracts placed with private shipyards during the second half of the 
nineteenth-century that put procurement on a substantial long-term basis.  Arnold says one 
of the state’s main aims was to create a warship building capacity in the private sector, rather 
than fully use it.1  He continues, once firms had invested in new facilities to handle a greater 
volume of highly sophisticated construction they had little alternative but to compete for 
contracts.2  It is arguable that private yards like Vickers could not rely on naval contracts as 
they did not guarantee sufficient work.3  Armaments contracts in the years leading up to the 
First World War have therefore been seen as representing the 'first steps in transactions 
between government and large-scale private enterprise', thus bringing about important 
changes in the relationship between the state and the leading technologically based industrial 
firms.4  Between 1889 and 1914, twenty-five private firms constructed Royal Navy vessels and 
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Constructed By Displacement (Tons) 
Vickers (Naval Construction), Barrow-in-Furness 287,994 
John Brown, Clydebank 218,611 
Armstrong Whitworth, Elswick 205,090 
Fairfield, Glasgow 196,173 
Palmers, Jarrow 139,467 
Total 1,047,335 
Table 1 - Leading Shipyard Construction for the Royal Navy 1899-1914 
In 1885, Vickers set up the largest forging press ever made to enable it to manufacture 
heavy marine work in Sheffield, and the first armour plate for warships soon followed.6  By 
1888, the company stretched its tentacles north acquiring the Naval Construction and 
Armaments Company at Barrow.7  After takeover the shipyard was re-equipped and 
expanded allowing orders to be secured for the largest and most sophisticated vessels in the 
Japanese, Brazilian, Russian, Turkish and British navies, making them the UK market leader 
for naval work.  Although foreign vessels built to progressive designs meant they were not 
generally overseen by naval representatives the Admiralty had close links with these 
projects.8  Importantly the Admiralty held option on foreign warships, allowing for war 
emergency purchases.9  Foreign trade was thus not simply of economic benefit for Vickers but 
provided a reserve of wartime capacity for the Admiralty.10  Where Armstrong’s depended 
mainly on naval shipbuilding for its profits the Vickers plant at Barrow was heavily committed 
to submarine work, the basis of which had rested on the granting of an effective monopoly 
by the Admiralty which endured from 1902 until 1911. 
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Figure 2 - Vickers 1914 Advert 
By 1900 Vickers and Armstrong’s had effectively supplanted the Royal Ordnance 
Works as the Admiralty’s main suppliers of naval ordnance and gun mountings.11  Significantly 
Admiralty contracts for hydraulic gun mountings kept the Vickers engineering sections busy 
and in some years rivalled the contribution of submarines to Barrow’s profits.  It was partially 
due to Albert Vickers big naval gun ideas that by 1914 the firm had moved into a commanding 
market position.12  In the financial year 1913-14 out of a total of £643,000 spent on naval 
firepower by the Admiralty, some £302,925 went to Vickers.13  By the end of 1914, to expedite 
the contracts for naval guns and mountings, it had become necessary to engage other huge 
sheds in the vicinity of the docks.14  Further in the interest of working together economically 
and largely in expanding warship building capacity Vickers acquired a half share in William 
Beardmore’s.15  In recognition of the private yards the Admiralty announced in 1906 ‘the first 
business of the Royal Dockyards is to keep the fleet in repair and the amount of new 
construction allocated to them should be subordinated to this consideration’.16  
Notwithstanding, when Portsmouth dockyard constructed HMS Dreadnought in 1906 the 
                                                     
11 Peebles, H., Warship-building on the Clyde, (Edinburgh, John Donald, 1987), p.48  
12 Clark, T., A Century of Shipbuilding: Products of Barrow-in-Furness, (Clapham, Dalesman Publishing Company Ltd., 1971), 
p.52, HMS Revenge the last battleship to be built at Barrow, ordered in 1913 was fitted with 15 in. guns 
13 Trebilcock, R. C., The Vickers Brothers: Armaments and Enterprise 1854-1914, (London, Europa Publications, 1977), p.110 
14 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, Thursday, 31 December 1914 
15 The Observer, Sunday, 24 December 1911, Beardmores built HMS Benbow and Vickers HMS Emperor of India; Beardmores 
also produced armoured plate 
16 Scott, J. D., Vickers a History, (London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson Ltd., 1962), p.56 
31 
 
12in. guns were designed by Vickers and while the prime contractor for the machinery, the 
turbines were sourced from Parsons.17  Importance of the private yards was further 
underlined when the First Lord of the Admiralty said ‘the works at Barrow are a natural asset, 
and thank heaven we have them to supply our needs’.18   
Vickers was central to Barrow and the new work brought a welcome adjustment to 
the earlier downtrend in warship building at the beginning of the century.  Decline in product 
efficiency through lean markets had relegated existing machinery to idleness while poor 
profits had prevented renewal and modernization.  The shipyard had been worked in an 
indifferent and expensive manner with building berth facilities inadequate for rapid 
production, and with inefficient power plant and tools causing breakdowns and work 
stoppages.  The Vickers Director, Sir Trevor Dawson, recorded ‘when the Vickers Board 
received evidence of Barrow’s condition, the concern was that the yard lagged behind in 
equipment compared to other yards’.19  Large expenditure was thereafter incurred, including 
amounts to rectify power supply failings and provide new machinery to ensure acceleration 
of warship and submarine construction.  The outlay was reflected in the returns for 1909 
which showed a record year at the shipyard mainly achieved through foreign orders which 
had needed expanded capacity for gun mountings and large steam-turbines.20  By 1910 huge 
activity was seen at Barrow afforded by the increased naval programme which caused the 
Chairman to remark ‘they had never at any given time had such an amount of work as at 
present.’21   
The specialist work of building submarines had governed Barrow, but after 1911 
submarines steadily lost their power to dominate Barrow’s shipping returns.22  This was 
caused by a general revival of orders after 1909 and the termination by the Admiralty of 
Vickers submarine building monopoly.  The Admiralty concerns was over Vickers inability to 
complete submarines on time Vickers worry was the introduction of other yards into the field 
could affect output as rivals bribed their skilled men away.  Attempting to improve output the 
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submarine department was expanded, night work introduced and manpower increased to 
capacity.  After 1913 Vickers was free to build submarines for export markets, but when the 
Admiralty needed more patrol submarines they found Vickers facilities mostly occupied.  
Submarine personnel and plant had to be kept busy, otherwise the extensive plant installed 
to carry out existing Admiralty work without foreign contracts would have been 
underemployed.23  As part of the general development facilities continued to be improved 
and by the outbreak of war the submarine berths were in a state of efficiency.24   By 1914 
Vickers and Armstrong’s had reached a position where they were working together to win 
contracts in the naval trade, with Vickers securing the lion’s share.  Despite cooperation 
Vickers dominated, their marine hardware being preferred by the world’s major importers of 
arms.  Cooperation meant many arms and shipbuilding companies were interlocked in 
ownership and shared directors, while the Admiralty design and procurement branches 
exchanged personnel with the private firm’s at the most senior level.   
The same maverick spirit that had promoted submarines encouraged naval airships, 
leading to the selection of Vickers as the main contractor.25  Vickers perceiving what was 
improbable today might be essential tomorrow, offered to pay for the erection of an airship 
shed at Barrow in exchange for the building monopoly, but the Admiralty turned down the 
monopoly clause.  Although the Barrow built HMA No.1 suffered catastrophic failure the 
airship provided valuable training and experimental data.26  The question now was not 
whether the Admiralty were willing to take up experimental work with a new invention, but 
whether they could afford to neglect a weapon of uncertain value which might prove a 
determining factor in war.  The Admiralty responded in September 1912, when the naval 
airship section, which had earlier been disbanded was reconstituted.  In 1913 Winston 
Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty and a supporter of the ‘enormous bladder’, approved 
the construction of two rigid and six non-rigid airships.27  The rigids and three non-rigids of 
the Parseval type, for which Vickers had obtained a licence were contracted to Barrow.28  
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None of these airships however were completed until 1917, greater than the time taken to 
construct a super-dreadnought.29   
While Vickers was fully committed to foreign and Admiralty orders, which included 
the production of naval shells, it had past experience with the War Office.  After the turn of 
the century the War Office ordered significant numbers of field guns from Vickers, the guns 
being manufactured at Sheffield and the carriages at Barrow.30  The Boer War also led to the 
War Office improving its garrison guns, bringing work for the Garrison Gun Mounting 
Department at Barrow.31    
 Despite large increases in spending on expansion and improvements to turn around 
earlier problems, Vickers shares were in favour on the eve of the war The Economist reported 
the Company’s shares were oversubscribed and shareholders were expecting good returns.32  
The single concern was whether enough profits could be earned to write off the plant 
provided in excess of future needs.   Effectively control was in the hands of the employers as 
the proportion of shares held by workers was so small they could only exercise slight influence 
on the Company.  Shortly after the war it was realised by Vickers that giving employees the 
opportunity to become shareholders would more than anything else have prevented strikes 
and promoted increased efficiency.33  Kirkaldy however notes that pre-war many employees 
believed that shares were a device to obtain extra production at small cost.34  There was also 
the objection that profit sharing tended to weaken Trade Unionism and labour solidarity.  
Without their Unions workers felt that they were at a disadvantage when dealing with 
employers. 
The effects of the abundance of work and wages was reflected in the increased 
prosperity of all classes in the community Barrow’s fortunes were therefore linked to Vickers 
development.  The firm’s high success suggests in the period before the war industrial 
management was well able to run complex and giant operations, while Vickers superior local 
management with the backing of capital expenditure provided improvements.  Growth was 
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not solely dependent on Vickers management but on the widening and deepening of the 
docks and harbour passageways by the port authority, the Furness Railway Company.  This 
allowed building, launching and fitting out of the latest and largest battleships and was only 
made possible by Vickers association with and financial assistance to the port authority.35  
Regrettably no dry dock was built for dreadnoughts, which would have benefited the nation 
and Vickers as dreadnoughts had to dock at Liverpool, on the Clyde and Belfast.  This meant 
that Barrow’s dreadnoughts could be launched, while hull repairs and refits were not possible.  
Importantly the docks received shipbuilding items such as steel plates from Cardiff and large 
forgings from Vickers Sheffield works via the Manchester docks.36   
The commercial docks as well as being used by passenger ferries and pleasure 
steamers were employed for imports, mainly foreign ore for the iron and steel works and 
timber for the pulp and paper works.  Though coke and coal came by rail, petroleum for which 
storage was provided at the dockside for onward distribution arrived by sea.37  General 
merchandise trade was landed at Barrow by the short routes from Liverpool and Belfast 
providing a varied supply of livestock and foodstuff.38  Though the Corporation had no 
financial interest in the docks it had an important interest in maintaining and keeping abreast 
of Barrow’s staple industry.   This could be arrived at through housing, health and education 
with the likelihood that further harbour and dock extensions might call for the other various 
interests in the town.39  
It was important that the shipyard and town should be protected.  For many years 
Barrow had been in an undefended position, in 1871 Reed saw its port as providing defence 
for the shipping lanes to Liverpool rather than the shipyard.40  Previously there had been a 
Naval Reserve station with two small guns but it was not until 1910 that the naval and military 
authorities took practical steps to protect the naval construction works by building Fort 
Walney.41  To provide further protection an aerial coastal defence station was proposed in 
1913 but cancelled and only in 1914 was an emergency battery constructed at the south end 
                                                     
35 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, Friday, 3 November 1911 
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35 
 
of Walney near the harbour entrance.42  Fragilities were nonetheless demonstrated when the 
alleged presence of German spies and fear of dock water loss prompted armed sailors to be 
posted at the dock gates.43   The classified nature of Vickers work meant internal security was 
vital, the management must have felt assured when a correspondent visiting Barrow in 
February 1911 reported that he was surprised how little was known in the town about what 
was going on.44  However, the complexities of a private firm with a national role were shown 
when Krupp Von Bulow and two representatives visited Vickers in June 1914.45  The Admiralty 
advised secrecy, particularly revealing large projectiles or gun manufacturing, but the party 
was escorted through the gun and engine shops, shown the latest super-dreadnoughts and 
taken to the Walney airship shed. 
The fortunes of Vickers impacted on the labour force, and hence Barrow’s population.  
As a result of extensive foreign and naval orders and the increased size and complexity of 
warships many highly skilled men and labourers were needed in a large and varied number of 
departments.46  Obtaining artisans was difficult, though generally blamed on lack of housing, 
the Barrow News took the view that workers were simply not available as competition for 
men on Admiralty work was fierce.47  Predicting shipyard labour was problematic, causing 
employers to shed or stand-down and later re-employ squads even during high output years.  
As a consequence of labour demand it was difficult to maintain discipline, rather than dismiss 
men for breaching rules, the involvement required in recruiting meant cases were 
overlooked.   
The 1911 census for Barrow enumerated 5,935 men employed in general engineering 
and 4,297 employed in ship construction, comprising 44 per cent of the 23,225 men employed 
out of a population of 63,770.48  Elizabeth Roberts say the Census does not mention Vickers, 
but it can be assumed those enumerated under general engineering worked for the 
company.49   Workers had arriving from Scotland, Tyneside and Belfast, leading to the town 
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being described as a Tower of Babel for dialect.50  By 1911 Bainbridge notes Barrow was the 
English County Borough with the greatest proportion of Scotch born inhabitants followed by 
Newcastle-upon-Tyne.51  By May 1914 an additional thousand skilled mechanics were needed 
at the shipyard and eight hundred to a thousand at the airship works.52  When a mammoth 
floating dock was to be built the Birmingham Daily Post reported ‘manufacturing will be at 
Barrow but the dock will be erected in France consequent to labour scarcity’.53  By September 
1914 expansion led to approximately 19,000 men being employed by Vickers out of an 
estimated population of 75,369.54  By comparison, according to the 1911 Census, 1,485 men 
were employed at the Barrow Haematite and Steel Works, the second highest employer. 
However, on reopening of the plate mills in April 1912 for the production of shipbuilding 
materials, more men were needed with the opportunity of full-time employment.55   
The 1909 Labour Exchange Act transformed recruiting, yet trade unionists looked on 
exchanges with distrust as they were not entirely or mainly officered by the trade union 
class.56  This coupled with the fact that trade unions had excellent recruiting machinery 
rendered their support of the exchanges doubtful.  Any attempts to cheapen labour or employ 
non-unionists at Vickers largely led to unrest and the loss of valuable skilled men.57  Little 
opportunity existed for outside labour until local men were employed, yet men hoping to 
obtain work headed for Barrow.58  Traditionally men were recruited at the factory gate and 
in the works by foremen but in February 1910 the Barrow Labour Exchange opened.  While 
information is sparse the Barrow exchange figures for April 1910 showed out of 227 vacancies, 
221 were filled with 338 applications remaining on the register.59   
Although there was abundant work for men in 1914, the National Federation of 
Women Workers (NFWW) reported practically the only occupation for Barrow women 
outside of domestic work was laundry work and consequently the wages were poor and the 
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hours long60   Full time working however had been reinstated at the Flax and Jute Works after 
a slump in trade, the 1911 census enumerating 474 females, while the Paper and Pulp Works 
provided further women’s work.61  A deficiency in the amount of female occupations 
compared with the size and character of the population existed.  In 1911, Barrow’s population 
was balanced with 33,374 males and 30,396 females of which was 23,225 males and 20,688 
females made up the working population.  Of these only 5,295 (23.6 per cent) females were 
in waged employment of which 1,982 (10.4 per cent) were married.62  Most females were 
therefore in the home or education.  The average Barrow girl was of reasonable intelligence 
and many were daughters of artisans who refused domestic or farm service.63  Many stayed 
at school until they were fourteen while others continued their education at night classes.  
Barrow’s inaccessibility prevented new large female enterprises, however small businesses 
for women were established for example James Tunley and Co were making wholesale and 
export umbrellas.64  
Male rates of pay and earning capacity in Barrow were far and above similar conditions 
obtained in the Lancashire and Yorkshire textile areas.65  In the mills, the fact that wives and 
daughters of mechanics could secure employment was often used by employers as a reason 
for not increasing men’s wages.  Women’s pre-war employment was only accepted in the 
airship shed because the work was within their physical capability and not introduced in unfair 
competition with men’s rates.66    When in April 1915 a woman disguised as a man was found 
working in Vickers timber yard, she explained she needed the money to support her relatives 
and, as a woman access to good well-paying jobs were blocked.67 
Vickers can be seen as central to national re-armament and to Barrow’s economy, it 
was the major employer and therefore dominant in the town it could not however operate 
successfully without the cooperation of the shipbuilding and engineering trade unions and 
good industrial relations. 
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Workers, Employers, Unions and Industrial Relations 
Shipbuilding and engineering were closely connected, many trade unions being 
engaged in both.  The main sectors consisted of shipyard workers, engineers and labourers.  
The Boilermakers Society was the main union organising the largest section of skilled workers 
in shipbuilding while the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) dominated engineering 
resulting in a strong union of skilled workers separate from, and seldom acting in concert with 
the unskilled.68  Good industrial relations were advantageous to employer and worker alike 
and it was essential that arrangements existed to ensure disputes were dealt with as they 
arose.  When disputes could not be dealt with locally they were raised to national level 
through the employer’s, shipbuilding and engineering federations.69     
The central engineering skills of fitting, turning etc. accounted for over half the skilled 
workers in British industry of which 28.5 per cent were marine engineers.70  A further 49 per 
cent were boilermakers, shipwrights etc., trades largely confined to shipbuilders.71  
Shipbuilding and engineering were closely connected, the same problems occurring in all 
branches of the metal-industries such that fusion seemed essential.  Although shipbuilders 
and engineers unions formed protective federations there was no amalgamated 
metalworkers' union and few signs of the need for closer unity.72  Syndicalists aspired to one 
great combination, but craft society members met such ideas with ridicule or hostility the 
large unions were too strong to be broken and fusion into a single organisation was 
inconceivable.73  Combination, craft unions realised could strike at the heart of the working-
class caste system undermining their social condition and weaken their bargaining power.   
 By mid-1894 the skilled engineers were well organised at Barrow resulting in an 
atmosphere expressed in struggles over dilution advocated by increasing technology.74  
Vickers were restricted in the use they could make of labour, this restriction taking the form 
of a rigid limitation of the number and type of operations semi-skilled or unskilled men could 
perform.  New machines, seen by employers as methods of economic production presented 
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opportunities for lower wage rates, important for lowering costs when tendering for 
contracts.  However, the ASE claimed only skilled tradesmen could be employed on new 
machinery at standard rates, and semi-skilled machine operators serve at least a four-year 
apprenticeship.  When Vickers tried introducing new screw-drilling machines operated by 
unskilled labour, opposition was such that they conceded to the skilled men in the interest of 
harmony.75  Craftsmen were likely to be sons of craftsmen, labourer’s children could become 
craftsmen but in practice it was difficult as the majority of families could not afford 
apprenticeship costs.76  Pressing pre-war work however meant that many Vickers apprentices 
were prevented from attending regularly at the Barrow Technical School, training therefore 
was mainly on the job.77  The engineers neglected repetition work, devoting their time to 
more specialised operations with the result that they were unrivalled as builders of ships and 
bridges, meaning that when war came they had neither the labour nor the plant to deal with 
vast quantities of simple turning.  Accordingly, the right to do most of the engineering work 
was the monopoly of a limited class of fully skilled men. 
 Barrow shipyard labourers shared in the stimulus provided for general unions by the 
so called ‘New Unionism’ of the late 1880’s and by 1897 approximately 30 per cent of their 
numbers were unionised.78 In 1899 the National Associated Union of Labour (NAUL) and the 
National Union of Gas Workers and General Labourers became affiliated to the Barrow Trades 
and Labour Council.79   The Lancashire Evening Post reported in 1909 that the NAUL Secretary 
had set about organising the most unorganised and unfortunate section of the Barrow people, 
‘the labourers’.80  By 1913 some 3,000 organised labourers were employed at the shipyard, 
but with their low skills and wages they were at the mercy of the artisans.  The NAUL pursued 
recognition by employers and provided viable member welfare benefits, while strike pay 
allowed opportunity for limited action.   
Barrow women’s trade union organisation can be traced to the Women’s Trade Union 
League (WTUL) organiser Ada Nield Chew who formed a General Workers women’s branch at 
the Jute Works in 1907, which transferred to the National Federation of Women Workers 
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(NFWW) the following year.81  This was a reversal of the Federation’s policy of ensuring that 
women wherever possible were organised with the men and suggests that the General 
Workers were not prepared to continue to provide sources to organise women.  At 
approximately the same time the Women’s Industrial Branch of the Gas Workers and General 
Labourers Union joined the Barrow Trade and Labour Council, combining the forces of female 
labour in the town.82  The NFWW appears to have lapsed, possibly caused by the slump in 
trade at the Jute Works, however in 1913 Mrs. Mills working with the Women’s Labour League 
(WLL) re-established a new branch in Barrow.83  
As early as 1897 shop stewards were elected in the Vickers works.  However, the shop 
steward had no official right to negotiate with the foreman or management should a 
grievance arise in the shop.84  He was not officially recognized by management and the district 
and national Trade Union officials could not constitutionally delegate to him any part of their 
function of collective bargaining.85  The shop steward’s functions prior to 1914 were limited 
to contribution card checks, collecting union dues and keeping vigilance over work practices.  
Suppression of shop floor democracy thus allowed craft unions to take a centralised role, the 
skilled forming strong occupational organisations exercising significant unilateral control over 
labour supply, definition of job territories, standards of wages and working conditions while 
providing welfare benefits to bind the membership.86  At Barrow, the trade union movement 
predominantly represented Vickers workers meaning their officials concentrated on their 
own problems.   
Under a National Shipyard Agreement (NSA) the objective was to provide a means 
whereby questions between employers and unions might be discussed without work 
stoppages.  While the boilermakers had dissociated themselves, a new amended Agreement 
was signed by both the shipyard trade unions and the Shipbuilding Employers Federation 
(SEF) in 1913 operational for three years.87  The separate national agreement signed by the 
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engineering unions, including the ASE, terminated in March 1914.88  There were other 
engineering union signatories to a new settlement, but the ASE by not consulting with them 
left the industry in difficulty.89  The difficulty was overcome when a provisional treaty was 
agreed by the ASE with the Engineering Employers Federation (EEF) to prevent stoppages.90  
That it would take months for complete agreement, meant negotiations were ongoing when 
the war broke out.91  Arrangements by mutual agreement were thus more acceptable to 
employers and unions alike and liable to be kept.92  Characterization of pre-war industrial 
relationships was voluntarist, meaning a preference for non-legally enforceable collective 
agreements and autonomous settlement of terms by the parties themselves, rather than the 
intervention of third parties or the State.93   
 By means of national employer federations negotiating power was strengthened, and 
whilst collective bargaining benefited the trade unions, it necessitated recognition of the 
employers’ as managers.94  While yard owners had the power which came from winning 
contracts, their lack of control over labour meant they were dependent on a significant level 
of voluntary cooperation in everyday production.  Management preferred to leave work 
organisation to the practical experience and intuitive skill of the different trades’ foremen, 
although there was growing insistence that foremen should not be society members.95  While 
performing vital administrative tasks and acting as the employer’s representative in hiring 
and firing labour, foremen could be pulled into collusion with the squads they were 
supervising and in demarcation disputes normally sided with their own trades.  For benefit 
purposes they remained in their own unions, encouraged closed-shops and accelerated work 
by offering generous allowances.  Emphasis of managerial initiatives in the shipyard thus leant 
to a system of payment by results through piecework and the Premium Bonus System (PBS) 
which would stimulate and increase the productive capacity of industry.  
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Wages, Payment Schemes and Overtime 
Wage rates conformed generally to the state of trade, a rise in a boom, a reduction in 
a slump, the last pre-war year of depressed trade being seen at Barrow in 1908.96  It was 
widely understood that wages would be restored as trade increased.  At Barrow while 
working hours remained the same in pre-war years, wages rose gradually, increases being 
made to attract and retain workmen and meet the high cost of living and rents.97   
The nature of shipyard products meant many tasks were organised as contracts 
handed to largely self-regulating work groups, predominantly pieceworkers.  While 
piecework prices for the job were set locally general advances were set nationally.  It was 
largely accepted that wage changes due to ‘general industry conditions’ in the shipbuilding 
industry and not ‘local circumstances’ would apply to all trades in the federated shipyards 
concurrently and equally, bringing each district in line with the ‘agreed’ standard rates on 
piecework and time wages.98  The general award could however vary dependent on the 
general condition of industry and in its determination all trades negotiated with employers.   
In the case of the engineers, in an attempt to escape wage fluctuations long-term 
wage agreements were made.  Agreement existed between the EEF and the engineering 
unions that wage disputes would be dealt with locally and appealed nationally should this be 
necessary.  At Vickers, a five-year wage agreement between the ASE and employers 
terminated on 31 March, 1914 affecting 2,580 engineers.99  While the ASE requested a 6s per 
week increase bringing certain trades up to 40s per week, an agreement was reached of an 
immediate increase of 2s per week with a further 1s in October 1914.100  Included in the 
agreement was a proviso that no decrease in wages would be made if a reduction of hours 
were introduced in the future.101  In turn other Barrow engineers benefited from Vickers 
improved wages, the general increase of 3s per week granted in the district being the highest 
alongside London, Southall, Sheffield and Erith.102   
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Considering the unskilled, a minimum wage of 20s per week was granted to shipyard 
labourers in 1911 by Vickers at a time when wages were already higher than those in similar 
yards.103  For all labourers on 23s or less a general rise of 1s a week from November 1912, 
followed by 1s per week in June 1913 was granted attached to a two year agreement.  On 
acceptance of this agreement the NAUL demanded a general increase of 3s for men on more 
than 23s as this was the rate at other yards.  Vickers refused and 120 men came out followed 
by a further 1,400 NAUL members who struck in sympathy.104  Work resumed when the NAUL 
accepted a 2s per week advance linked to a two year agreement.105  Similar wage increases 
were made with other sections of labourers in March 1913.106  In the Steelworks labourer’s 
wages were affected by fluctuating prices in the industry, while certain trades were tied to a 
sliding scale agreement.   
The system of piece-rates riddled with workgroup customs and special allowances 
was not efficient, what employers needed was a scheme of stimulating and increasing the 
productive capacity of industry.107  The Premium Bonus System (PBS) offered an answer as it 
allowed an additional payment for every unit of time saved on the job, but made payments 
smaller as more time was saved ensuring double-time could never be attained.108  There were 
limitations as it was difficult timing jobs accurately except on standardised machine-work 
such as routine turning in the engineering and joiners shops.109  Additionally as soon as a 
significant amount of time was saved on a job it was retimed.110  The PBS was not introduced 
into the Vickers shipyard during the war, nor was it introduced into any shipyards.  On the 
Vickers engineering side the system was introduced by the Committee on Production, stating 
that the rules of the trade societies which hindered output should be suspended.111  
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 While the ASE were the only society to have agreement with employers on the system, 
they were conscious of the profit motive and contended at times of urgent work men were 
speeded-up leaving them with a diminishing return.112  The ASE concluded the PBS enabled 
the employer to retain from the worker, or part of it, that which would have been his under 
a piecework system.  For the most part trade union opposition remained and resisted the 
system’s application, but united action for its abolition proved impossible and while the ASE 
gave notice that agreement would be suspended.113      
 Given the independence of work groups, difficulty of supervision, and the problem of 
developing effective payment by results, it was hardly surprising that workers retained a high 
level of independence in deciding how hard and long they worked.  Technical workers and 
outfitters on time-rates had an incentive to work slowly and spin out the length of their 
contracts.  Metalworkers on piece-rates held down output to demonstrate existing rates were 
inadequate, while workers who anticipated being offered overtime at higher rates postponed 
work until evenings or weekend.114  Complaint at Barrow was that men could earn such good 
wages on piecework that absenteeism was a considerable nuisance.  Part of the problem lay 
where men had a definite standard of living and regulated their wages accordingly.  If further 
rises outside agreements were made enabling men to earn more in less time, increased 
absenteeism, further delays and penalties could be expected.    
High pressure was seen in naval work.  With limitations on building time and 
imposition of penalties for late delivery, contactors had little option but add to their estimates 
an amount for overtime or safeguard themselves against penalties.   Dependent on the state 
of contract completion and men’s craft, normal wages could be significantly boosted by 
overtime, shift work, Sunday and holiday work and work until completion.115  Rapid work and 
overtime in some Vickers departments became so excessive that protests were made to the 
management.116  When NAUL members threatened an overtime ban, Vickers agreed to 
restrict overtime to 30 hours per month in the naval works.  If Vickers needed labourers they 
agreed to ask the union to supply the demand, if not enough men were available then the 
union would agree to an overtime extension.  On the engineering side, the major societies 
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were not affected by overtime decisions as they were tied to a national agreement obliging 
them to work as and when required.  From 1911 growing unrest and a need for shorter 
working hours were seen.   
 
Disputes and the 48 Hour Week  
When trade was good, neither employers nor workers wanted unrest.  In a time of 
prosperity Vickers could not afford extended stoppages having contracts to complete, while 
workers on good wages realised prolonged strikes brought distress.117  The single extended 
stoppage during the immediate pre-war period was caused by the 1910 lock-out of the 
boilermakers in the federated yards in response to frequent breaches in violation of the 
National Agreement by members on the Tyne and Clyde.118  At Barrow it was hoped that the 
management would withdraw notices at the last minute, but the men were disappointed.  
Some 4,000 Vickers workers were affected of which 200 received no pay, others received 10s 
strike pay for the first fortnight and 3s thereafter.119  Distress was seen largely amongst 
labourers and their wives and families for whom funds were raised through public appeal, 
while school attendance officers reported necessitous cases to the Ladies’ Free Dinners’ 
Committee.120  After fourteen weeks the lock-out notices were withdrawn, the cost of the 
dispute in lost production, workers’ wages and union funds being enormous.  Todd says, 
regarding the engineers, the national engineer’s lock-out of 1897-98 was a factor which kept 
them free from national disruption throughout the pre-war period.121 
 While there were no great upheavals in 1913, such as experienced in the 1911 national 
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121 Todd, N., Trade Unions and the Engineering Dispute at Barrow-in-Furness, 1897-98, p.47 
122 Official History of the Ministry of Munitions: Vol. IV The Supply and Control of Labour 1915-6  - Chapter 1, The Regulation 
of Labour, p.11  
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Year Disputes  Workmen Affected Working Days Lost 
1911, Average 4 Quarters 64 23,446 330,479 
1912, Average 4 Quarters 58 20,221 342,332 
1913, Average 4 Quarters 98 33,172 746,924 
1914 January to March 66 13,603 424,200 
1914 April to June 91 23,061 307,500 
1914 July to September 47 11,978 581,900 
Table 2 - Engineering, Shipbuilding and Metal Trades Industrial Disputes 1911-1914 
National Figures Known to the Board of Trade 
Arrangements existed for dealing with disputes as they arose.  Permanent Conciliation or 
Arbitration Boards existed to which all disputes were automatically referred, while the rules 
of Trade Union and Employers’ Associations allowed for the summoning of joint conferences 
as required.  Conciliation was preferred to arbitration, but the system being voluntary workers 
retained the right to enforce their demands by striking whilst employers held the power of 
the lock-out.  Although the 1913 unrest was widespread and stoppages numerous, the 
Conciliation Boards and Joint Committees demonstrated their value by the small proportion 
of cases referred to them which ended in stoppages.123  Sir Trevor Dawson, in 1913 spoke of 
the mutually satisfactory interests of Vickers masters and men.  When difficulty arose he said 
men approached the management or directors and their case was immediately investigated 
to enable production to be maintained without long term difficulty.124   
 ‘Demarcation again’ was the phrase often used as disputes held back work.  It was 
essential that arbitration machinery was established and in July 1912 the shipyard and 
engineering trades agreed to a National Demarcation Board, the Boilermakers Society making 
their own arrangements with the employers.125  As shipbuilders and engineers work was 
closely connected disputes chiefly occurred between them.  Shortage of certain trades at 
Vickers and the urgent need to complete contracts often caused men to be transferred to 
                                                     
123 Kirkaldy, British Labour: Replacement and Conciliation 1914-1921: Methods Adopted to Diminish Industrial Unrest, p.33, 
in 1913 Conciliation and Joint Committees dealt with 4,070 cases of dispute were dealt with, 2,238 cases were settled and 
291 case were settled by umpires and in only 31 instances did work stop 
124 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Friday 28 November 1913  
125 Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, Saturday 13 July 1912; Motherwell Times, Friday, 26 July 1912,  the engineers 
voted 18,096 to 3905 for the agreement, the boilermakers rejected the agreement by 2,309, to 1,720 votes 
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work that was not theirs, therefore demarcation disputes became common.126  On 10 July 
1913, a strike called by the Boilermaker’s Society caused 5,000 men to be out including many 
labourers.127  It was unusual in that it was a demarcation dispute amongst themselves, thus 
Vickers refused to discuss the matter with their delegation.  It was also hinted that a national 
lock-out would be sought if the men did not resume at an early date.  The labourer’s suffered 
financial loss through no fault of their own and when the Boilermakers Society members 
returned the labourers demanded compensation and on failure refused to work preventing 
the skilled men doing so.  The labourers returned, but by their action indicated they were 
worthy of consideration.   
Self-regulating groups could be cause for disruption, particularly riveting squads, as if 
one member was absent this caused the squad to be broken preventing others working.  On 
the other hand when efforts were made to accelerate ship-plating plater’s labourers walked 
out complaining their numbers were being reduced such that work became excessive, the 
strike was quickly settled when sufficient men to carry out the work was agreed.128  In general 
it can be said that the various Vickers disputes were dealt with quickly and without difficulty 
through the workers and employers organisations.  
Unrest was not restricted to Vickers, in March 1913 with the backing of local unions 
350 Barrow gas workers struck over wages leaving two days’ gas supply.  Local industries 
dependent on gas for production were affected while street lights remained unlit and 
domestic users were asked to curtail gas cooking.129  Using municipal clerks, draughtsmen and 
others, which included an ill-fated attempt to import labour, the Corporation maintained a 
limited gas supply.130  Inconvenience would have been greater had not the Electricity 
Department maintained supply, the workers resisting union efforts to bring them out.131  
Whilst the council used wage comparisons with other towns for refusing increases, workers 
pointed out that Barrow house rents were amongst the highest in the country while the cost 
                                                     
126 BDB 16/L/264 Discipline; North West Daily Mail, Friday 15 August 1914, squads of riveters, caulkers, angle-iron smiths, 
strikers, hand or pneumatic drillers, shipwrights, electrical wireman were only a number of the trade classes where men are 
needed 
127 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 12 July 1913, the dispute affected 500-600 labourers 
128 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Friday, 11 April and Monday, 14 April 1913 
129 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Thursday, 15 March 1913; The Manchester Guardian, 31 March 1913 
130 The Barrow News, Saturday, 22 March 1913; Aberdeen Daily Journal, Wednesday, 19 March 1913, 12,000 customers were 
required to be supplied with light 
131 Yorkshire Evening Post, Thursday, 20 March 1913, Walney where many Vickers workers lived was supplied by electricity 
and not gas 
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of living was greater than most towns.132  The strike continued for three weeks, the men 
returning on the Corporation’s terms, which did not include a wage increase.133   
Under the control of the Northern Paper Makers Association the Barrow Pulp and 
Paper works was threatened by the lockout of Glossop workers, but a partial settlement saw 
the Glossop men return.134  Unrest was also seen at the steelworks, while with 
accommodation in great demand houses planned for completion by late 1913 were delayed 
by a nineteen-week builders’ strike and lock-out.135  Thankfully 1914 was quiescent following 
the unrest of previous years, wages were mainly tied to agreements, disputes settled quickly, 
and the lessons from prolonged strikes were learnt.   
By its isolation and reliance on outside supplies Barrow was particularly vulnerable to 
external disputes.  The towns heavy industries meant they required coal and coke as did the 
gas and electricity works, any breakdown in supplies therefore could cause serious disruption.  
The August 1911 railway strike prevented Durham coke arriving at the Barrow iron and steel 
works, though most of the plant shut down the plate mills maintained production.136  A 
limited rail service meant food and milk took priority over passengers, while general non-
perishable goods declined pushing up prices.  Though the Furness Railway offered bonuses of 
50 per cent to men who remained at work, the Company’s dock labourers came out over 
wage advances.137  The 1911 Liverpool dock strike further demonstrated Barrow’s 
susceptibility when the steamer service from the port carrying provisions and foodstuffs to 
Barrow was suspended.138 
While the threatened 1909 miners’ industrial action caused anxiety at Barrow the 
1912 strike found some industries and the gas and electricity works better prepared with 
stockpiles of fuel.  Vickers with Government contracts to complete held four to six weeks fuel 
supply which not only allowed them to maintain operation but provide workmen with 
                                                     
132 The Barrow News, Saturday 29 March 1913, Amongst the towns compared were Wigan where it cost 2s 6d per week to 
rent a house and Leicester where it cost 4s for a five-roomed house; at Barrow it cost from 6s to  6 s 6d to rent the smallest 
house 
133 Barrow-in-Furness Council Minutes, October 1912 to November 1913, Barrow Records Office 
134 Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, Monday 14 April and Tuesday 15 April 1913 
135 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday 13 September 1913, the strike was caused by the employment of non-
union plumbers by Barrow builders; The Barrow News, Saturday 11 October 1913, by October 1913, forty-nine houses were 
erected and seventeen were one-storey high, fifty houses would have been occupied had the deadlock not occurred 
136 Manchester Guardian, Saturday,19 August 1911 
137 Shields Daily Gazette, Friday 25 August, 1911 
138 Manchester Guardian,17 August 1911 
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household coal.139  Although the Furness Railway held large coal stocks, decreased rail 
services affected some 1,500 workmen needing to travel to Barrow daily.  The Barrow 
Hematite and Steel Company however, being a heavy fuel consumer, gave notice that workers 
contracts would cease fourteen days from commencement of the strike and subsequent 
employment would be temporary.140  In all some 4,000 men were laid off in the town causing 
the Necessitous Meals Bill to be introduced.141    
 Regarding the shorter working week, before 1914 most men were working not less 
than 54 hours finishing Saturday lunchtime.  In their demand for a 48-hour week the 
boilermakers sought to stop overtime completely, but this was unachievable without the 
cooperation of other trades unions.  Not all societies had identical views as the lessening of 
hours meant a decrease in wages for time-workers while hardly affecting the boilermakers on 
piecework.  Other unions refused their demands which caused the boilermakers to change 
their policy to one of fixing local bye-laws to reduce overtime to its narrowest.142  Though the 
boilermakers were prepared to support a call for action for a 48-hour week, their claim was 
set aside when war was declared.  An approach was also made by ASE for the shorter week, 
but delays in negotiations occurred and before agreement could be made war broke out and 
discussions were suspended releasing Vickers from their obligation of reducing the working 
week. 143     
Barrow was of such distinctly working-class character that it would have be criminal 
for the Labour Party not to contest its Parliamentary seat.   
  
Politics 
  Politically the shipbuilding, engineering and iron and steel interests were of great 
significance to the town.  It was seen that economic emancipation and social reform could be 
made through pressure exerted by the trade unions, and the growing influence of the political 
labour movement.  Although the engineers were successful in returning their own Labour 
candidate to Parliament most of the energies of Barrow’s activists were put into the fight to 
                                                     
139 Manchester Guardian, 16 March 1912, Vickers held a 250,000 ton coal supply, the iron and steel works shut down for 
eight weeks and the strike shut the company’s Barnsley colliery 
140 Manchester Guardian, 17 February 1912 
141 Ibid. 
142 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 8 November 1913, Barrow boilermakers came out over  overtime at this 
time 
143 Brownlie, J. T., The Engineers Case for an Eight Hour Day, 1914, Brownlie said workers found modern production wearing 
on the nerves, while deadening the intellect thus requiring more leisure for recreation and development of higher faculties    
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win the parliamentary seat and success was not repeated in the council elections where 
Labour failed to make significant gains.  Returning a Labour MP was thus important in 
defending Barrow and its industry.   
Barrow's labour movement was rooted in diverse political, industrial and consumer 
organisations, which, by the late nineteenth century, included strong trade unions, 
Cooperative and Fabian societies, the Trades Council and the Independent Labour Party (ILP).  
These institutions provided a firm base for popular support, and were influential in the growth 
of the Labour and Socialist Parties.144  Barrow Trades Council was at the head of the Barrow 
trade union movement and the collective experiences of its members changed it from an 
organisation concerned solely with the protection of 'craft basis' and union business to that 
of workers alive to the changing political currents of the time.  In addition to focussing on 
Parliamentary politics, the ILP channelled its energies into organising the unemployed and 
unskilled.  These strong links with the general unions conflicted with the strong craft union 
presence on the Trades Council and generated considerable antagonism between these 
bodies.  By the early twentieth century an integrated labour movement had developed from 
the piecemeal collection of disparate working-class organisations and relaxing tensions within 
the Trades Council, together with greater co-operation with the ILP contributed to the 
development of independent labour representation in Barrow.145 
Through a new political trade unionism hope was seen for workers.  Due to the 
inadequacy of strikes and the growing power of employers’ federations, political action was 
seen by some ASE members and leaders as the only effective weapon possessed by the 
workers.146  Union funds it was realised would be better spent sending members to 
Parliament than on strikes and lockouts.  Following inauguration in 1904 of the Labour 
Representation Committee the first political levies were taken.147  The ASE provided 
member’s money to contest the two industrial constituencies of Glasgow Blackfriars (George 
Barnes) and Barrow-in-Furness (Charles Duncan).148  ‘The Barrow ‘trade unionists and 
societies’ were ‘united’ in returning a trades unionist to Parliament’ said David Graham of the 
                                                     
144 Roberts, Working Class Barrow and Lancaster 1890 to 1930, p.10, the first socialist parliamentary candidate Peter Curran 
contested the 1895 general election for the Barrow ILP 
145 Todd, A History of Labour, p.128, Barrow's Co-operative Society was not connected with the LRC and remained unaffiliated 
146 ASE Monthly Journal, June 1908 
147 Todd, A History of Labour, pp. 144, 186 
148 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 28 November 1910, when Duncan was readopted as candidate for Barrow by the ILP 
the delegates numbered 131 from 34 branches of 27 trade unions representing 8,000 organised workers 
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Boilermakers Society.149  While women were prevented from voting their systematic 
canvassing for Labour candidates demonstrated they were serious for representation.150  
Moreover Labour was in favour of women’s franchise and in support of Labour candidates 
and to propagate Labour principles The Barrow Pioneer was founded in 1905 and a column 
provided for the Barrow WLL.151   
  Following the resignation of the Barrow Liberal candidate the Liberal Party were 
unresolved whether to run a Parliamentary candidate at the 1906 election.152  Finding Charles 
Duncan opposed to the introduction of Protection and sound on education and temperance, 
Liberal electors decided to support him.153  Duncan therefore beat the Tory Sir Charles Cayzer 
on what was effectively a Liberal platform.154  Not only were there socialists but Liberals and 
Conservatives in trade unionism who objected to paying the Labour Party levy and following 
the 1909 Osborne Judgement preventing use of union funds for political action, a voluntary 
fund was set up by the ASE.155  The engineers’ continued financing of Barnes and Duncan 
ensured they both were returned to Parliament in 1910.156  Writing to the Manchester 
Guardian a Barrow resident said ‘locally we have a representative of labour sitting for Barrow 
but not a ‘Member for Barrow’ in the time-honoured sense which is deplorable’.157       
Duncan saw his Parliamentary job in obtaining benefits in which the town would share, 
even if it meant going against Labour policy.158  On the occasion when Duncan spoke out 
against the restrictions of armaments, the Labour member R. H. Rose said: ‘I have no 
complaint against Duncan, but why pass solemn resolutions on the detestation of war while 
retaining in office a man openly in support of perpetuating these evils?’159  Duncan as the ASE 
                                                     
149 Lancashire Daily Post, Friday, 25 March 1904, the Barrow Labour Party represented all the affiliated trades, Trescatheric. 
Barrow-in-Furness Labour Party, p.1, Sponsorship was attained by J. J. Stephenson of the ASE Executive and Charles Duncan 
nominated to represent Barrow 
150 The Barrow Pioneer, Issue No.6, January 1906 
151 Shields Daily News, Friday, 15 February 1918, Councillor Egerton Wake became the representative of the WWL on the 
Executive of the National Administration Council of the National Labour Party 
152 Aberdeen Journal, Wednesday, 9 March 1904, the Liberal Party Association disapproved of his views and Mr. Conybeare 
the Barrow Liberal candidate retired 
153 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 30 December 1905, Nottingham Evening Post, Tuesday, 17 October 1910, Duncan was 
an abstainer and supporter of the Temperance Movement  
154 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 17 January 1906, Duncan won the Barrow seat from the Tory Sir Charles Cayzer 
who had represented the borough through three Parliaments 
155 Gloucestershire Chronicle, Saturday, 24 August 1912 
156 Manchester Guardian, Tuesday, 18 January 1910, the strength of the vote had increased with over 1,000 names being 
added to the electoral register since 1906 of which Labour claimed 60 per cent  
157 Manchester Guardian, Thursday, 10 November 1910 
158 Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Adviser, Wednesday, 1 February 1911, Yorkshire Telegraph and Star, Friday, 
26 January 1912, by refusing to condemn naval re-armament he had done his best to ensure Barrow got its fair share of 
orders 
159 Manchester Evening News, Friday, 6 February 1914  
52 
 
elective defended the workers.160  On the occasion of the 1910 boilermakers’ lockout, he had 
warned ASE members ‘if the employers succeeded in taking the boilermakers down, you will 
be next’.161  But when distress took hold Duncan introduced a Parliamentary notice to ask the 
Admiralty to bear pressure on employers to persuade them to become amenable to the 
suggestion that lockout notices should be withdrawn, his request however placed onus on 
contract delays rather than the boilermakers coming to agreement.162  In reality political 
representation to bring about significant change was limited typically the 1908 slump at 
Barrow found the unemployed in the same desperate position they had been without 
Parliamentary Labour representation.    
By August 1912 there was great strain on the ASE’s ‘voluntary’ political fund causing 
the Management Committee to address the members on its continued neglect.   Not only did 
the ASE have heavy liabilities in connection with Barnes and Duncan, contributions to Labour 
Party funds were several years overdue.163  Following the 1913 Trade Union Act, passed to 
remedy the Osborne Judgement, the temper of many union members regarding Labour Party 
support had changed.164  Labour’s record was not considered creditable and ‘political sham 
fighters’ and ‘nothing but liberals’ were terms oft quoted.165  One worker suggested what 
Barnes and Duncan had done in the House since 1906 could be inscribed on one side of a 
threepenny piece.166  In April 1914 a retrograde vote for the levying of ASE members of 1s per 
year to provide funds for political action came as a serious set-back to the trade union and 
labour movement.167  It was impossible to impose levies, and political action became 
dependent once again on voluntary funds which were already heavily in debt.  There was thus 
no money available to pay the upcoming election expenses of Barnes and Duncan.  The union 
activists realising parliamentary representation was limited made plans to put up Socialist 
candidates against leading Labour members at the 1914 general election.168  Although there 
                                                     
160 Todd, A History of Labour, p.147 interestingly records there is a hint in Tom Mann's Memoirs that he and Duncan, another 
ASE member formed the Workers' Union, in 1898, to overcome craft/labourer divisions by recruiting non-union engineering 
workers 
161 Hartlepool Mail, Tuesday, 13 September 1910; Sunderland Daily Echo and Shipping Gazette, Monday, 19 September 1910 
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was little chance of capturing these seats, the hope was to discard the current Labour leaders 
including Duncan, but before the campaign could be carried out the war intervened.   
 In the Barrow municipal elections Labour made slow progress as there was difficulty 
getting out their own vote.  Alexandra McConnell, a Belfast immigrant and shipyard worker 
became the party’s first official councillor in November 1905, followed by Arthur Peters a year 
later.  These early candidates were made aware of the limitations of a supposedly free and 
open democratic system.  The shipyard and steelwork owners actively opposed the circulation 
of Labour nomination papers within their works whilst promoting other candidates.  Peters 
stressed to Labour supporters the secrecy of the ballot, ‘even if the foremen were outside the 
polling booth.’  Further, the party was accused of ‘bad taste’ when putting up a candidate 
against Councillor Miller who was supported by Vickers, while the Barrow Herald was moved 
to rhyme ‘it is strange that labourers choose, as champions of their cause, men who were 
never known to use anything save their jaws.’169   
Although Barrow was initially ruled by an industrial elite with a greater interest in new 
industrial projects than welfare, representatives of middle-class professional, trading and 
business interests gradually filtered onto Barrow Council.170  A substantial number of early 
Labour candidates were thus middle-class socialists like Charles Ellison who ran his own 
mineral-water business.171  Others were Labour activists like Egerton P. Wake who called for 
the establishment of the principle of the right to work or the provision of maintenance before 
armaments reductions.172  Ethnic and religious divisions also played an important part in local 
politics and a significant section of the Unionist vote comprised Northern Irish working-class 
Protestant migrants who in 1908 swung the vote in the Hindpool ward where Labour lost to 
a churchman and Conservative.173   
It was argued repeatedly that Labour was introducing politics into the Council 
Chamber, previously the preserve of unbiased freethinking Independents.  Most of these 
Independents however appeared on the election committees for Conservative Parliamentary 
candidates.  The Barrow Property Owners Association lobby group who claimed to be non-
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political, held that at all costs the Labour Party representatives must be opposed.174  By 1914 
Labour had a solid body of eight Councillors yet were still a minority.  It would have been 
expected Labour would have continued their advance and gradually won control of the 
Council, but the war intervened.  Not only was there underrepresentation of the working-
classes on the Council but on the bench as of 18 justices only one was representative of the 
workers.175    
Employers realised to guarantee profits they had to attract and retain labour absence 
of adequate housing they realised was an obstacle to their ambitions.  It was also firmly 
understood that healthy and contented workers were liable to stay rather than leave and 
therefore the conditions of Barrow’s housing was important in this matter.   
 
Housing 
Barrow housing was mostly provided by private enterprise with variable quality, while 
Vickers had taken the lead in building its own housing stock.  Initially significant numbers of 
tenements and houses had been built by Barrow’s industrialists to accommodate a wide range 
of workers.176  Hindpool, built to house iron and steel workers was consistently identified as 
the poorest area, its dwellings described as sub-standard, badly designed and poorly 
maintained.  Company tenements were unpopular and generated prejudices as a result of 
their forbidding appearance.  For shipbuilding workers Reid says housing was provided on a 
small scale by firms able to move to bigger sites away from congested areas, however Vickers 
did not hold this option.177  A scarcity of workers due to the inadequacy of housing 
accommodation in Barrow led the firm to build the large Vickerstown estate on Walney 
Island.178  Residential status reflected the labour hierarchies of the shipyard.  Grander houses 
were reserved for managers and villas for draughtsmen, while workers obtained suitable 
                                                     
174 Trescatheric, Barrow-in-Furness Labour Party, p.2, Belfast Weekly, Thursday, 10 July 1913 reported the holding of the 
meeting of the Loyal Orange Institution of England Grand Lodge at Barrow Town Hall of which the Mayor was a member 
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LXIII (1952-53), p.110, by 1873-4 the Furness Railway Company had 194 houses, the Haematite and Steel Company 696, the 
Barrow Iron Shipbuilding Company 437 and the Jute and Flax Company 116 
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accommodation for low rent.179  The estate had its own shops, churches and schools while 
attractions were provided for workers’ leisure hours.180   
The 1909 Barrow Medical Officer of Health’s Report stated ‘the housing of the 
working-classes has no significance in the town, there has never been any difficulty, except 
on rare and temporary occasions for the workers to find homes for their families’.  But from 
here on Barrow would pass through a period of unprecedented and continuous industrial 
activity, the renewed wave of migration being such that the Corporation was faced with the 
difficulty of providing accommodation.  Even after finding work men had left because they 
could not find decent accommodation, whilst money was sent away by men who could not 
bring their wives and families to Barrow through lack of suitable houses.181  Realisation was 
that private builders could not by their own efforts provide sufficient houses.  They were 
physically unable to build enough during boom years and because their concern was profit 
they did not build in years of depression when no one was prepared to buy or rent.  
Accordingly private enterprise built to meet the needs of the better classes and the artisan 
classes when profitable.  Beyond the provision of bare essentials, municipal concerns were 
limited and reflected Council intentions of keeping rates low and leaving housing in private 
hands.182  
While craftsmen were anxious to maintain wage differentials Elizabeth Roberts says 
there was no distinction in housing as craftsmen and labourers lived next to each other and 
paid identical ‘rents’.183  However, it is highly probable that poorer families moved frequently, 
dependent upon changes in family incomes and circumstances.  With a scarcity of houses, 
rents were naturally high and many had realised it was more economical to buy their own 
properties.  Roberts’s enquiries found four working-class families who had bought their own 
houses encouraged by the Barrow Trades Council who in 1904 pointed out that if a buyer 
could raise £10 deposit, he could pay off his mortgage at 12s a month rather than pay 20s a 
month rent.184  These properties were likely to have been of the smaller type.  Skilled 
craftsman and tradesman on high wages wanted new and better housing not inadequate 
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small two and three bedroom properties.185  Such men therefore bought their own houses 
through building societies, private advances and Barrow Corporation under their powers of 
lending.186  While appreciation of lending under the 1899 Small Dwellings Acquisition Act was 
expressed by the Barrow Property Owners’ Association, but Barrow’s socialists saw workers 
being crushed at the expense of the house-owning class as most labourers could not afford 
the down payments.  The overall position exhibited a high proportion of house-owners, for 
instance it was reported in 1915 that in one street with less than one hundred houses there 
were seventy-two separate house-owners.187   
Adoption of a municipal housing scheme to house workers at reasonable rents 
continued to be demanded by trade unions and the Health Committee supported by Labour 
representatives on the Council, but with no success.188  With a lack of commitment by Barrow 
Council to build working-class dwellings, 250 workers houses were provided by private 
syndicate in January 1913.189 Vickers took further steps to erect 151 utilitarian cottages at 
North Vickerstown.190  By the time these were underway a further 253 workers cottages were 
ordered to be erected at the same site paid for by a Government Loan.191   
  With broad roads and wide back streets the town in normal times had a low density 
occupation per square mile compared with other towns and cities.192  This condition is 
demonstrated by Ashmore Baker’s graph for 1910 (Fig.3).193  
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Figure 3 - Population-density Against Population for 1910 
The 1911 census indicated overcrowding was not acute and compared with the other sixteen 
Lancashire county boroughs and cities Barrow ranked seventh.194  By 1912 the steady increase 
in population and the inability to provide adequate housing led to serious overcrowding in 
Barrow.195  At this juncture overcrowding increased, 62 cases being dealt with by the courts 
in 1913.196  By sub-letting rooms, a source of additional income and economic necessity for 
some low-income families’ people were crammed in, many ‘two-up and two-down’ houses 
accommodating a family in each room.197   
 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 
57,500 63,770 65,257 68,523 75,368 
Table 3 - Barrow Estimated Population Size 1911-1914 
From Table 3 the upshot of continued and unprecedented work expansion at Vickers 
between 1910 and 1914 was a 31 per cent increase in population.198  When added to an 
accommodation shortage and a lack of will to build houses based upon previous experiences 
of boom and bust the outcome was overcrowding and high rents.   
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196 Chief Medical Officer's Report, 1913, Borough of Barrow-in-Furness Account Books 1913-19, Cumbria Records Office 
197 Liverpool Echo, Friday 25 June 1915; Barrow-in-Furness Council Minutes November 1912 to October 1913, three 
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198 Census of England and Wales, County of Lancaster, 1911; 1912 Barrow Borough Treasures Report, Liverpool Echo, 
Tuesday, 2 February 1915; population 31 December 1913, 31 December 1914, (Historical Records/R/346. 2/4) 
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Health and Leisure 
Others have looked at the issue of health in Barrow during the years immediately 
preceding the First World War and therefore there is no requirement to go further into depth 
on the issue.199   Nonetheless it is worth noting that Vickers took an interest in their workers’ 
health.  Previous to the 1911 National Insurance Act the firm ran a sick and accident medical 
relief fund, the employees contributing 2d per week receiving free medical benefit and sick 
pay of 10s per week up to 16 weeks.200  The balance of the money collected by Vickers went 
mainly to the upkeep of the local North Lonsdale Hospital.  When the Insurance Act came into 
force the company implied they would cease collecting contributions.  As no provision was 
made in the Act for hospitals a ballot was taken by the workmen to decide to continue 
support; the outcome was that a majority were in favour.  In the works itself Vickers had first 
aid posts and an ambulance service allowing the seriously injured to be taken to the 
hospital.201  Barrow Council also ran a hospital scheme from 26 July 1912, when as a condition 
of employment all Corporation workers contributed to the North Lonsdale Hospital through 
the Borough Treasurer 1d a week or if unmarried or under twenty-one a 1/2d per week.202   
 Before the war most men worked long hours, people arose early to start work and 
consequently bedtime was early too.  Many lived close to the works cutting down travelling 
time allowing for mid-day meals.203  Most were too tired take part in leisure activities outside 
the home except at weekends.  In general the home was not a place for leisure as many 
houses were small and overcrowded.  Leisure activities for the working-classes were limited 
by money so it was usual to seek free or cheap entertainment.  Pre-war launches were 
popular, especially when attended by royalty while the airship at Cavendish Dock drew large 
crowds, as did warship departures.204  Walking was enjoyed by all while the tramcar afforded 
the benefits of cheap travel taking people to the Walney beaches or Furness Abbey.  Elizabeth 
Roberts says few went on holiday before the First World War day trips nonetheless were 
                                                     
199 Roberts, E. A. M., Working Class Barrow and Lancaster 1890 to 1930, Roberts, Working Class Housing in Barrow and 
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cruiser from Ramsden Dock 
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popular, steamers crossing to the Isle-of-Man and Fleetwood for Blackpool while trains took 
many people to the Lake District.205   Great pleasure was gained from pubs by men and 
therefore heavy drinking was a serious social problem in Barrow.206  Spectator sports were 
popular and many played sport in their local neighbourhood, others went fishing, some were 
poachers, kept racing pigeons and hens, or owned allotments.   
Young unmarried working adults suffered least from financial restrictions enjoying 
more sophisticated activities including dancing.  Some pastimes were legal, the game of 
crown and anchor was played at sports meetings, in ante rooms at whist drives, in workshops 
and generally where youths about.207  Music was popular, like the printed word it was easily 
satisfied.  Pianos were owned by better off workers and the sound of gramophones while 
providing free entertainment paid homage to possession.208  Concert and theatre were both 
popular cinema however became a chief source of enjoyment with the working-classes, 
particularly their children.  The limitations of time and money however dictated and 
fragmented the degree in which the social hierarchy pursued their leisure.      
  
Conclusions 
 Barrow’s fortunes were largely tied up with Vickers and the big ship policy of the day.  
Vickers succeeded in their efforts to win a place among the elite shipbuilders and naval and 
foreign contracts guaranteeing continuation of work and full employment.   The condition of 
extended and full work broke the trend of boom and bust and it has been seen that the size 
and technological changes of warships required expansion and the need for additional skilled 
men.  Vast technological changes in warships not only required design skills but craft skills, 
and increased technological changes in the workshops.  Long standing trade rules and work 
ethics however frustrated Vickers innovative methods of production and technical 
management.  The fact dilution was not a possibility meant skilled men could only be 
recruited and retained through paying high wages and providing them with houses.  Trade 
unionism strength in Barrow also meant that good men were lost who refused to join a trade 
union.  
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 The spread of external disputes in federated yards was always a threat, whilst local 
unrest was generally caused by wage demands and demarcation disputes, often between the 
Boilermakers Society and the ASE.  Profitable times were seen and neither employers nor 
employees wanted prolonged stoppages. Good earnings were being made, skills or lack of 
them dictating wages and social standing.  While a shop-stewards organisation existed it had 
little influence before the war.  Though women stayed mainly in the home, because there was 
little female industrial employment, those who found work in the factories formed early 
unions and became politically active through membership of the Trades and Labour 
Committee.  By the outbreak of war a federation of women workers was formed in the town.   
Besides shipbuilding and marine engineering, iron and steel production formed a large 
part of Barrow’s industry, while the docks received materials required for manufacturing and 
much of the districts provisions including foodstuff.   The rail system was important for the 
transporting of iron ore and pig iron, coal and coke and the movement of workers.  Barrow’s 
isolation meant it was dependent on its port and rail system it was not a great exporter as its 
major products steamed away from the port.  The transport links, were therefore tenuous 
and vulnerable to external influences. 
At the outbreak of the First World War although the Labour Party movement was 
strong, well-organised and supported by the unions they were under-represented on the 
town council.  Refusing to be swayed by union pressure the council maintained its 
independence.  The very fact that little or nothing was gained from strikes was reason enough 
to provide a political Trade Unionism however political action for solving economic problems 
were slow or ineffective.  
Health was dictated by a multitude of things including accidents, working conditions, 
the ability to pay for health care and living conditions.  Leisure was circumstantial upon time 
and money whilst welfare was provided by Vickers in the interest of paternalism with the aim 
of attracting men away from undesirable activities.  Housing was a real problem to recruiting 
as the stock was never increased in sufficient numbers to meet pre-war needs.  In their 
defence Barrow Council did encourage artisan housing by private syndicate but there were 
never enough.  Meanwhile trade unions and the Labour Party were aware of the need for 
working-class housing but it was left to Vickers to provide limited numbers.  By the outbreak 
of war there was therefore a housing and an overcrowding problem.   
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 On the eve of war Vickers and the iron and steel works were shut down for the 
summer holidays.  The men were immediately recalled to their work and from then onwards 
the war dictated how industry would be run and thereafter the conditions in the town. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE OUTBREAK OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
Introduction 
 This chapter looks at the period from the outbreak of war to the advent of 
the Ministry of Munitions.  Due to mobilisation of the reserves and territorials and 
the competition between the armed forces and Vickers for manpower without state 
intervention, many skilled men were lost from the company.   The problems of 
Vickers were further exacerbated by the immediate need to complete essential 
Admiralty work and by huge War Office contracts for shells.  Following the initial 
disruption informal attempts to protect key workers were made by Vickers, these 
protective measures were consolidated by the Admiralty and to a smaller extent by 
a hesitant War Office.  Although the railways came under the control of the Rail 
Executive Committee (REC) on the outbreak of war men were lost to the Army.   The 
turmoil caused by the call up was not only restricted to Vickers but to the town’s 
iron and steel industries and Barrow Corporation yet no immediate protection was 
afforded to their workers, the effects of which will be discussed.  New attempts to 
find labour mainly in the shipyard and engineering workshops by various means 
including the recruiting of Belgians and Canadians will also be examined.   
The labour movement was pledged to the war effort and it was resolved 
that an immediate effort would be made to terminate all existing trade disputes 
and whenever difficulties arose during the war period, a serious attempt should be 
made by all concerned to reach an amicable settlement before resorting to a strike 
or lockout.  The worsening labour situation led to the Shell Conference at which the 
Board of Trade proposed, in addition to the no strike agreement, that trade union 
rules and practices restricting output should be temporarily suspended for the 
duration of the war to allow for dilution.  The outcome was the Shells and Fuses 
Agreement encompassed in the Treasury Agreements which were followed by the 
formation of the Ministry of Munitions and the introduction of the Munitions Act.  
The issue of improved war production based around work efficiency mainly centred 
mainly on the question of drink as the cause of bad timekeeping, however lack of 
serious attention was given to the question of workers housing and accommodation.  
Chapter 1 therefore deals with the attempts to confront the manpower crisis, the 
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need to prevent disputes and suspend restrictive practices, whilst improving 
workshop efficiency to meet war contracts. 
 
The outbreak and first months of the war 
 On 4 August amongst dramatic scenes in London and across the country, 
Britain declared war with Germany a declaration that saw Britain swamped with a 
patriotic swell of emotion.  Two days previous the British navy had been mobilized 
and 242 Barrow naval reservists left by train to Devonport, while it was reported 900 
troops had arrived to help in the defence of Barrow, its docks and works.1  On 5 
August Barrow docks were put under military orders and the shipyard guarded, 
whilst 766 men, many of them Vickers workers reported for duty.2  The local 
territorial unit the 4th Battalion Kings Own Royal Lancashire (KORL) Battalion was 
called back to Barrow from training on 3 August in preparation to mobilize.  As part 
of their duties men were sent to guard the Kent and Leven viaducts carrying the 
Furness Railway line into Barrow, however the territorials were quickly relieved by 
the 4th Battalion Lancashire Fusiliers on 8 August.3  Expecting to move to Ireland an 
advance party of the 4th Battalion KORL was sent to Liverpool on 8 August, but their 
orders were withdrawn the same day.  On the 11 August the battalion marched to 
Ulverston and four days later departed for Slough.  Meanwhile plans were put in 
place for the unlikely threat of air attack and the police commissioner proscribed the 
town for both friendly and enemy aliens.    However when Belgian labour was 
required by Vickers the part dealing with friendly aliens was set aside.4   
The crisis in Ulster had loomed large in the public consciousness for most of 
the summer of 1914 and by late August the Barrow battalion of the Irish National 
Volunteers were drilling at Little Park on the outskirts of town.5  Nearly 90 members 
returned to the British Army while the battalion’s services were offered to Kitchener 
for the defence of Ireland.  Not only were there Ulstermen but Irish independence 
                                                     
1 Sheffield Independent, Monday, 3 August 1914, men of the reserve were also sent to Barrow to man naval ships 
as they were completed  
2 Barrow News, Saturday, 10 July 1915, Barrow Docks were under military order and drink was prohibited from 
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supporters.6  Thomas Leahy, a riveter and trade unionist working on submarines 
stated ‘all our actions and work in support of the movement had to be well guarded 
for Barrow remembered the assassination of one of its founding fathers, Lord 
Cavendish’.7  Once war was declared those of Southern Irish origin or recently 
arrived at Barrow on gun and submarine work were particularly careful in everyday 
life.  Those who could get home before restrictions came into force did so while 
staying in touch with Barrow families who remained active.  
On the outbreak of war Vickers and the Barrow Hematite and Steel works 
were shut for the annual holidays, although numbers of men had remained at work 
on Admiralty rush jobs.8  Vickers’ focus was on expediting existing Admiralty 
contracts to increase the strength of the Fleet, while recommencement of 
production in the naval shell and gun shops where work would become continuous 
to cope with orders became an immediate priority.9  At midnight on 4 August 1914, 
Vickers issued a patriotic statement to the Press Association for distribution in 
newspapers, requesting that in the national interest all their workmen and staff now 
on holiday return to work immediately.10  Although the North Sea was closed on 8 
August and the Admiralty requisition British vessels in home waters, shipping 
continued in the Irish Sea allowing Belfast workers to return to Vickers shipyard and 
Irish cattle to be landed at  Barrow.11 The first Admiralty requisitions were of the City 
of Belfast and Duchess of Devonshire, the Midland Railways Belfast-Barrow boats 
taken on 30 October 1914.  They were used to transport refugees and German 
prisoners to the Isle-of-Man and were not returned to Barrow after the war, causing 
the Barrow-Belfast to be discontinued.12  For the Furness Railway, their daily sailings 
                                                     
6 Bureau of Military History 1913-21, Document No. W.S. 660, Statement by Witness Thomas Leahy, p.2 
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continued between Fleetwood and Barrow for tours of the Lakes until they were 
withdrawn on 30 September 1914.13    
   Government’s haste to war caused a rush to the colours of all classes of 
workpeople including young engineer’s adding further disruption to the Vickers 
workforce.14  Amongst them were large numbers of apprentices and in replacing 
them the School Medical Officer said virtually all the boys of the lower sixth decided 
their patriotic business was with Vickers.15  Although Army call up threatened a 
grave situation throughout the first month of the War it was hampered from the 
outset by a lack of recruiting staff at Barrow.  With no protection for industrial 
workers Vickers became aware of the need to safeguard key men and by 8 August 
workers liable to call up were required to supply their names, addresses and 
employment particulars so that the Government could determine whether they 
might best serve the national interest by continuing their employment or joining the 
colours.16    
Vickers directors decided to pay to wives, families and other dependents of 
‘employees called up’ an allowance similar to that paid by Government by way of 
separation allowance.17  Hutton confirms this saying Vickers agreed to keep open 
the jobs of those who ‘volunteered’ and match any allowances paid by the 
Government to their families left behind.18  Arguably these patriotic gestures might 
have encouraged men to enlist rather than keep them in place and as the 
recruitment drive in Furness gathered pace Vickers began to experience a 
problematic loss of key workers.  The company were eventually forced to modify 
their offer of an allowance to every man who ‘joined the colours’ and from early 
September this was restricted to those who were members of the Territorials and 
other reserve units.19   Hutton also notes that the iron and steel works owners by 
                                                     
13 Ibid., p.218, the Lady Moyra and Lady Evelyn were laid up due to lack of crew until they were requisitioned by 
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mid-September had withdrawn their offer of allowances, as the company were 
finding it difficult to maintain production with so many men ‘enlisting’.    
 Following complaints by armament employers that their work was being 
disorganised by the loss of pivotal men, Vickers offered the emergency solution of 
issuing private wartime service badges.20  In response to the firm’s request for use 
of a recognized badge for their men, replies were received from the Master-General 
of the Ordnance and Kitchener.21  The latter sent a letter saying that it was fully 
recognised that in supplying munitions men were doing their duty as equally as 
those doing service in the field.  ‘Industry and commerce,’ wrote Arthur Greenwood, 
‘were not primarily intended as a field for exploitation and profit, but were essential 
national services in as true a sense as the Army and Navy.’22  In the early months of 
the war attention was thus turned towards impressing on employees the 
importance of Government work, while assuring men their duty was equal to those 
of the armed services.  Such assurance took the form of messages, memorandums 
and personal speeches followed in May 1915 by a visit by the King to Barrow and 
Vickers.23  The feeling locally however was men were aware of the responsibility of 
their position and it was their patriotic duty to do all that they could.    
The Admiralty was keen to press for a ‘comprehensive’ protection system of 
the labour essential to its work.  On 27 October 1914 the First Lord made enquiries 
of Admiralty contracts and how their operations were being hampered by the 
withdrawal of workmen.  An Admiralty design badge was ordered and endorsed by 
the Cabinet on 26 December; by late January 1915 they were being distributed 
amongst workmen of military age employed at the Barrow shipyard.24  Additionally 
both the Admiralty and War Office drew up lists of contractors including Vickers 
whose employees should not be accepted for military service without written 
consent of a responsible member of the firm.25 This had an immediate and 
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considerable effect as the Barrow Recruiting Office reported average numbers 
enlisted had fallen to five or six a day.26  Sibley concludes that growing industries in 
the first year of the war sent significantly fewer men to the army than shrinking 
industries, and statistical and anecdotal evidence support each other on this point.27  
Mansergh also notes that Barrow sent a small proportion of men to war compared 
to similar sized towns.28  As the majority of eligible men were now engaged in 
turning out armaments and building or fitting-out warships and submarines, the 
Barrow shipyard became known as ‘the Funk Hole’ by the local population.29   
  In their quest to complete warships for active service Vickers attempted to 
bring men to Barrow.  Appeals for workers were made for skilled men through the 
press in the major engineering centres of the North West and Midlands.  The Barrow 
Labour Exchange was open from 6 a.m. until midnight while 24-hour access for 
telegraph and telephone communication was provided.30  One Barrow newspaper 
noted ‘there had been considerable exodus through one cause or another lately but 
so vigorous and urgent has been the campaign for fresh workers conducted by 
Vickers that the influx is of a parallel if not greater proportion, and yet demand 
remains unsatisfied.’31   
The slacking of pressure in merchant shipbuilding set free large numbers of 
men to accelerate Admiralty work in private yards and Royal Dockyards.32  However, 
Naval Dockyards having entered the manpower market and by offering special 
terms disadvantaged the private yards.  The Board of Trade and the Admiralty had 
a previous agreement that labour exchanges would obtain additional skilled labour 
for war mobilisation or emergency.  The difficulty arose in the terms of employment 
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approved at the Dockyards which included a subsistence allowance.33  In the case of 
Admiralty work the emergency did not cease with mobilisation and dockyard terms 
were not withdrawn. Though it had been intended that subsistence be only paid for 
a short time it continued indefinitely.34  This gave rise to a claim for Admiralty terms 
in private yards and become a principal point of contention between employers and 
trade unions.  Employers opposed a subsistence allowance, arguing it would have 
an unsettling effect on other workers who received no allowance and would 
provoke wage demands.  Conversely the Unions’ argued travelling and subsistence 
allowance was the established custom when men were employed away for a 
guaranteed period.35  The outcome was that men transferred from private 
shipbuilding yards to those engaged on Admiralty work were moved by the Labour 
Exchanges with no special terms, except as a rule rail fares were paid by the 
employers.  Altogether, in the first fortnight of the war, over 30,000 men were 
transferred by the Exchanges to urgent war work, principally in the dockyards and 
shipyards.36 
Although engineers, shipyard and iron and steel workers had contributed to 
the National Prince of Wales Relief Fund to help servicemen’s families and those out 
of work due to dislocation of trade, little unemployment was seen at Barrow.37  
DeGroot points out that the rush of recruits was dominated by the sort who had 
always volunteered for the army, the young, unskilled, unemployed and desperate 
but this is a generalisation.38  The unusual activity at Barrow attracted unemployed 
men particularly from the Lancashire cotton industry.39  But where men were placed 
they were often found to be inefficient and lacked shipyard experience prompting 
the local MP to say ‘old grannies would have done just as well’.40  Not only were 
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inefficient men being employed, but men who would normally never have been 
engaged on account of their bad timekeeping.    
By the end of August 1914 Barrow’s iron and steel trades were reported as 
being brisker than at any other time in their history, yet in the pig iron industry 
uncertainty existed as north-west coast manufactures realised foreign ore supplies 
could be cut off at any time.41  At the steelworks notices were posted warning 
workers that all contracts would expire fourteen days hence and subsequent to that 
date employment would be temporary.   A later bulletin notified workers that the 
earlier notice was precautionary over doubt whether the Furness Railway and other 
companies could sustain coke supplies and transport manufactured items.  The 
recruitment of some 250 men for the armed forces and men leaving for higher 
wages at Vickers was particularly damaging causing a heavy reduction in output as 
furnaces and plant were occasionally shut down.42   
In their demand for recruiting the War Office failed to see the importance of 
the iron and steel companies to produce material for munitions manufacture.  The 
list of trades exempted from recruiting excluded blast furnace-men, workers in 
puddling furnaces, or iron and steel rolling mills, steel manufacture and smelting or 
iron-founding.  When the Government needed all the iron possible, output was 
prevented until additional furnaces could be put into blast and men were found to 
work them.  The Barrow works were left to replace men as best possible, but this 
was problematic as there was already shortages of skilled men and dilution was not 
an option.43  Attempting to recruit men, the iron and steel works management 
posted notices at the factory gates, while a hostel for 40 single men was set up to 
provide accommodation.44   
More blast furnaces required additional iron ore and miners were ordered 
to return from munitions work at Vickers, the War Office also instructed recruiting 
officers not to take iron ore miners and undertook to return men who had joined 
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the army.  With labour shortages steel workers asked for a 6s per week increase to 
be submitted to arbitration.45  The response was the granting of a war bonus of 6d 
per shift where men’s wages did not exceed 50s per week and for boys 3d per shift 
representing an advance of 3s weekly to the men and 1s 6d to boys.46  Furnace-
men’s wages however were tied to a sliding scale and when pig-iron prices rose in 
April 1915 they obtained the substantial advance of 22¾ per cent.47  As a result of 
negotiations between the Barrow Hematite Company and their locally owned iron 
ore mine managers the men’s wages were increased and if needed miners or slate 
quarrymen, including men from North Wales would be found work in the area.48  It 
was not until June 1915 that the Ministry of Munitions turned its attention to the 
industry when a committee of steelmakers was appointed.   
In common with many other railway companies the Furness Railway found 
itself squeezed between the call up and enlistment of men at a time when the 
demands of its workforce were unprecedented.49  Though Government control of 
the railways took place on the outbreak of war this did not prevent the Company 
losing men to military service and Vickers.50  Some 515 men left for the services 
throughout the war, equal to 18 per cent of the workforce on 4 August 1914.51  To 
offset the drain of essential personnel, Belgians were employed at the engineering 
works and females as clerks, ticket collectors and carriage upholsterers.52  
Government control however added to the Company’s problems throughout 
the war.  Although the railway companies continued managing their own systems as 
previously, they were subject to an increasing number of Railway Executive 
Committee (REC) orders.  During 1915 alone 527 instructions and circular letters 
were received which involved considerable amounts of labour in the general 
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52 Barrow Records Office, List of girls working for the Furness Railway 1916-18 
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manager’s offices at Barrow and other departments concerned.53 The vastly 
increased levels of rail traffic into and out of the shipyard and engineering works 
caused problems of management, while at the railway owned docks time was lost 
in unloading causing unshipped goods piled at the wharves until railway wagons 
were available.54  These difficulties were particularly notable in the case of iron ore 
cargoes which needed experienced labour to unload them. 
Kitchener had not only appealed to the public for men for the army but to 
local authorities to supply labour for munitions.55 In his appeal the need to protect 
Corporation workers of recruitment age required to provide essential utilities and 
services was ignored.  The war as well as having an impact on Barrow Corporation 
as a major employer caused a knock-on effect by reducing local authority activities.  
As the war progressed its impact through the removal of staff and workers become 
evident as labour was economised in various departments causing the elderly to be 
retained for such work as street cleaning.56  Arthur Race the borough engineer and 
surveyor indicated the effects of providing men for Vickers.57  Regarding refuse 
collection, he said in normal times ash pits were emptied once a week in summer 
but owing to the increased population and staff reduction, collection was every 
three weeks.58  Householders were asked to burn refuse as far as practicable to 
reduce scavenging, while the refuse destructor plant was kept going as the 
alternative was to tip refuse on the fields requiring additional transport and labour 
whilst providing a health hazard.59  By February 1916 Sunday labour was sanctioned 
                                                     
53 Third General Meeting of the Furness Railway Company, Thursday, 17 February 1916; Lancashire Evening Post, 
Saturday, 24 February 1917 reported 877 circulars had been received by the general managers department from 
the REC involving instructions to staff and numerous enquiries 
54 Ibid. 
55 Manchester Evening News, Thursday, 29 April 1915, Kitchener asked for men to augment the supply of fitters, 
millwrights, machine hands, and skilled or unskilled labour, it was suggested in replacing men active and strong 
women and old men might be used 
56 Barrow Records Office, Borough Engineer and Surveyor Letter dated 29 April 1915, maintenance of sewerage 
gang could be cut from 14 to 8, public park from 15 to 8 men, normally 60 men were employed on the repair of 
streets and footpaths now reduced to 39 elderly men, 30 men was considered the minimum; Newcastle Journal, 
Wednesday, 12 May 1915 when Barrow elementary schools closed due to an influenza epidemic, two male 
teachers enlisted, two went into the shell shops, while the rest entered the Corporations understaffed 
departments; Western Press, Wednesday, 23 June 1915, a Methodist minister was working full time in Vickers 
gun shop but was continuing his ministerial duties Sundays  
57 Barrow Records Office, Borough Engineer and Surveyor Letter dated 29 April 1915 
58 Joy, War and Unemployment, p.82, she says that this posed a real health threat but fails to say what actions 
were taken 
59 The Barrow News, Saturday, 3 July 1915 Complaints were made by property owners when the rates were 
increased, it was reported the municipal debt was £1.25 million on which ever increasing interest was paid 
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to overcome the refuse difficulty it was also decided the collection of trade refuse 
be discontinued, but this was strongly opposed by some tradesmen councillors.  The 
LGB was also requested to insist on the inclusion of workmen amongst the reserved 
occupations to enable the local authority to maintain a sanitary service at a 
reasonable standard of safety and efficiency.  The Electrical Department meanwhile 
complained that the number of changes in staff had been exceptionally large, adding 
considerably to the difficulties of carrying out work in the department.  Although the 
extraordinary demands were met with a willing and loyal response from permanent 
staff members, it was said many temporary men did not show the same willingness 
to do their share in carrying out the work of the country.60   
War service meant not only labour for munitions production but the erection 
of workmen’s dwellings and munitions buildings, further Lloyd George also asked for 
economies to release resources for the war.61  Local authorities were instructed to 
sanction expenditure only for the war, public health or other urgent purposes.  As a 
consequence capital expenditure by Barrow Corporation was restricted to essential 
services and projects, resulting in a number of private building schemes being halted 
and public works suspended including construction of new police and magistrates’ 
courts and two schools accommodating 1,000 children.62   
By the outbreak of war the Barrow Labour Party was deeply divided into far 
left 'pacifists' and those supporting the government in its full prosecution.  The 
Industrial Committee of the local Trades Party saw the working-classes being best 
served by the Labour Party devoting its time and attention to the needs of the 
working-classes rather than acting as agents of a capitalist government.63  Charles 
Duncan the local MP, chose to support the government addressing working people 
as a member of the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee.64  In an attempt to recruit 
                                                     
60 Barrow-in-Furness Accounts Book 1914-15 - Electrical Engineers Report for Year Ending 31 March 1915 
61 National Federation of Building Trade Employers Minutes, 9 June 1915, Vickers munitions plant at Barrow was 
reported as one of the most aggressive labour poachers; Dearle, N.B., An Economic Chronicle of the Great War 
for Great Britain and Ireland,1914-1919, (London, Oxford University Press, 1929), p.9   
62 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 23 December 1916, evidence suggests that two new schools did open as 
the newspaper said tenders had been accepted for furnishing of the new Ocean Road and Victoria Schools; 
Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 11 December 1915, the cost of schools for the previous year 
came to £176,737; the Corporation spent £170,750 on the gas works, £158,480 on the electricity works and the 
waterworks had cost £433,482 
63 BDSO 7-1 Minutes of the Barrow Labour Party and Trades Council Minutes, Thursday, 11 February 1915 
64 Manchester Evening News, Saturday 3 October 1914 
 73  
experienced NCO’s Duncan became a signatory to an appeal to trade unionist ex-
NCO’s to re-enlist and train fellow trade unionists and others who had responded 
to the call.65  These were exactly the experienced men industry need to keep, men 
qualified to undertake duties of shop floor superintendence and whose removal 
meant additional work and fatigue for those left behind.66  The Burnley News 
reported that men who had visited Barrow said there was no supervision and work 
was not getting done.67   
Mobilization and recruitment thinned the ranks of workers creating a 
shortage of skilled men and those qualified to undertake duties of superintendence 
and management.68  Additionally facilitating delivery of Admiralty contracts created 
conditions where it was impossible to obtain all the skilled and semi-skilled labour 
needed.  Employers and the Board of Trade believed from the outset that the supply 
of skilled men would not match demand and in an attempt to resolve the problem 
employers emphasised the necessity to suspend trade union restrictions and 
demarcation rules.  Trade unions on the other hand believed labour could be 
provided by other means without sacrificing their practices.  
 
New Attempts to Find Labour 
 Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, suggested it would be far more 
fruitful concentrating the labour force on Government work, as opposed to 
merchant ship work. He suggested that the same principle successfully applied to 
the railways should be extended to shipbuilding.69  The trade union leaders believed 
such a transference from merchant work would fulfil the deficiency for shipbuilding; 
and since merchant shipbuilding was the key to many minor industries, a similar 
                                                     
65 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Thursday 17 September 1914  
66 Barrow News, Saturday 10 April 1915, If foremen overslept they could come in at 6.30 a.m. or 6.45 a.m. where 
a worker lost a quarter after 6.15 a.m., many foreman a source of irritation to workers; BDSO 85/1/4 Barrow 
Working Men’s Club and Institute Minutes, the Mayor sent a notice regarding the recruiting of NCO’s for the 
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67 The Burnley News, Saturday 1 May 1915 
68 Board of Trade Report on the State of Employment in the United Kingdom, July 1915, Part I, p.3, by October 
1914 the engineering trade group generally had lost 12.2 per cent of the male pre-war workers, by February 
1915 this proportion rose to 16.4 per cent. 
69 OHMoM, Vol. I, Industrial Mobilisation 1914-15, Pt. II The Treasury Agreement, Chapter II Supply of Armament 
Labour, p.62 
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transference could be made to where the War Office needed labour.  Although 
contemplated by the government in February 1915 the idea was dropped.   
Fresh labour was now to be supplied from unemployed engineering workmen 
through the labour exchanges.  On 4 January 1915 the exchanges became recruiting 
centres for armament firms, and managers were instructed to bring armaments 
vacancies to the notice of suitable men signing on or drawing benefit.70  The 
problem was that unemployed men were the least skilled and efficient, whereas 
Vickers needed highly skilled men.  Trade union strength meant dilution was not an 
option and union members were preferred by employers in the interest of 
harmony.71  Indeed the skilled trade unions engaged their own men, the South 
Wales Steel Smelters Society for example provided unemployed skilled labour for 
Vickers at Barrow.72  A further difficulty was men were scattered around the country 
in small numbers and it was unlikely the majority with wives and families would 
move to Barrow with its housing problems.   It became evident the demand could 
not be met from the reserve of unemployed and it would be necessary to compel 
men engaged in ordinary engineering.  
Diversion of labour from ordinary engineering to government work was hardly 
productive.  Many engineering companies preferred armament work to be spread 
rather than diverting their skilled men to earn high profits for Armstrong’s and 
Vickers.73  This did not deter the large armament firms from using enticement.  The 
shortage of skilled men led to attempts on all sided to attract labour by advertising, 
using canvassing agents or by offers of higher wages.  Typically the Halifax 
Association of Engineering Employers complained that Vickers and Armstrong’s 
were using representatives to entice their men.74  In attempting to prevent 
enticement the Defence of the Realm Act was used but proving inducement made 
                                                     
70 C. O. Circular 1700 (4/1/15) 
71 CAB 24/55/100 Labour Position in Munition Industries, 26 June 1918, so strong and successful was the 
pressure applied by the unions that of the 35,000 workers employed at Vickers during the war only 60 or 70 
were non-unionists 
72 Western Mail, Thursday, 15 April 1915, these were men recruited amongst unemployed tin-workers sent in 
batches to be employed on munitions at £3 per week 
73 OHMoM, Vol.1 Industrial Mobilisation 1914-15, Pt. III The Armaments Output Committee, Ch. I Beginnings of 
Local Organisations, p.4 
74 OHMoM, Vol. I Industrial Mobilisation 1914-15, Pt. III The Armaments Output Committee, Ch.5 Central 
Organisation, p.95; The Manchester Guardian, Wednesday, 16 December 1914, Vickers advertising for 
coppersmiths offered 41s for 53 hours; a bonus of 25 per cent to 33 per cent of wages and permanency there 
were no offers of rail fares, subsistence allowance or housing 
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the measure ineffective.75  Another solution to the manpower shortage was the 
recruiting of Belgian refugees. 
Sir Trevor Dawson making a big effort on behalf of Vickers to get hold of 
Belgian labour had been frustrated in obtaining skilled men through Holland.76  As 
the labour exchanges were able to give priority to suitable British labour, Admiralty 
and War Office contractors were to obtain Belgian labour through them.  Lists of 
vacancies were made by the armament firms and labour applications compared 
against a live register of Belgians not of military age or exempt from service.  To 
dispel anxieties about migrant refugee workers being exploited or used to drive 
down wages, employment conditions were to be as good as those offered to British 
labour, which was not to be displaced.  Once employed, newspapers reported 
Belgians were working well alongside British workmen, but this was not the case as 
initially Belgian engineers were not welcomed by the Barrow ASE and seen as a 
menace due to their ignorance of trade unionism.77  They were perceived as 
displacing workers, and while ASE members were sent to fight, Belgium men of 
serviceable age were in fact taking their places.78  Language was a major problem 
and only when interpreters were found was it possible to ascertain the feelings 
amongst them and discover their qualifications and wage rates.  It was discovered 
many had been shop stewards and members of Belgium’s largest trade union and 
were therefore anxious to join the ASE which made them acceptable.79  Results 
achieved for Vickers by the ‘Board of Trade’ campaign for supplying labour, whether 
unemployed or diverted from private work are provided in Table 4.80   However the 
demand continued and a fortnight later the labour requirements of the Royal 
                                                     
75 OHMoM, Vol. I Industrial Mobilisation 1914-15, Pt. III The Armaments Output Committee, Ch.5 Central 
Organisation, p.94 
76 OHMoM, Vol.1 Industrial Mobilisation 1914-15, Pt. I Munitions Supply, Ch. V Need for Reinforcement, p.124; 
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as Starting Work 
Total 
601 913 273 179 1,966 
Table 4 – Board of Trade Results for Vickers, Barrow to 31 January 1915 
In early February 1915 it was reported that ‘originally a small party of Belgians were 
employed at Vickers and the experiment having proved satisfactory further workers 
were requested and now 900 were employed by the firm.’82   
In Canada there were thousands of unemployed men of which a considerable 
proportion were ex-employees of Woolwich Arsenal, Government Dockyards and 
armament firms, men willing to come to England to form an industrial reserve.83  
Suitable men could be found but neither Woolwich, the Government Dockyards nor 
the private firms notably Vickers and Armstrongs favoured the proposal.84  The 
grounds of opposition were that the introduction of such labour would be liable to 
cause trouble with their employees; the difficulty of securing suitable men, since the 
best were likely to go to the United States; and a preference for placing munitions 
orders in Canada rather than withdrawing labour.  Vickers changed their minds, 
conceivably because their Montreal yard was not fully employed having built ten H 
Class submarines which were close to completion.85  On 10 May 1915, Vickers 
Barrow management wrote to the head office in London saying they had already 
made arrangements with the ASE to send through their Canadian agents 
                                                     
81 Ibid. 
82 The Times, Monday, 8 February 1915; Leamington Spa Courier, Friday, 12 February 1915; Cumbria Archives 
Catalogue (CASCAT), Belgian Refugees in West Cumbria, though Belgians lived in Barrow, in January 1915 Millom 
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considerable numbers of workmen.86  Additionally Canadians above enlistment age 
were recruited by the Board of Trade and allocated to Barrow some of which the 
ASE found were not Society members.87   
The terms of engagement were unclear.  A guarantee of six months’ work 
was given for which men had to remain at their work post, however return fares 
were to be paid by the employer to those who remained as long as they were 
needed for Government work.88  While a leaving certificate was not required on 
completion of contract to return to Canada, Vickers needing all available men were 
apt to refuse certificates to men wanting to work elsewhere letting them take their 
appeals to the Munitions Tribunal.89  When a number of Canadians were refused 
certificates things were brought to a head.90   On appeal it was held they were 
entitled on expiry of the contracted six months to obtain certificates unless the 
employer had reasonable grounds for withholding them and the Munitions Tribunal 
should have considered this.  The workmen were therefore entitled to a re-hearing 
if they wanted one.  On completing their contracts they had to apply for a passport, 
the declaration form having to be signed by either a magistrate, doctor or religious 
minster who knew the applicant.  This was altered in February 1916 when the 
Foreign Office declared that the form could be signed by a Vickers manager or other 
responsible official.91   
The Canadians’ view of Vickers is revealing, one worker complained ‘we do 
not know where to get material, cannot borrow tools which should be supplied and 
                                                     
86 OHMoM, Vol. I, Pt. II, Ch. I, p.20 
87 Liverpool Echo, Tuesday 7 September 1915, at Barrow Munitions Tribunal a Canadian complained that he was 
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without exaggeration the firm was a hundred years behind the times.’92  Canadian 
engineers were unlikely to volunteer to work in Britain when such reports reached 
back across the Atlantic, in truth numbers were limited by armaments contracts 
being placed in Canada.  The fact that Canadians were allowed to return home from 
Barrow or to seek munitions work elsewhere in Britain does not allow for reliable 
statistics.  Problems of distance, transport and testing of applicants meant skilled 
men from other Commonwealth countries were initially declined.  Australians 
whose passages, subsistence allowance and unemployment pay were later arranged 
with the Australian Government arrived at Barrow in their low hundreds in 1916.93   
A common factor regarding many Belgian and Commonwealth workers seems to be 
that they were doing work which they were unaccustomed too indicating that 
Vickers were filling jobs as best as they could. 
At the start of 1915 the principle of releasing men from the colours needed 
for indispensable industrial work was accepted by the War Office.  Getting back men 
from the army proved difficult as many had left the country while others claimed 
they were engineers when they were not.94  To assist the War Office a Government 
circular was sent to engineering firms to supply names of men who had enlisted 
along with their units.  Once the names became available steps were taken to return 
them however men were released not discharged and if required Kitchener could 
recall them to utilise their military training.95  In the spring of 1915 over 300 men 
from the Kings Own Royal Lancaster Regiment returned to the Barrow shipyard 
disrupting the regiments war service preparations.  In response a new recruitment 
drive focused on parts of Lancashire not affected by the needs of the defence 
industries for key workers. 96   
Waites says the immense transfer of workers from one occupation to 
another and one district to another, accustomed individuals to wages they would 
have never commanded in their original occupations giving them new conceptions 
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of their economic value.97  Better conditions of work occasionally offered by 
different firms merely resulted in the circulation of men from yard-to-yard and 
consequent disorganisation of work occasioned by constant change of each firm’s 
employees.  In three Vickers works, the number of men leaving their employment 
during April and May 1915 amounted to nearly 50 per cent recruited in the same 
period.98   
Generally, wage increases were secured where labour need was greatest 
and backed by organisation.  With employers desperate to attract and complete 
contracts a widespread chaotic bidding-up of wage rates took place resulting in a 
free-for-all to the detriment of the supply departments.  Allegations were made that 
the reasons Vickers could not obtain sufficient men, and why they were continually 
losing them was because they did not pay them highly and they had ‘a bad name’ 
amongst the workers.  When Sydney Smith a government officer visited Barrow he 
found the allegations were false and overall the opinion was that Vickers was an 
extremely good shop.99    
With wages stationary, the sharp rise in the cost of living had led to workers 
demanding increases.  In February 1915, the industrial truce was broken when 
unprecedented wage advances were secured by workers whose labour was critical 
for war purposes.  At Vickers the ASE demanded 6s on their current wages while the 
steam engine makers patriotically refused to endorse the demand having vowed not 
to strike throughout the war.100  By a large majority the engineers accepted the offer 
of 3s per week affecting some 6,000 out of approximately 10,000 engineers.  
Turners now received 43s, fitters, coppersmiths and blacksmiths 42s, machinists 39s 
and capstan hands 36s.101  This was shortly followed as over 12,000 labourers 
accepted a 4s a week increase on time-rates and 10 per cent on piece-rates, having 
demanded 5s and 15 per cent respectively, the terms were to remain undisturbed 
for twelve-months.102  Importantly the conditions provided for the trade unions 
concerned to cooperate with Vickers in remedying the excessive time-losing by 
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workmen.103  In general the cost of labour was higher than would be expected, 
recognised rates as incentives were added to prevent men leaving.104  The question 
was whether a form of control or motive not purely financial in character could be 
effectively substituted.  The answer would be sensible labour control by the 
Government introduced under the Munitions of War Act.    
Whilst most Vickers men were busy on Admiralty and marine engineering 
work, large factory extensions were being built to meet the huge new contracts for 
artillery and shell production.    
 
Gun and Shell Production 
In the five years previous to the war the bulk of army supplies had come from 
the Royal Ordnance Factories, but the factories could not greatly expand their 
output and the immense increase had to be got from armaments firms, mainly 
Armstrongs, Vickers, the Coventry Ordnance Works and Beardmores.  The private 
manufacturers were looked upon as ‘maids of all work’ on whom demands for guns 
and shells could be made, thus the planning for total war placed the new burdens 
squarely on their shoulders.105   
Vickers had limited experience as suppliers to the War Office but suddenly 
the company was overwhelmed with demands.  By the end of October 1914 the 
Company had agreed to undertake a total of 1,010 18 pounder guns and do their 
best to produce 1,000 before 1 July 1915.106  The firm however would not quote 
rates of delivery in excess of the 640 guns they had promised at a conference on 13 
October.  As the firm was keeping fairly up-to-date with deliveries a continuation 
order for 450 18-pounder guns was sent to Vickers in January 1915.107  Barrow 
                                                     
103 Manchester Evening News, Monday, 15 March 1915, it was proposed to provide a printed notice in the works 
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106 OHMoM, Vol. I, Industrial Mobilisation 1914-15, Pt I Munitions Supply 1914-15, Ch. IV Supply Policy and 
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found, and that they would be fully compensated for any consequential loss Vickers and the other contractor 
undertook to extend their output by every practicable means 
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shared in these orders manufacturing both guns and carriages which were proved 
at the Vickers Eskmeals firing range.108  Visiting the Barrow Works in 1915, James M. 
Tuohy the London Correspondent of the New York World said: 
I saw numbers of 18-pounder guns in all stages, beautiful finished 
weapons, whose breach mechanism is such a marvellous combination 
of strength, simplicity, and effectiveness.  The breaches demand the 
skill of expert fitters, and it is surprising how rapidly and regularly they 
are completed.  I am not permitted to give any definite indication of a 
week’s output, but I saw rows and rows of them mounted on their 
carriages awaiting transport to their destination having passed every 
test of the workshop and the firing ground.109   
 
With a shortage of heavy guns, Vickers were asked to enter the market and 
on 4 September 1914 were given a contract for sixteen 9.2in howitzers raised to 
thirty-two on 13 October.  A further contract for eight 12in. howitzers was accepted 
and the first one proved in January 1915, it was further agreed that damaged 9.2in 
and 12.2in siege gun carriages would be repaired at Barrow.110   Touhy quoted ‘the 
heavy howitzer is impressive and there are special sheds devoted to this weapon 
and their numbers and extent are being increased.  The increases in the gun 
programme required a corresponding expansion in shell supplies.   In the first 
instance orders were placed to the amount the private armament firms thought 
capable of producing.  By the end of 1914 the private firms had taken on the lion’s 
share of the work and orders were distributed as follows: 
 Ordnance factories     812,000 
 Armament firms  6,210,000 
 American firms  1,280,000 
 Canadian Shell Committee 1,700,000 
 Indian Government       52,000 
                            10,054,000111 
It followed any forecast of future supply of these vast orders rested on 
promises of deliveries from the Ordnance Factories and private contractors.  At the 
Shell Conference of 21 December 1914 it came to light that the grave shortage of 
engineering labour threatened all the great firms offering a substantial increase in 
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production.  Vickers at Barrow could not take on additional contracts without the 
supply of 814 skilled mechanics besides large numbers of unskilled men and women, 
while finding labour by themselves would be difficult.112  Hampered by the problems 
of obtaining labour and materials whilst competing for production equipment, it is 
understandable why armaments firms found it difficult to meet shell contracts.113   
Following on the Ministry designs being accepted large shell workshops were 
built as extensions to the existing Vickers works by Sir William Arroll and supervised 
by the Office of Works.  Although Government property, Vickers provided managers 
to run the workshops as Ministry agents and it followed that shell production 
required both expert supervision and Government inspection.  Large numbers of 
special single-purpose and largely automatic machines, or adaptation of existing 
machines for repetitive shell production operations were installed.  Shortage of 
labour was particularly seen in men essential for setting up and equipping 
workshops, men in the tool departments, this led Vickers to engage Canadians as 
millwrights, work they had never previously done.114   
 To allow ‘wide recruitment’ of additional labour for the ‘operation’ of 
machines the Employers’ Federation in December 1914 asked that trade restrictions 
should be removed to allow the manufacture of shells and fuses by employing 
women and semi-skilled men.115  On 4 February 1915 the Committee on Production 
was appointed to report on means of making labour fully available for government 
work.116  One recommendation was to increase the output of shells and fuses by 
extending female labour.117  Shell and fuses production carried out by machine was 
ideal for piecework and the Committee on Production recommended that to 
increase output for the duration of the war piecework prices should not be reduced, 
thus encouraging work to be continued knowing rates were guaranteed.118   After 
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several discussions with the employers and the Government, the ‘Shells and Fuses 
Agreement was signed by the ASE Executive on 4 March 1915.’119  This allowed the 
employment of unskilled labour and women on skilled men’s work during the war, 
excluding gauge and tool making and setting of machines.120   
In April 1915, The Times reported new and large workshops fitted with 
modern shell-making machinery were complete at Barrow.  Initially men, women 
and boys were recruited locally as munitions buildings and preparations were 
completed.121 The problem with boys though was that they were difficult to manage 
and needed constant supervision.  At the Vickers shell shop sufficient women were 
recruited to allow three eight-hour shifts, seven days a week for the standard wage 
of 15s for 45 hours this amount could be increased according to individual 
capacity.122  For many the recruitment of women in Barrow was welcomed, 
particularly those with parents to support.123  However, for Barrow’s commercial 
industries it meant the loss of many of their workers as they left to manufacture 
munitions at Vickers.124 Local farmers complained of the difficulty of replacing men 
called up, as many young women who could be employed in agriculture were 
attracted to munitions work by high wages.125  Such was the lure of the munitions 
shops that it was reported that domestic servants, shop girls and the like were at a 
premium in Barrow.  Women were also brought from Lancashire where work had 
fallen off in the cotton trade and ancillary industries; disciplined to work and 
accustomed to machinery they were rapidly assimilated to produce the vast 
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numbers of shells needed.126   By the end of May 1915 Barrow was estimated to be 
producing 50,000 shells per week and in June it was reported that the 600 women 
shell makers were to be immediately augmented by a further 1,000.127    
The problems of obtaining skilled men for munitions factories were to some 
extent overcome in June 1915 when a scheme for War Munitions Volunteers 
(WMVs) was announced.  A list was opened for the enrolment of skilled volunteer 
workers who were not working on government contracts.  Signing up for six months 
they were to be paid the district rate, rail fares to be paid as required and where 
necessary a subsistence allowance granted.  Vickers were only prepared to employ 
WMVs without subsistence alongside other workmen who had left their homes for 
war work previous to the scheme being launched.  Nonetheless WMV’s were 
employed at Barrow as on 20 June 1916 the Chairman of the Munitions Tribunal 
asked whether volunteers were signing on again after completing their first term of 
service.  Although the Vickers representative admitted the majority did and a few 
hundred were employed, he said housing difficulties were encountered.128  Table 5, 
compiled from weekly returns of increases in the numbers employed in private 
works, demonstrates the growth at Vickers helped by additional armament 
workers.129   
Total No. Employed Increase in 13 weeks 
3 April 1915 3 July 1915 No. Per Cent 
3,650 6,243 2,593 72 
Table 5 – Quarterly Increase in Numbers in the Barrow Armament Works  
Protection was needed for male munitions workers against the Army 
recruiters.  The War Office had only gone as far as instituting a list of firms whose 
men were not to be accepted for enlistment without written consent of the firm.  
When signs of breakdown in the munitions programme accumulated the War Office 
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followed the Admiralty and started issuing badges.  During March 1915 technical 
workers employed by the Royal Ordnance Factories and recognised armament firms 
were issued with badges.  Despite the system being continually refined and 
extended, the war service badge was only a temporary expedient and never a 
complete solution to resolving labour shortages.  The system did not solve the 
labour problem, but it served a purpose for Vickers and prepared the way for a 
systematic method of exemption when conscription became inevitable.     
The placing of Admiralty and War Office contracts with the major private 
firms meant their problems of production were inherited, whereas government 
arsenals and dockyards worked practically trouble free.  Restrictive rules were 
reduced to a minimum, irregular attendance did not exist, there were no drink 
problems and strikes and lock-outs were virtually unknown.  Arguably by 
assimilating private shipyards and armament works to Government establishments 
these evils might be remedied and war production increased.   
 
Removing Restrictive Practices 
 The first steps were taken shortly after the commencement of war when a 
number of private firms entered into negotiations with the unions in the hope of 
abandoning restrictive practices to which a vague ‘industrial truce’ was offered on 
behalf of labour.130   With the need to increase war production early attempts to 
introduce unskilled workers were made but the first case of dilution led to serious 
threats of trouble at Vickers works at Crayford where engineers objected to setting 
up work on machines to be operated by females.131  This was overcome by an 
agreement between the engineering employers and the ASE in November 1914.  
Cole said this was the first agreement of its kind during the war but in the same 
month the ASE approved to women operating automatic machinery at the Naval 
Shell Shop at Elswick.132  Simmonds further states that Vickers’ attempts to extend 
the Crayford Agreement to its other works floundered in the face of grass-roots 
opposition, nonetheless females were introduced on naval shell finishing at Barrow 
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in late January 1915.133  The steps seen at Crayford, Elswick and Barrow did not 
provide the great advances in productivity needed for the mass production of shells 
and while the Shells and Fuses Agreement had been a welcome sign it was limited 
in scope causing Lloyd George to become involved.    
With the need to increase munitions and equipment production Lloyd 
George called representatives of the principal trade unions to a conference at the 
Treasury held from 17-19 March 1915.134  Government had the powers under the 
Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) to assume control over works which were turning 
out munitions, but could not exercise it without cooperation of employers and 
workmen.  By taking over this meant assuming control of the large private works 
already producing munitions.  Above all was the imposition of a limitation on profits, 
as long as workmen knew the state was benefitting from their efforts and the profits 
were not going to any particular individual or class they would hopefully put more 
effort into the war.135  Securing control over the principal private armament and 
shipbuilding firms to the limitations of profits would not be realised until the 
‘controlled establishment’ clauses were introduced into the first Munitions of War 
Act.136  A controlled establishment meant the state became a statutory partner in 
the industry, owners ceased to freely conduct their business, and the state shared 
in the profits.  Limiting the profits of Admiralty and War Office private contractors, 
including Vickers, was thus a major part of the government agreement in the 
settlement of labour.  In return there would be a relaxation of restrictive practices 
during the war and continuance of work pending the settlement of disputes by 
arbitration as recommended by the Commission on Production.   
The first Treasury Agreement was signed by the chief trade unions 
representatives on 19 March 1915, but not fully accepted by the shipbuilding 
unions, whilst the miners withdrew and the ASE demanded further safeguards.137  
On 25 March, the Government called the Second Treasury Conference at which the 
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ASE claimed that as far as ammunition production was concerned they had assisted 
the Government by signing the Shells and Fuses Agreement.  Should a similar need 
arise in ‘any other branch of the industry’ the ASE was willing to meet the 
government, but asking for semi-skilled and female labour to be introduced into ‘all 
engineering branches’ was something they were not prepared to do.   In fact this 
was what Lloyd George wanted, that when the need did arise to increase the 
munitions output, semi-skilled and female labour ‘for the moment’ should be 
introduced.    
The ASE accepted the First Treasury Agreement in return for Government 
undertaking to secure limitation of profits of firms where trade union practices were 
to be relaxed.  This bound workmen’s representatives to recommend the proposals, 
which did not specifically mention dilution.138  The Times reported the feeling 
amongst workers at Barrow regarding the proposals were favourable and further 
emphasised that the town was a strong union place where all men were well 
organized.139  The initial document signed at the first Treasury Conference bound 
the workmen’s representatives to recommend the proposals to their members but 
until a favourable ballot was taken no Union was committed.   Though the ASE 
recommended their members accept the Treasury Agreement, it was not confirmed 
by ballot of the whole Society until 16 June 1915.140  On realisation the Agreement 
was no more than a dead letter, and voluntary agreement was proving insufficient, 
negotiations between the Government and Unions were reopened and the terms of 
the treaty embodied into the Munitions of War Act 1915.141   
 DeGroot notes as industrial output increased bad time-keeping came under 
the microscope, production being said to be hindered by high wages and drink.142   
 
The drink problem  
  The First World War helped reposition drink as an aspect of national 
efficiency rather than temperance, though politicians were not averse to drawing on 
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an older rhetoric to whip up support for his plans to create a more sober and 
productive workforce.  Locally, the Chief Constable in his annual report stated during 
1914 the increase in persons proceeded against for drunkenness in Barrow had 
increased by 40 per cent.143  During the summer there had been decreases, but after 
the war broke out proceedings had increased.  This was largely expected as the 
population had expanded and trade was brisker, one foreman pointed out that 
drinking in Barrow had always been bad but was now worse than ever.   
Drink agitation started on 18 November 1914 when the government 
announced it was raising the duty on a standard barrel of beer.  As the highest tax 
was placed on the highest gravity beer it was anticipated that brewers might lower 
the gravity while making it too expensive for heavy drinkers.  Insofar as the tax 
induced the drinking of lighter liquors it would make for efficiency.   Although the 
influx of Scotsmen at Barrow increased spirit sales, workers were neither spirit nor 
wine drinkers, and with wages high men were drinking a combination of beers priced 
at 5d a pint, whereas previously they could only afford beer at 3d a pint.   The 
increase in the price of beer therefore made little difference, as one report said: 
‘publicans in Barrow collect the new taxes with all the scrupulousness and boldness 
of a trustee for the nation.’144  
Drinking was deeply seated in the earnings and habits of men and any 
irregular timekeeping consequent upon it naturally affected others.145  Early opening 
coincided with the start of work, while allowing men to drink coming off the 
nightshift it allowed men going on shift to break shipyard rules to obtain drink and 
turn up late.  Responding to bad time-keeping Vickers told men to carry on working 
until their mates turned up, to which the engineers objected, saying that men should 
be relieved as soon as possible.146  Vickers could not afford to hold up work and 
evidence indicates that previous to Munitions Tribunals workers who broke 
regulations were subjected to fines enforced by the firm’s police.147   
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Further incentives were required and on 5 March 1915, the Barrow licensing 
magistrates in pursuance of the Intoxicating Liquor (Temporary Restriction) Act, 
1914 reduced the licensing hours.  It was agreed that weekday hours should be from 
9 a.m. to 10 p.m. and between 12.30 and 2.30 pm and 6.30 p.m. and 9 p.m. on 
Sundays.148  Though the shorter hours removed the early drinking, arousing 
comment amongst shipyard workers, men now drank more in less time.149  On 24 
March a military order prohibited the sale and supply of intoxicants throughout the 
Barrow Garrison area before 10.30 a.m. on a weekday.150  The justice’s now revoked 
their first order and made another to correspond with the hours of the military.151  
For women the sale of drink had be prohibited before 11.30 a.m. from 20 November 
1914.  Opening hours were not uniform throughout the district and the problem of 
accommodation meant workmen living outside Barrow drank as usual.  Managers 
also complained there were no restrictions six miles away at Dalton and many of the 
nightshift took the train and started drinking there shortly after 6 a.m.    
  Emphasis changed as the Government prepared the ground for further 
drink legislation after investigation into bad timekeeping in shipyards.152  The 
investigation emanated from large labour employers including Vickers who had 
approached the government for special powers to deal with drink.153  Reports to the 
naval authorities in the shipbuilding areas indicated partial measures would be 
useless and total prohibition was the only remedy outside martial law.   At Barrow 
there was agreement that the amount of work being carried out was less than 
reasonably expected and a study of 135 fitters in the submarine engine shop proved 
this.  Published in a white paper it showed that during a single week in March 1915, 
less work was carried out in a normal 53-hour week than in peacetime, some of the 
lost time ‘it was believed’ was down to drink.154  Labour representatives however 
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were not consulted before publishing the white paper and no indication given as to 
whether production was retarded.155  The Times referring to Barrow stated: ‘that at 
no town in the country had such bad time been made by men who preferred to 
spend their time in public- houses.’156  For the activist section of the Barrow 
working-classes such reports caused resentment and were regarded as an 
unjustified slight, as the conclusions were broad-based and often unconvincing.157    
 Individual reports of drinking in the town were provided by Sydney Smith, a 
government officer on the committee on bad timekeeping who paid five visits to 
Barrow.  He reported there was plenty of drinking but the impression was men could 
stand a fair amount without getting drunk.  Smith noted that public-houses were 
well patronised during the daytime and there was always numbers of men in 
working clothes in the vicinity showing signs of having a skin full.  However, during 
one week there was little evidence of drunkenness in the streets and only a few 
cases brought before the courts.   The decrease in drinking was due to double wages 
on Good Friday and one-and-a-half wages on Saturday morning being offered to 
men who had worked regularly all week, a distinct incentive to remain sober.   
Drinking habits Smith believed were prevalent among riveters and platers 
and the less skilled.  Such men, although their remuneration was equal to that of 
professional men had not increased much above the social position of the man 
earning 30s a week, noted another commentator.  Having not been educated to 
spend their wages wisely money was wasted as apart from alcohol they had few 
interests and little else to spend their wages on.’158  In reviewing 1915 the Mayor 
remarked that the prosperity of the town was phenomenal but he would like to have 
seen a greater exercise in thrift by those earning record amounts.159  It appears there 
was an easiness with cash, and many had more money than they knew how to 
sensibly spend. 
One writer in the Manchester Guardian said he had not met any serious 
minded trade unionist who does not admit there is far more drinking by Barrow’s 
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workers than can be justified, even by the lingering idea that beer is a necessary aid 
to healthy perspiration in hot and hard labour.160  Smith doubted if there was 
anything like the amount of fatigue among the workers which was considered in 
some areas to be prevalent, though he admitted workers at the large shell-forging 
presses and heating furnaces were the exception as were the shipyard riveters and 
platers.  Much of the manual work he said was not fatiguing as men stood watching 
machines.  The ASE president begged to differ saying workers found modern 
production mentally wearing encouraging the use of intoxicating stimulants.161   
DeGroot says that a later government report directly linked poor production 
at Barrow’s factories with workplace intoxication, Scotsmen who had moved to the 
area were being blamed, ‘a cheap shot’ he suspects.162  The generally feeling 
however was that those responsible for excessive drunkenness and lost time were 
imported hands, the bulk of Barrow workers being said to be of high calibre.163  
Smith reported that the police records gave some support to this view as a striking 
proportion of strangers were arrested for drunkenness.164  Even though Smith 
admitted the majority of men kept good time he failed to bring out clearly the 
problem was amongst a small number of the workforce which reflected badly on the 
production of the majority of sober workers.  In fact it was the sober, steady four-
fifths of the workmen led by the trade union leaders who applied moral pressure on 
the slackers. 
As new workers poured into the town the effect was to bump up the already 
high population density, cramming them into a limited housing stock.  Duncan also 
made the fundamental point that provision of proper housing was essential if public-
houses were to be less frequented.165    
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Housing 
For the previous three or four years Barrow had been faced with a housing 
problem and as thousands additional workers were brought into the town to 
increase munitions output the problem became more acute.  Early attempts to 
overcome the problem was by patriotic appeal to the Barrow people to afford all 
the accommodation they could and to send their names and addresses to Vickers 
with particulars.166  While the difficulty was said to have been overcome by residents 
offering accommodation the local labour exchange informed Vickers further labour 
would be refused unless accommodation was found prompting the company to 
form a housing department.167  By this method Vickers found it easier to find tenants 
as the company had facilities for deducting rents.  In an attempt to assist the 
Ulverston Trades Association it pointed out that the town could accommodate 
several hundred the response was favourable and by June 1915, 650 Ulverston 
boarders were working at Barrow.168  Amongst these were colonial workers, one 
worker stating ‘boarding cost 16s 6d a week and rail fares 2s 6d’.169      
 Since the start of the pre-war boom workmen’s trains had been run into 
Barrow.  Firstly from Dalton, Lindal and Ulverston then from Askam and following 
the outbreak of war a workman’s train was run from Millom to the Shipyard Junction 
on Barrow Island a distance of sixteen miles.170  Eleven workmen’s trains were run 
per day and on top of these dedicated services workmen’s carriages were attached 
to ordinary passenger trains.   From Dalton alone some 1,200 men were taken to 
Barrow every day and as many as 640 men mainly Belgians were travelling from 
Millom to Vickers.171 Previously there were some 200 empty houses at Millom but 
since the arrival of the Belgian men with their wives and families no houses were 
available for rent.172  Unheated workers trains however caused some Belgians 
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workers to move from Millom to Barrow.173  By mid-1915 workmen’s trains were 
extended to Cark, Kent’s Bank and Grange-over-Sands where other Belgians lived.  
Engineers earning £5 and £6 a week occupied rooms at Grange usually taken by 
summer visitors therefore providing landladies with winter incomes.174  On account 
of the Barrow housing problem not only were thousands of pounds being sent away 
to wives and families by workers, the special trains conveying men from Vickers 
night and day to the surrounding district were boosting their economies.  
Houses in Barrow were built for selling not letting purposes as trade 
fluctuations made letting risky even just before the war an increase in population of 
5,000 had been met by the erection of just 644 houses.175  As war commenced and 
things became uncertain, private builders were unwilling to build, the cost of 
materials having risen while banks stopped lending.  Additionally, enforcement of 
rent control after 1915 eliminated any economic incentive for speculative builders 
to provide housing for the working-classes.  Some contractors lost men to the 
services whilst the onset of winter and fall off in housebuilding caused labourers to 
take jobs in the shipyard erecting munition and armaments workshops.176  McIvor 
notes there was wage drift in the North West as building firms responded to the 
request for labour in places like Barrow where large munitions plants were 
building.177  However, labourers working on a Vickers factory extension complained 
they were not getting a war bonus like other men, and as they were unable to make 
30s per week, and the cost of living being so high, they asked the Barrow Munitions 
Tribunal for certificates to move elsewhere.178 
For many newcomers to Barrow, their total worth being what they stood up 
in the problem of accommodation was acute and the growing feeling was towards a 
municipal scheme.  When Barrow Council was asked how many of the houses being 
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built or newly constructed would be let for 6s to 6s 6d per week, the average pre-
war cost of a workman’s house, the answer was that under a municipal scheme it 
could not build a small house under a minimum rent for that amount.179  The most 
a man could expect for 5s was three rooms on the top floor of a tenement a house 
cost 8s and more if there was a lodger as this gave some landlords opportunity to 
raise already high rents.180  Property ownership being high in Barrow, useful incomes 
could be made from lodgers by landlords living in a couple of rooms and renting out 
the rest to lower paid workers.  In this way the Rent Restrictions Act, which pegged 
the rates at 1914 levels was overcome landlords however were prevented from 
selling the tenants home without recourse to the courts.181  When a mother and 
daughter responded to the mayor’s appeal to undertake the inconvenience of taking 
in lodgers the landlord raised the rent by 2s. 6d. a week.182  This hardly encouraged 
others and the search for affordable accommodation meant people would keep on 
piling themselves up unless restrained.  
There were no bye-laws to the effect that no room or rooms of a furnished 
or unfurnished house could be sub-let, and without registration the municipality was 
powerless to ascertain accurately the pressures on housing accommodation.  
Registration would have provided a municipal barometer to indicate dangerous 
overcrowding but instead Barrow became a sponge soaking up an invisible influx.  
Overcrowding had led to amazing statements regarding conditions.183  One woman 
said she lived with her husband and six children in a single room.  An example was 
given of a family living in a single room where a coffin sat at one end of the table 
while a meal was eaten at the other.  In another house there were fourteen lodgers 
where beds were occupied night and day, while a near relative of an important 
council member was said had been turned into the street with an ill wife.   
 Although the Local Government Board gave authority for the preparation of 
a corporation town planning scheme, resistance to municipal housing by landlords 
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was formidable and Barrow Council shelved the question until after the war on the 
grounds these were abnormal times and when the war ended there might be no 
need for a housing scheme.184  Proviso was made that after the war Vickers be asked 
if necessary to assist the Corporation with a view to erecting permanent buildings, 
while a recommendation was made that Corporation bye-laws should not be 
enforced in providing ‘temporary’ housing for men employed in manufacturing 
munitions.  Once the Ministry of Munitions was formed housing munitions workers 
was seen as their responsibility and arguably the Corporation should have insisted 
proper provision was made.  Ministry responsibility was hardly less because 
munitions workers were employed by a private firm if the Ministry denied 
responsibility and held housing requirements were the province of the Corporation, 
it should have ensured they fulfilled their obligation.  In all events munitions was 
state work, therefore it was the business of the Ministry of Munitions to ensure it 
was carried out efficiently, it would not however be the Ministry that determined 
workers’ accommodation, but the Treasury. 
 The extent to which the permanent building of housing for munitions 
workers could be realised was limited by control over Treasury expenditure.  It was 
only under extreme pressure that the Treasury consented to erect permanent 
houses at Woolwich.185  By the middle of 1915 as the extraordinary cost of building 
became apparent, the Treasury regretted its decision.  A letter to the new Ministry 
of Munitions in June 1915 laid down Treasury rules on housing; schemes would be 
permitted where shown to be necessary for war production and to be temporary 
unless this was impossible.186  Not all the benefits were on the side of temporary 
structures.  The cost of building constituted part of the provision of housing, the 
substantial cost of site development had to be borne whether permanent or 
temporary buildings were erected.  It was arguable that temporary buildings were 
more expensive than permanent buildings because of their shorter life.   The limited 
amount of housebuilding in Barrow meant the bulk of the industrial labour force 
had to find lodgings in the private market however other ideas were under 
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consideration to relieve domestic congestion.  When drafting the Defence of the 
Realm (Amendment) No.2 Act in February 1915, it was proposed to take powers to 
compulsory billet workmen in centres such as Barrow and Newcastle.187  The Board 
of Trade recommended a more moderate provision giving powers to take 
possession of empty properties, following these recommendations the Treasury 
instructed that accommodation at Barrow was to be provided by men and women’s 
temporary hostels and the seconding of buildings as will be seen in the next 
chapter.188     
 
Conclusions 
 The outbreak of war brought no unemployment to Barrow.  On the contrary 
the town benefited from the rush of Admiralty work and the new contracts the War 
Office brought.  However the call to the colours and the lack of manpower control 
caused a loss of key men, particularly foremen, which affected workshop 
organisation.  Movement was seen towards total war as Barrow’s population 
became involved with war work in support of munitions production.  This had the 
effect of disrupting council services and caused the migration of workers from other 
industries into higher paid work at Vickers.  From the start it was urged on the 
Barrow male population that their duty was at home rather than in the armed 
forces.   
Success of industry concerned with the continuance of the war could only be 
achieved by replacing, retaining and expanding the skilled workforce.  Initially the 
labour exchanges found men from the merchant ship yards to complete Admiralty 
work, whilst amongst the unemployed inferior unskilled men were recruited.  
Vickers took steps to replace lost labour and protect their workers.  Protection was 
taken a step further when the Admiralty provided official badges for its workers, this 
scheme was thereafter taken up by the War Office and the Ministry of Munitions.  
Output depended on increasing or economising the supply of labour but the 
uncontrolled labour market led to competition between firms for men and 
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inducements had to be found to attract and retain men largely based on 
remuneration and a guarantee of service.  The quest to find and transfer new skilled 
men failed mainly due to disagreement between employers and unions over 
allowances and incentives.  When the Board of Trade tried to find skilled men from 
the unemployed and commercial work they fared only slightly better.  Recruiting of 
Belgians was initially successful, while the bringing over of Canadians and the return 
of skilled men from the colours went some way to easing the manpower problems.   
Employers and government alike realised that production could only be 
increased through the relaxation of trade union practices and rules.  The massive 
numbers of shells required not only skilled men but semi and unskilled men and 
women.  After failed talks between employers and unions the Government’s 
Production Committee brokered the Shells and Fuses Agreement allowing dilution 
of work in shells shops.  If the armaments industry was to become efficient, the 
continuance of work pending the settlement of disputes and relaxation of restrictive 
practices was essential.  The Treasury Agreement signed by government and trade 
union representatives confirmed labour's promise to abandon strike action for the 
duration of the war.  The unions, including the ASE, whose members were principally 
affected, further agreed to suspend 'restrictive practices' in skilled trades by 
agreeing to the use of unskilled or semi-skilled labour including women in ‘some 
branches’ of engineering under their supervision.   
High wages generated by overtime and bonuses determined the hours many 
men worked and allowed some to spend their wages on beer without worry of 
government restriction and taxes.  Drink was increasingly seen as a cause of bad 
time-keeping which the government intended to stamp out starting with early 
legislation which had little effect.   The decisions of Barrow Town Council not to build 
corporation housing and of the Treasury not to provide funding for housebuilding 
determined the living conditions under an expanding population throughout the 
war.  The health of shipyard workers was affected by working long hours in bad 
weather and cramped conditions.   Any weakness in health was aggravated by 
overcrowding and indifferent cooking in such lodgings as were obtainable, whilst 
men’s tempers were increased by the petty annoyances of fellow lodgers.   
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Although there was increasing government involvement, the armament 
industry during this period was not working efficiently and lacked organisation.  In 
addition to the measures taken for supplying skilled labour for munitions work, 
powers were needed to prevent the disorganisation of the munitions factories by 
the capricious movement of labour and to increase the efficiency of workmen by 
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CHAPTER 3: THE MOVE TO INCREASE OUTPUT AND ITS EFFECTS 
Introduction  
This chapter concentrates largely on the period from the summer of 1915 
until the summer of 1916, although dates are extended where necessary to provide 
further understanding.  Vickers being integral to the war effort the Ministry turned 
to them and the other major armaments companies for the production of shells and 
guns needed for an expanding army.   The aim is to show how Vickers whilst already 
under Admiralty control came increasingly under the influence of the Ministry of 
Munitions and the War Office, which exacerbated an already difficult situation.  A 
short explanation will be provided regarding the introduction of the Ministry of 
Munitions Act and its application to controlled establishments.  With the intention 
of regulating the migration of men to better paid work, providing discipline in the 
workplace and improving timekeeping in controlled establishments, local munitions 
tribunals were introduced.  These will be examined to provide insight into how they 
operated and cooperated with industry.  It will be argued that Barrow was a special 
case and did not fit into the general pattern of tribunals as advocated by general 
historians.  In creating further restrictions to prevent time losing and improve 
industrial efficiency the Central Control (Liquor) Board (CCB) was formed and its 
effects on Barrow and its environs will be seen.    
The implications of extended munitions production were far reaching in an 
already overcrowded town.  Housing will be revisited to examine how increased 
numbers of workers, many of them females, arriving in Barrow were 
accommodated.  The housing position now became more acute and the provision of 
hostels and hotels as temporary accommodation was seen as a limited answer to 
the problem.  The chapter will demonstrate the effect the massive increase in 
munitions production had on utilities and how this impacted on the population.  It 
will also examine how the Government in an effort to save rail miles changed 
Barrow’s coal and coke supplies and what the implications were of this.  The change 
in trade at the docks to the import of war materials and the results on rail transport 
will be examined while the transport system for moving workers will be discussed.   
Due to the needs to complete contracts and due to a shortage of manpower limited 
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Sunday work was introduced, but this could only ever be a temporary measure as 
industry was driven by the needs of the needs front and the requirements of the 
navy.    
 
The Ministry of War Act, Munitions Tribunals and Leaving Certificates 
 Apart from the Defence of the Realm Act no particular legislation had been 
enacted on the outbreak of hostilities it was quickly realised however that an 
overwhelming supply of war munitions was essential in the successful promotion of 
the war.  To attain this output the organisation of industry would need to be run on 
a new basis.  Difficulties were many and varied and legislation was required to 
provide the requisite powers for the direction and distribution of munitions work so 
that the best results could be obtained from the available resources.  Following the 
Shell Scandal, and the fall of the Liberal Government a coalition was formed and the 
Ministry of Munitions created under the leadership of Lloyd George.  The new 
cabinet minister was charged with ‘examining and organising the sources of supply 
and labour available for the production of all types of munitions of war’.189  Marriot 
says government policy was such that: 
No private interest was to be permitted to obstruct the service, or 
imperil the safety of the State. Trade Union regulations must be 
suspended; employers' profits must be limited, skilled men must fight, if 
not in the trenches, in the factories; manpower must be economize by 
the dilution of labour and the employment of women; private factories 
must pass under the control of the State, and new national factories set 
up.190 
 
The new Ministry of Munitions Act enshrined both the Shells and Fuses and 
Treasury Agreements while introducing the leaving certificate.  Powers exercised 
under the Ministry of Munitions were extensive and drastic steps were taken to 
control the conditions under which private firms were carried on.  Simmonds says 
that on paper at least, the balance of power within industrial Britain now tilted 
decisively towards the government.191  Control argues Marwick was in the sense of 
a constant watchfulness over discipline, timekeeping, and the achievement of a 
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reasonable level of output.192  Hinton interpreted the Act as while being a reciprocal 
agreement between employers and unions, it was in reality a direct attack on 
organised labour which succeeded in reducing its protection and strength.193  
Wrigley provides a more measured view, describing government intervention in the 
deadlock between employers and unions over the suspension of craft union core 
practices as a necessity and a means of finding a compromise while providing the 
unions with some safeguards in the face of extreme employer demands.194   
According to Todd industrial relations at Barrow were particularly volatile and 
described as being brought to an all-time low in the war years as Vickers exploited 
the Munitions Act to the full.195  One Vickers Director later remarked that: ‘relations 
between employers and employed were complex, but if the questions of 
Government were intelligently and sympathetically approached from all sides’ 
solutions could be found’.196   
The most important sections of the Act related to controlled establishments 
which included Vickers, controlled implying with regard to the employer as the 
limitation of profits, control of wage changes, and in regard to the workman the 
suspension under statutory safeguard of rules and practices restricting production 
or employment in regards to efficiency.197  Importantly the strike and lock out was 
forbidden by the Act.  Within the controlled establishments the total effect before 
amendment of the Act in 1916 was to arm employers, managers, and foremen with 
arbitrary powers which generally affected workers in a negative manner.  These 
powers were extended through the Munitions Tribunals, which not only retained 
workmen but helped maintain discipline in the interest of production.   
 The most unpopular section of the Munitions Act provided an effective 
means of tying munitions workers to their employment by the institution of leaving 
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certificates.  This was a drastic restriction of normal liberties and the most powerful 
instrument of industrial efficiency which the war produced which in practice gave 
rise to discontent.  The leaving certificate virtually extinguished the market for free 
labour, the only commodity a worker had to sell, whereas there was open 
competition for everything he had to buy.  Not only was freedom of movement to 
be circumscribed dramatically but also discipline and control over men who were 
slack or disobedient to reasonable orders were to be dealt with.  Hinton sees the 
trinity of wage deflation, labour immobility and factory discipline embraced in the 
leaving certificate and Munitions Tribunal as introduced by the Act.198  In the 
absence of direct wage regulation imposing uniformity of rates and earnings, 
employers were vulnerable to the enhanced market power possessed by skilled 
labour.  The first task Rubin says was to control wages by stopping employees 
moving elsewhere for better wages.199   While applications for leaving certificates to 
allow men to improve their earnings were requested at the Barrow Tribunal the 
Chairman could not deal with actual workers’ wages.200   
Responsibility nonetheless was placed on those in authority to which the 
system applied to ensure that the least possible hardship occurred to the 
workpeople whose freedom had been restricted.  However, the paramount 
consideration in each case was whether the national interest could be best served 
by a workman remaining where he was or moving him to a new sphere of work.  
Although the Barrow Munitions Tribunal reports provide indication of cases and 
outcomes before the Chairman they but do not indicate numbers of certificates 
issued by Vickers without recourse to the tribunal.  Whilst the majority of cases dealt 
with Vickers workers, a number were from other firms and companies in the town 
carrying out war work.201   
Workers had come to Barrow on promises of high wages and continuous 
work and a major complaint was they were prevented from bringing their wives and 
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children to Barrow through a shortage of suitable houses in the town.202  In late 1916 
an advertisement appeared in a local newspaper of a house to let noting it was ‘a 
very rare thing nowadays’.  This brought between 300 and 400 applications, others 
meanwhile in searching for a house were offering as much as £5 for a key.203   The 
cost of keeping two places of residence became too much for some, leaving them 
with little alternative but to request leaving certificates.204  The problem was not 
one of wanting to move for higher wages, as men’s earnings were high in Barrow.  It 
was also not necessarily that a man wanted to return to his family, as national work 
elsewhere with suitable housing was just as acceptable.205  Also those wanting to 
move away with their wives and children from the conditions of Barrow, were 
forbidden to do so without leave of the tribunal.  Fundamental objections existed 
challenging the scheme’s lack of reciprocity, the most obvious was that while a 
worker could not leave his employment without a certificate the employer could 
dismiss him.  Once a worker entered a scheduled industry he had to prove his 
services could be of greater advantage to the national interest elsewhere before a 
certificate was granted.  If the employer whose yard a man had left unreasonably 
withheld a certificate it was up to the tribunal to decide whether it was 
unreasonable or not.  The onus was on the man to convince the tribunal that the 
employer was unreasonable.  Even if he was successful the employer was not liable 
to a penalty.   
Leaving without a certificate meant disqualification from a man’s trade for 
six weeks before a new job could be taken up, something few could afford.  Amongst 
penniless Irish labourers brought over by Vickers, three returned home without 
certificates.  One man unable to find proper living accommodation in Barrow wrote 
to the tribunal saying he had a wife and six children and wished to have his certificate 
as he could not afford to remain idle in Ireland.206  The tribunal could do little but 
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refuse, as granting a certificate to those who left and departed Barrow would set a 
precedent causing an exodus.  Employers were liable to a penalty of up to £50 if they 
employed anyone who during the previous six weeks had been working in a 
scheduled industry without seeing a certificate signed by the previous employer.  
This rule left discharged men and employers in limbo.  When Armstrong’s, 
Openshaw works discharged 121 skilled workers, Vickers at Barrow were prevented 
from employing one man in their shell department until issued with a certificate.207  
Vickers was in a bad position, being geographically isolated and having 
brought workers to Barrow they could ill afford to lose them.  All workers were 
needed and the local tribunal Chairman rarely assisted in granting certificates 
through appeal.  This meant the tribunal was more accommodating to the employer, 
while many cases were adjourned to discuss what could be done to obviate workers’ 
problems.  Munitions production was first and foremost and the position was such 
that if the employer needed to retain a man and taking that man away delayed work, 
then the objective of the Munitions Act was defeated.208    
Numbers of requests for certificates were caused by changes in work 
practices leading to lower wages which affected men’s standards of living giving 
cause to dissatisfaction.  Labourers came to Barrow under agreement whereby 
Vickers could place them in sections of the works where employment was not 
suitable or as well paid.  This was an economic way of using labour to meet contracts 
and when questioned by one certificate applicant he was informed that it was not 
his place to say how work was run.209  Labourers on work squads were particularly 
vulnerable as when jobs finished they were taken off piecework at higher rates and 
put on lower rate timework.210  Foremen stated they were only placed on timework 
until piecework became available again, but men could not afford delays in an 
expensive town.211  Men were apt to walk out refusing to work for lower wages or 
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were passed out by their departmental managers, even when employment was 
available in other departments.  Managers subverted the system hanging on to men 
to prevent them being shorthanded when work unexpectedly came in experience 
showed that once men changed departments they were unlikely to be changed 
back.  When cases were brought before the tribunal the chairman could do little 
other than state if workers agreed to alternative work and Vickers kept them in 
another department for an unreasonable time, then the case should be brought 
back.   
In cases of discipline the general approach of the Barrow Munitions Tribunal 
was to draw men’s attention to the provisions of the Munitions Act, administer 
warnings, followed by action and fines.  With labour scarce in Barrow men were 
unlikely to be dismissed unless the case was overwhelming.  Trade union 
representatives admitted men voluntarily came into shipyards habitually absenting 
themselves and making bad time when they knew work was urgent.  In less 
pressurised departments men were not arriving on time, therefore failing to assist 
the war effort.  In ordinary circumstances, if men kept bad time the employer had 
the remedy of dismissing them, but under war conditions extreme labour shortage 
made this difficult.  Significantly working in a protected industry safeguarded men. 
When young Vickers men passed A1 fit appeared before the Tribunal for time losing 
the Chairman suggested releasing them to the Army, but it was pointed out they 
were exempted from the Military Service Acts.212  Though men were unsatisfactory, 
Vickers’ standpoint was that bad men were better than none and rather than 
threatening men with the Army to improve timekeeping, as happened elsewhere, 
this method was rejected.213  Some men saw timekeeping no worse than before the 
war and if taken before the Munitions Tribunal failed to understand why they were 
there, as long as they were paid for their time they saw no reason to change their 
ways.  Furthermore the Commission of Unrest pointed out that not all bad 
timekeepers were brought before the courts.214  Nonetheless it was in the union’s 
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interest to improve timekeeping.  Bad timekeepers were thus called before their 
District Committees, their excuses heard and warned and advised to mend their 
ways in their own and the country’s interest and of course the union’s.   
Numbers of cases appearing before the tribunal were due to lost time 
through illness and symptoms caused by the nature and conditions of work.  Long 
hours under heavy conditions naturally led to strain and irregularities leading to lost 
quarters and sometimes days which were often wrongfully diagnosed as the result 
of slackness.  Constant work brought on physical strain and in many cases men 
remained off to recover men not at their peak could not be expected to work to the 
best of their abilities.215  Duncan pointed out the allegations for time losing against 
a section of men were at a time when the climatic conditions in the shipyard were 
at their worst and consequently there was much illness.216  Apart from the incidence 
of normal ailments and disease the average standard of health was lowered by the 
influx of workers of poor physique.217   
Most men had family and financial commitments and were liable to hide 
serious ailments and continue working until forced to take time off.218 Typically a 
tank tester working amongst water and complaining of soreness and rheumatics 
pleaded guilty at the Munitions Tribunal to missing days.219  In such conditions men 
earned high wages at the expense of their health and occasional requests were 
made for certificates to transfer to departments where work was less arduous.  For 
example a rivet holder-up suffering from rheumatism and other ailments from 
working in confined spaces requested to be transferred from the submarine 
department to the gun shop.220  While earning £5 a week including overtime, he 
considered his health more important, but transfer was made difficult by the lack of 
such skills and the need to complete contracts.  Although offered a job in the gun 
shop the submarine department could not afford to release him and when offered 
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a labouring job he refused as the pay was too low.  Vickers proposed to see if he 
could be transferred.   
Vickers complained if men provided foremen with medical certificates they 
would not be taken before the tribunal, but men who held certificates were often 
too ill to hand them in.  Hard pushed doctors were not always sympathetic and even 
when men were not fully fit they were told to return to work, whereas workers 
hesitated to trouble doctors unless there was a serious problem.221  The panacea for 
minor ailments was to take a day off, men finding their own cures.  One worker told 
the Munitions Tribunal his influenza had been cured by drinking a half bottle of rum 
followed by a hot bath and twenty-hours in bed.222  Doctors informed one licensed 
victualler that death occurred from influenza simply because people were not able 
to obtain the necessary spirits.223  Such cures were known to prove fatal, a foreman 
with a cold on returning to his lodgings added a bottle of whisky to a basin of tea, 
consumed it, and the next morning was found expired.224    
Efforts to standardise medical certificates were not successful.  When large 
numbers were printed in 1917 for use in controlled establishments it was found busy 
munitions panel doctors whilst prepared to give written statements, often refused 
to do so unless allowed to charge more than the normal working-class fees.  This 
was overcome when the munitions tribunals were directed to obtain medical 
referees where doubtful cases could be sent.  Alternatively they could ask for 
attendance of the defendant’s doctor, provided they were registered, many having 
failed to change doctors on arrival in Barrow.225  Shortage of labour rendered the 
penalties of dismissal, suspension and exclusion for periods of the working day and 
irregularity of attendance by skilled and fit men as almost useless.226  Time arranged 
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in attending the court by foremen, witnesses and offenders along with the bitterness 
caused by conviction often made it pointless using them.  At Barrow previous cases 
of bad timekeeping dealt with leniently proved ineffective.  In attempting to stamp 
out systematic bad timekeeping, a large number of men were brought before the 
tribunal, not only to discourage those appearing but as a deterrent to others.227  
Barrow’s cases were widely published in the local and provincial newspapers, 
reporting delinquents alongside those requesting leaving certificates for genuine 
reasons.  However, reports of hearings meant to act as a deterrent to self-respecting 
workmen, rarely affected the bad cases.  Though excuses were offered, including 
looking for accommodation and sickness, a range of fines were imposed generally 
payable in instalments to prevent suffering to lower paid workers and their wives 
and families.  Fining some offenders was of no deterrent as they could easily make 
up losses.  Typically the scale of fines when paid by instalments, variable within the 
£3 limit, were insufficient penalty to workmen earning £5 to £10 a week.228   
   The provisions of the Act can be said to be draconian and workers could be 
hard-treated by it, especially those wanting to move away for family reasons.  On 
the other hand there was nothing that could be done about the significant numbers 
of poorer workers, so this was a double blow, as the deserving were penalised while 
the undeserving were protected, a situation which has not been properly considered 
in the secondary literature.  Following grievances on the Clyde an Amendment Bill 
was raised and the leaving certificate standardised to prevent the addition of 
comments by employers, any man was to be given a certificate immediately or 
within three days if suspended.  Tribunals were now empowered to issue certificates 
to men not receiving their rate or fully employed and to compensate workers not 
receiving the district rate.  Individuals were to be compensated for periods of 
unemployment caused by unreasonable refusal of a certificate and a court of appeal 
set up to hear complaints.229  Although this did not abolish the leaving certificate it 
ensured a fairer system. 
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While limited drink restrictions had been introduced by the Barrow justices 
and the military, the Government now saw it as a hindrance to munitions production 
and in the interest of industrial efficiency introduced further restrictions and 
regulations.   
 
Drink 
 In early spring 1915 a considerable body of evidence regarding lost time in 
the northern shipyards had been collected leading the public to believe that the 
chief reason for the delay in production was drink.230  Opinions and figures made a 
great impression on the country, presented as they were by Lloyd George when he 
introduced his Bill for the control of liquor traffic.231  The figures showed a serious 
loss of time but no attempt was made to determine how far the loss was due to 
unavoidable causes.  Charles Duncan while not opposing the Bill, said Labour could 
not stay silent in view of the aspersions made against those they represented which 
were one-sided and unjust.232  Nonetheless the Bill was passed and state control 
authorized establishing the Central Control Board (CCB) to deal with drink to 
improve national efficiency.233  Although drink control was introduced to rid 
excessive drinking among a section of workers as an obstacle to output it would also 
bring about changes in habits.234    
Barrow workmen were fully aware they would come under the new CCB 
Orders and on 22 July 1915 notice of the new restrictions were given.235  Initially the 
area was defined as within a circumference of a circle having a radius of ten miles 
from Barrow Town Hall.236  An interval was allowed between the issue of the new 
Order and enforcement to provide notice of impending changes, promote general 
                                                     
230 Report and Statistics of Bad Time kept in Shipbuilding, Munitions and Transport Areas (1 May, 1915); The 
Barrow News, Saturday, 3 July 1915, a report of eight cases for drunkenness at the Barrow Police Courts provides 
evidence that most Barrow workers were beyond reproach: five were non-residents mainly new arrivals, one 
was not known, one a soldier, one a sailor and two tramps 
231 H of C Parliamentary Debates (1915), LXXI. 864 -896 
232 The Times, Tuesday, 11 May 1915 
233 Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Adviser, Tuesday, 11 May 1915, in introducing the Bill, the Barrow 
MP said that Labour had no opposition to it but the party considered that many of the statements made in the 
white paper about workman and drink were unfair and unjust 
234 Duncan, R., Pubs and Patriots: The Drink Crisis in Britain during World War One, (Liverpool, Liverpool 
University Press, 2013), p.94 
235 Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, Saturday, 24 July 1915 
236 The Times, Wednesday, 7 July 1915 
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interest in its terms, and allow the local press to provide publicity.  The CCB 
complained that the object of the Order was defeated by migration during 
prohibited hours from the restricted to the non-restricted neighbourhood.  This 
loophole was closed by an amended Order when a new boundary a considerable 
distance from the scheduled area was created.237  In November 1915, Barrow was 
finally incorporated into the Western Border Area removing it from Lancashire 
influence altogether.238   
On 1 August 1915 the CCB gave notice that the hours for the sale of 
intoxicating liquors on weekdays would be further reduced to between noon and 
2.30 p.m. and 6 and 9 p.m. whilst Sunday hours would remain unchanged.239  Even 
so, Barrow’s Chief Constable pointed out that some men were drinking more in the 
shorter hours while spirits were ordered by men who previously happy with a glass 
of beer.240  If the new restrictive hours concentrated or changed consumptive energy 
the authorities’ impeded progress further.  No treating was allowed, meaning the 
method of every man for himself multiplied the waiters and barmen’s workload 
slowing business and lessening takings.  One Barrow visitor believed the new 
restrictions constituted a Machiavellian manoeuvre to drive barmen and waiters 
into the army, asylum or the grave thereby bringing about a drink deadlock.241  
Customers could not club together to buy beer, nor the price of a pint be lent, at 
least not openly, a man could not pay for his wife’s refreshment but gave her money 
before entering to buy her own while credit was banned.  Additionally the limited 
number of licensed houses in proportion to Barrow’s increased population caused 
such congestion, especially at weekends, that it was difficult for licensees to conduct 
business.   
Publicans were pretty unanimous in their belief that Barrow would be all the 
better for the change, even if they were out of pocket.  Many had no intention of 
being submerged under a wave of enforced temperance, if men could not drink, 
there was the opportunity and prospect of a revolution in public house enterprise in 
                                                     
237 Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, Saturday, 25 September 1915 
238 Barrow Records Office – Defence of the Realm Act, Order of the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) for the 
Western Border Area, 22 November 1915 
239 Manchester Evening News, Friday, 23 July 1915  
240 Barrow Chief Constables Report 1915 - Licensing and Drink 
241 Reported in the Derry Journal, Wednesday, 11 August 1915 
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the selling of food.  Treating restrictions conveniently provided the opportunity of 
allowing a person to pay for intoxicants consumed at a meal as long as a friend was 
invited.242  The ordinary time for opening a public house had been 6 a.m. but now 
Barrow’s publicans were permitted to throw open their portals at 5.30 a.m. for the 
sale of food and non-intoxicating drink.  Many who had never sold a sandwich and 
to whom a request for tea without spirituous reinforcement would have been an 
insult now kept stocks of edibles.243  Clubs also made adjustments, the Barrow 
Working Men’s Club and Institute for example following closing of the bar at 10 p.m. 
sold temperance drinks and solid refreshment until the club closed at 11 p.m.244    
There had been no real test of the new drink restrictions as influences 
towards efficiency in workshops, as shortly after they were introduced Barrow had 
five days holiday when many journeyed elsewhere in search of renovation and 
repair.245  By September 1915 it was reported further improvements had been seen 
in timekeeping at the principal works and men who turned up often suffering from 
the effects of drink appeared in better condition.246  The effect of the provisions also 
became noticeable as convictions for drunkenness in Barrow during the last five 
months of 1915 declining by over 30 per cent compared with the previous five 
months.247  While there was less evidence of public drunkenness the Barrow Chief 
Constable said that the problem had moved indoors.248  The CCB foresaw this and 
from August 1915 alcohol for home consumption in restricted areas could only be 
ordered in the promulgated opening hours and only during the week, Saturday and 
Sunday being barred while salesmen kept a written record of the purchaser and the 
amount purchased.  On 22 September 1915 a further order prohibited the ‘long pull’, 
the over-measuring of beer to draw trade into the house, while additional 
restrictions were imposed on the sale of beer and spirits for off premises 
consumption.   
                                                     
242 Coventry Evening Telegraph, Monday 20 September 1915 
243 Manchester  Evening News, Friday, 5 March 1915, The Home Office at this time had approved new drinking 
hours as from 9 am until 10 pm weekdays while Sundays were unaltered 
244 BDSO 85/1/4 Barrow Working Men’s Club and Institute Minutes, 29 March 1915 
245 Sheffield Independent, Saturday, 31 July 1915 
246 Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Advertiser, Saturday, 4 September 1915 
247 Barrow Chief Constables Report 1915 - Licensing and Drink 
248 Ibid. ‘more drink was now being consumed indoors’ were the words sited in the report 
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Many Scotch mechanics and labourers were employed in Barrow who had 
moved south to the call for munitions workers.  Leaving their wives and families 
behind they were apt to sweeten their solitude in the usual way, only more so.  The 
usual way was to drink a small whiskey then dilute it with a pint of beer and as he 
could do this indefinitely drastic action was called for.  The solution was to allow 
certain spirits to be diluted, Barrow Council having to take and analyse monthly 
samples, the results of which were sent to the CCB.249  On 28 March 1916, Barrow 
Council received a further communication from the LGB enclosing an amending 
order permitting further dilution of spirits.250  In making consumption less rapid and 
transport more difficult, spirits sold in bottles of less than a quart were banned.  
While drink regulations largely contributed to better timekeeping in Barrow, 
improvements were also brought about by the actions of the Local Munitions 
Tribunal and the curtailing of Sunday labour causing men to work weekday 
overtime.251 
Better work however could have been got out of the men if they were on 
three shifts of eight hours, but this was impossible without a large number of extra 
men and a great increase in accommodation.  
 
Accommodation 
Vickers in trying to hold on to key men, attempted to find accommodation 
by placing them on a register and by October 1915 houses were being supplied for 
their employees at the rate of approximately fourteen per week, often outside 
Barrow.252  In November, with the continuing need for accommodation the Barrow 
Chamber of Trade appealed on behalf of Vickers to ‘all classes’ of householders to 
find room for lodgers or paying guests.  Those who had not previously done so were 
asked to reconsider.  However, when the Central Billeting Board carried out its 
investigation in 1917 it found that the better off civil dignitaries and the like who 
                                                     
249 Barrow Council Minutes, 3 January 1916, Dilution of Spirits 
250 Barrow Council Minutes, 22 March 1916, Dilution of Spirits 
251 The Police Constables Annual Report for 1915 said with the restricting of hours of intoxicating liquor to 5.5 
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spoke loudest for patriotic self-sacrifice, were those least willing to lodge munitions 
workers.253    
Hutton says wartime developments were largely concerned with permanent 
housing for workers and their families rather than temporary accommodation while 
Sydney Smith suggested that increased accommodation could be provided by 
vessels in Barrow docks.254  In practice permanent housing was only sanctioned 
where it was certain it would be required to meet the needs of the normal 
population after the war.255   The Ministry’s primary interest in housing was to 
secure and increase output, welfare and social aspects were a means to an end and 
workers accommodation it seems subordinated to the needs of the moment.  When 
housing was needed for the Woolwich Chief Inspectors staff on arrival with their 
families arrangements were made with Vickers to build 90 houses close to the 
works.256  The firm received a grant to be written down from profits on each house, 
in return these better type houses were left at the disposal of the Ministry.257  On 
the other hand, suitable accommodation was never provided by the Ministry of 
Munitions for their women and girl workers on arrival at Barrow.258    
As shell production increased Vickers opened a bureau to further deal with 
the accommodation question.  A form of billeting system was introduced for 
workers, Alice Wycherley arriving from Manchester said she was met at the railway 
station and taken to lodgings where she was provided with a room in a private 
house.259  She paid 14s a week rent and board while only earning 20s 9d, so there 
was little left for extravagance.  Meals were depressing, although the landlady 
meant well, and when things turned bad with her roommate she moved, but this 
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meant sharing a bed with another girl as few had their own room.260  By going on 
alternative shifts she could earn 32s 6d but this she found more tiring and even 
though able to afford better accommodation there was little chance of finding 
anywhere else. 
 With the sudden pouring of people into Barrow in search of work, efforts 
were made particularly by Vickers to build houses, but it was soon realised the 
additional houses obtained were inadequate to keep pace with the population.  A 
limited number of hostels were thus provided for single men and women, although 
Hutton and the regional newspapers maintain they were provided for married 
couples, no such evidence has been found regarding Barrow.261  What is generally 
reported by historians is limited to women’s hostels, and concerning Barrow, Joy 
says statistics are unavailable.262  Nevertheless, hostels were established in various 
configurations for different classes of workers under assorted management.  Hostels 
emanated in two phases, firstly to accommodate men needed for expanding war 
work and secondly for imported female munitions workers.263 
To accommodate Belgians awaiting lodgings Vickers took over Whinsfield 
House converting it to a hostel for which they sent a bill for £550 to a local Belgian 
charity for refugees to recoup their outlay, the mayor pointed out that the fund was 
not for increasing Vickers’ dividends.264  Further accommodation for Belgians was 
provided at Lund Hall, Ulverston.265  In 1915 two hostels were erected, one close to 
Vickers’ works accommodating 250 single men on a cubicle system.266  The model 
Trades Hostel as it was known was of brick and made fireproof throughout.  Cubicles 
were of corrugated steel while the ground floor was taken up by a communal dining-
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room, kitchens, laundry, toilets and bathrooms.267  Its cliental could be quarrelsome; 
one lodger being ejected for splitting open a man’s head with a bottle.268  Advertising 
for a warder the hostel was described as a first-class weekly lodging house, whilst 
the job description was likened to that of a club doorman.269  The hostel 
accommodated all trades and tended to be full a building worker from Burnley 
complaining that he had slept three nights in the tram sheds before he could find 
lodgings there.270  The second timber constructed hostel accommodated 100 men 
affording the comforts expected by navvies, including cooking and other facilities.271  
For those preferring a private house Vickers altered and furnished the Bankfield 
Hotel on Walney to accommodate 80 men.  Renamed the Bankfield Boarding House 
it proved popular with colonial workers.272  Additionally the Salvation Army provided 
a hostel in town for 50 single male workers who paid 6s per week for lodgings and 
obtained food at fixed charges.273  Further accommodation was provided by three 
common lodging houses.274 
Shell production increased as workshops were completed, production 
machinery installed and workers, predominantly women and girls trained.275  
Vickers held the names of many women residing in the Barrow and Dalton district, 
but as production increased women arrived from all parts of the country needing 
accommodation.276  Some arrived with nothing more than what they stood up in and 
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headed towards the Barrow Hostel for Women and Girls.277  This pioneering hostel, 
effectively a clearing house, was self-supporting and any profits used to pay the 
mortgage on the building.  Run by a committee of ladies it brought into existence a 
group concerned with women workers, which resulted in a widespread movement 
throughout the borough.  The hostel also welcomed homeless and destitute girls 
and those arriving by late train with nowhere to go such people were provided with 
food and lodgings until suitable places could be procured.278  There was 31 beds, but 
on busy nights women slept in armchairs and on couches, no alcohol was allowed, 
lights out was at 10.30 p.m., and by 9 a.m. the premises had to be vacated.279  Whilst 
strict, the dormitories were described as nicely furnished and the establishment said 
to have a comfortable atmosphere. 
This work was further enlarged when the Dane Ghyll Hostel for twenty-eight 
women munitions workers opened under YMCA management.  The building, lent by 
Lady Cavendish, was situated in its own grounds and said to offer every comfort. 
Separate cubicles were provided and terms comprised residence and board 
including breakfast, packed lunch and supper costing from 16s to 17s 6d per week.280  
For Vickers’ manageresses and forewomen Ramsden Hall in the town was converted 
to a hostel, providing comfortable quarters at 18s per week.281  On Walney, Vickers 
erected a temporary hostel without cubicles for 104 women.  It was described as 
well-furnished and equipped with recreation, reading and writing rooms adjoining 
the main building.282  Initially the hostel was used as temporary accommodation for 
women brought over from the Isle of Man for training in balloon and airship fabric 
work.283  The Manx Hostel as it became known at the time was rent free and run by 
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the ladies who paid for the coal and electricity, while the cost of food and occupant 
care was 10s each per week.284   
Though conditions varied in hostels, conflicting opinions regarding their 
popularity existed.  Woollacott noted men like women preferred lodgings, while the 
Jarrow News stated men at Barrow were pouring into hostels as they provided 
comfortable and clean accommodation in preference to the undesirable crowded 
lodgings.285  In Barrow many women were said to be of poor class and disliking the 
restrictions of hostels they preferred crowding into private lodgings.286  The Barrow 
News also reported there were dreadful stories of girls who had maddened their 
landladies with their unclean habits.287  Not only were landladies maddened but 
women workers.  Alice Wycherley changed lodgings because her roommate had 
been freely using her hairbrush on hair described as dirty or worse.288 
Hostels barely touched the accommodation problem and in November 1916, 
Vickers wrote to the Ministry stating the housing congestion was now at breaking 
point.  Lord Harrowby was asked to investigate conditions at Barrow and his report 
of December 1916 substantiated Vickers’ concerns recommending 1,000 houses and 
a number of hutments should be built immediately, while more buildings should be 
converted to hostels.289   Vickers had done all it could and having spent £623,330 on 
housing refused to spend further capital on what was a war emergency largely 
occasioned by the needs of the new Ministry’s Howitzer Shop.290  Although a scheme 
for corporation housing brought forward by the Labour wing in the spring of 1915 
was defeated, agitation was renewed the following year.291  It was now certain any 
future schemes would have to be initiated by the Ministry.  
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Problems of accommodation did not just concern Vickers workers.  When 
the Barrow Steelworks plate mill shut down in March 1915 through lack of labour a 
hostel for 40 men was opened in the quest to accommodate and retain additional 
workers.  As the iron and steel industry took on importance and production 
increased, notices were posted at the works requesting lodgings for skilled workmen 
in the steel and engineering trades.  In December 1915 ejectment orders were 
applied for against tenants not engaged on government work living in their company 
housing. The accommodation was needed for key workers who would otherwise 
leave Barrow.    
With the huge requirements for industry energy and the needs of the vastly 
increased population, Barrow Corporation gas, electricity and water works with 
limited staff and workers came under enormous pressure. 
  
Utilities  
 As the major firms, smaller foundries and metal works in the borough 
became heavily engaged in Ministry work, gas demand increased enormously.292  
Vickers, the major consumer caused consumption in November 1915 to rise almost 
to the total capacity of the gasworks.293  It had become clear by 1910 that a new 
gasworks was needed, but a site was not purchased from the Furness Railway 
Company until 1913 and the new works eventually opened in 1917.  Finding key staff 
for the new works proved problematic as the appointed manager lacked experience 
and both he and the assistant manager were liable to military call up.294  While there 
were several successful applicants for a works foreman, they could not leave their 
employment and the Ministry of Munitions had to be contacted for the release of 
an experienced man.295   
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The Barrow gas position became so acute that steps were taken to curtail 
domestic gas supplies including shop and street lighting.296  Not only was there a 
need to conserve gas for industry but to conform to the Home Secretary’s lighting 
restrictions.  However with restraints less stringent on the West Coast, Barrow was 
only affected in the unlikely threat of an air attack.297  Public safety became of 
concern in the winter of 1917 causing the Chief Constable to ask the Council to 
increase street lighting.  Permission was granted and the restrictions lifted to allow 
the street lights to remain lit until 11 p.m.298   
Many Barrow houses were fitted with gas ovens, the numbers having 
increased as new houses were built to accommodate the growing population.299  To 
reduce consumption notice was given that all gas ovens where coal ranges were 
fixed in houses were to be cut off.  For some the loss of gas ovens had a detrimental 
effect as coal fires were too small to prepare and serve meals for families 
accommodating lodgers.300  There were also health issues as one resident pleaded 
for her gas oven to remain connected to cook light invalid food.301  In response to 
such complaints numbers of ovens were reconnected, ensuring adequate means of 
cooking for munitions workers were available and to meet cases of illness.302  As the 
new gasworks came on line, one councillor suggested that many would happily 
connect the pipes themselves and he hoped they would risk prosecution.303  The 
shortage of plumbers meant reconnection was slow and Vickers had to assist until 
urgent work called their men back, by July 1917 practically all the gas ovens were re-
connected.304    
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The electricity works were also at maximum output supplying Vickers with 
motive power.  The firm’s heightened electrical use led to an agreement in late 1914 
with Barrow Corporation to supply five million units per year for three years 
necessitating additional electrical plant until the firm commissioned their own.305  
Introduction of Vickers’ new plant reduced the Corporation output, but the loss was 
made up by new consumer demands.306  Table 6 indicates the units supplied by the 
Corporation and shows Vickers consumption rising considerably, and more than 
doubling in 1917-18.307 
 
Year 








1912-13 1.7 1912 17.5 
1913-14 2.1 1913 17.25 
1914-15 3.6 1914 18.5 
1915-16 13.8 1915 25.5 
1916-17 13.4 1916 34 
1917-18 10.2 1917 38.5 
1918-19 8.3 1918 36.6 
1919-20 6.6 1919 14.0 
Table 6 - Electricity Statistics 1912 to 1920 
  When the Corporation requested an extension of the electrical plant in 1917 
the Ministry electricity controller agreed only to expenditure on another boiler and 
converter to supply direct current to the shipyard.308  This rigid control had become 
necessary to cut down plant requirements to an absolute minimum and economise 
the use of power through coal shortages.309  The Controller was eventually 
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convinced of the need for a new generator and certification was provided in early 
1918 to allow its use the following winter.310 
Barrow gas and electricity works depended on a continuous supply of good 
quality coal.311  Failing to obtain suitable supplies at the old gasworks the Hindpool 
district suffered from a lack of pressure causing Barrow Council to issue a notice 
apologising for the gas shortage.312  Problems of coal supply did not exist until 1917 
when the Coal Transport Reorganisation Scheme assigned definite producing areas 
to particular consuming districts to save coal haulage miles.313  Barrow traditionally 
received high quality coal from the Barnsley and Wigan districts but was reallocated 
to the West Cumberland area.  This meant coal now arrived from Durham and 
Northumberland.  Instead of shorter journeys they were lengthened incurring higher 
carriage costs of which the west-coast iron smelters mainly using Durham coke were 
already experiencing.314  Additional costs were therefore incurred for less efficient 
coal affecting Barrow’s industries and population.315  Great strain was put on the 
railway line between Whitehaven and Barrow as the coal and ore traffic vied for rail 
pathways.316  
In view of the increased prices a pure coal gas supply could not meet demand 
and carburetted oil gas was introduced.  Ministry oil was obtained but the supply 
fell short of demand and the plant throughput was reduced affecting daily gas 
output.317  Even when the new gasworks came into operation household gas cookers 
remained disconnected until the gas pressure could be built up.318 Following 
repeated applications a licence was obtained to obtain sufficient coal from Yorkshire 
for the new gasworks the quantity from Yorkshire however was never more than 
                                                     
310 Lancashire Evening Post, Friday, 15 February 1918 
311 Barrow Accounts Book 1916-1917, deliveries of coal had been fairly good but the quality had deteriorated 
considerably, the collieries not being able to screen and pick their coal so thoroughly owing to labour shortages 
312 Barrow Council Committee Meeting Minutes, 15 October 1915, Barrow Records Office 
313 Dearle, An Economic Chronicle of the Great War, p.148 
314 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Tuesday, 31 July 1917, the cost of carriage to the gasworks alone was 
estimated as £7,000 per year more; Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 8 September 1917 the Coal 
Controller eventually offered to cut carriage costs depending on colliery location 
315 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 8 September 1917 
316 The coal traffic was due to War Office decision while the iron ore was the concern of the Ministry of Munitions 
317 Lancashire Evening Post, Tuesday, 2 October 1917, a delivery of 150,000 gallons was authorised; Lancashire 
Evening Post, Tuesday, 5 February 1918, reported that to 31 March 1918  the quantity quoted would increase 
from 68,950 gallons to 88,950 gallons 
318 The Daily Telegraph, Tuesday, 27 July 1915, noted the existing gas works would not be able to cope with next 
winters demands; Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 28 February 1917 
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half met. The new gasworks justified itself, however better results would have been 
obtained had the deliveries of Yorkshire coal been fully maintained the variation to 
Durham coal causing output to be reduced.319  Supply of coal for the electricity works 
came from the North-East while the steelworks were allowed to carry on receiving 
supplies from its own colliery at Barnsley.320  There was also concern that the change 
of supply would affect household coal costs and the working-classes.   Although the 
Coal Controller had cancelled the normal coal supplies to the Barrow district on 31 
July 1917, the decision was modified to allow deliveries of household coal until 
further notice.321  The fear of Barrow household supply falling short of ordinary 
demand caused the formation of a local retail coal price committee with 
authorisation to stockpile as much coal as they considered necessary up to 2,000 
tons for distribution to the poor and sick at cost price during the winter months.  The 
tonnage of emergency coal for distributing to the poor was roughly 1,000 tons to 
100,000 inhabitants enabling Barrow to stockpile 637 tons. 322  This figure was 
calculated on the 1911 census of 63,700 inhabitants which by December 1917 was 
85,048.  Barrow Council therefore authorised the stockpiling of additional household 
coal.  
 Ironically in an area renowned for rainfall on the edge of the Lake District a 
water shortage threatened industry during the war years.  The town’s great 
population, industrial consumption and serious drought linked to Barrow’s low 
reservoir capacity all endangered the water supply.  In October 1915 water 
consumption had reached 42,000,000 gallons per week of which industry was taking 
20,000,000 gallons (Vickers 12,000,000 gallons) the remainder being for domestic 
purposes, an abnormal drain on the local reservoirs.323  The Corporation issued 
precautionary notices warning there was only seven days’ supply, and the situation 
would become critical if rain did not fall copiously during the next week.324  No 
domestic water could be drawn from the High Furness reservoirs and Barrow 
                                                     
319 Barrow Accounts Book 1917-1918 
320 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Thursday 19 July 1917 
321 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Wednesday, 31 July 1917 the instruction was not expected until 8 
September for Barrow; Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 4 August 1917 
322 Lancashire Evening Post, Tuesday, 2 October 1917 
323 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Tuesday, 5 October 1915, Barrow-in-Furness Accounts Book 1915-16, 
Vickers water consumption was 66.1 per cent in excess of 1914-15 
324 Hull Daily Mail, Monday, 11 October 1915 
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became reliant on the Duddon Valley Water Works.325  When the works opened in 
1910 Barrow Corporation asked for powers to take up to five million gallons a day, 
this was strenuously fought by mining and iron smelting companies, local 
authorities, and riparian owners which resulted in an allowance of two million 
gallons a day.326    
Restrictions were enforced in the summer of 1916 on washing windows, 
watering gardens, allotments and bowling greens, swilling flagstones and paths and 
the use of hosepipes whilst no street watering was allowed to damp down dust 
preventing disease.  The situation was exacerbated by severe frosts in the winter of 
1916-17, when a large number of mains services burst with consequent waste of 
water accounting to some degree for the heavy consumption.327  Restrictions thus 
remained in operation as the drought continued in the summer of 1917 when the 
average rainfall fell to 4.23 inches below average, the lowest on record for the ten 
year period.  Water had to be found somewhere and was pumped direct to the 
mains from the disused Yarlside ore mines.  Though said to be fit for human 
consumption, the water was described as decidedly off, unclean looking, not nice to 
drink or wash in and bad for ladies’ complexions.328  It smelled, contained too much 
lime and sulphate of soda and organic impurities and forced many to drink beer.329  
Despite winter rains the reservoirs were short of their full capacity by 168,000,000 
gallons and the storage in January 1916 was 123,000,000 million gallons less than at 
the corresponding period in 1915.330  Stocks of reservoir water and usage for the 
week ending 5 May 1917 and corresponding periods of 1915 and 1916 are shown in 
Table 7.331  The table indicates the stock in 1917 was lower than in 1915 and 
consumption was 600,000 gallons more per day, even after making economies but 
a healthy balance seems to have been maintained.   
 
                                                     
325 The Manchester Guardian, Monday, 8 November 1915 
326 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Monday, 30 October 1916 
327 Barrow-in-Furness Accounts Book 1916-1917, the situation was not helped by a shortage of plumbers 
328 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Tuesday 5 October 1915 
329 The News, Saturday, 20 November 1915 
330 Lancashire Evening Post, Tuesday, 4 January 1916 
331 Lancashire Evening Post, Friday, 11 May 1917 
 124  
Date Water Stock 
(gallons) 
Daily Consumption  
(gallons) 
8 May 1915 484,000,000 5,526,000 
6 May 1916 504,000,000 5,953,000 
5 May 1917 427,000,000 6,190,000 
Table 7 - Local Water Stock and Usage 
With water being drawn from the reservoirs and without the possibility of gathering 
and storing more water, the demands of Barrow’s increased population and 
enormous amounts used by Vickers and other works left Barrow Corporation to seek 
more water from the Duddon through Parliament powers.332  The Water Bill was 
quickly passed but the concern was that if the drought continued there would be no 
water coming down the river.333  Basically due to the needs of war production the 
population suffered, not only in Barrow but the surrounding district where towns 
were forced to make water savings.    
As war production intensified and continuous work became the norm use of 
electricity, gas and water increased in consequence of which supplies were only 
maintained by Corporation employees working overtime.  Utility departments were 
not establishments where munitions were being made so did not come under the 
1915 Munitions of War Act.  However supplies became of such vital importance that 
in September 1915 badge certificates were issued to essential Barrow Council 
workers.334  Under the Ministry of Munitions (Amendment) Act 1916 the provision 
of light, heat, water and power for tramways for carrying on munitions work all 
became certified war work.335   
Throughout the war the railways were the quickest way of moving people 
and goods around and most places had access to a railway station.  With a huge 
workforce spread over a wide area, getting the workers to and from Vickers however 
was a problem.  While the Shipyard Railway Station was only a short walk from the 
                                                     
332 Ibid. 
333 Lancashire Daily Mail, 9 May 1917, Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday 31 July 1917, one labour councillor 
contended there would still be 3 million gallons coming down the Duddon 
334 Barrow Records Office, Letter by the Borough Electricity Engineer: War Badges, Notice to Workmen; Barrow 
Council Minutes, General Purpose Committee, 11 June 1915; The Electricity Works was supplied with coal from 
the New Silkstone and Haigh Moor Colliery 
335 Barrow Records Office, Letter to Barrow Council from the Ministry of Munitions dated 12 October 1915 
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works and trams ran past the main gates there was no public transport covering 
outlying districts due to the lack of an omnibus service.  Additionally much of 
Barrow’s foodstuffs were now carried on the railways following the discontinuing of 
the Liverpool and Belfast routes, leaving the docks largely to be used for the import 
of war materials. 
 
Transport and Trade 
After a serious decline in the business of the iron and steel industries in the 
first half of 1914, on which the Furness Railway largely depended, a reversal of 
fortunes was seen on the outbreak of war.  Work had mainly continued on improving 
the permanent way and the strengthening of the Kent and Leven viaducts to enable 
heavier loads to be conveyed and the speed restrictions to be lifted.336  However, 
virtually all capital expenditure now needed approval of the Railway Executive and 
after 1915 in many cases the Ministry of Munitions.   
Along with the expansion of the Vickers works was the need for additional 
siding accommodation to handle munitions and related traffic.337  Improvements 
were made and in 1915 the shipyard dispatched and received almost double the 
traffic it handled in 1914.   Siding accommodation was also provided for the storage 
of coaches for an additional workmen’s train, the Vickers workforce having risen 
with many living outside Barrow encouraged by cheap railway tickets.338  Special 
arrangements were made for females travelling from Dalton and Ulverston engaged 
in the Vickers shell shop and for workers living at Rampside and Roa Island along the 
Piel branch.339  As the war proceeded further new traffic was generated by the 
Vickers New Park Howitzer Shop (NPHS) and later by its extension where the 
                                                     
336 Liverpool Daily Post, Monday, 14 February 1916, reconstruction of the Levens Bridge was completed in 1915 
at a cost of £27,482  
337 Robinson, Cumbria Railways Vol. 11, No.2, The Wartime Crisis on the Furness Railway, August 2013, p.44; 
Barrow Council Minutes, Highways and Lighting, 8 November 1915, an additional siding was built at Bridge Road 
under the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act 
338 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 20 February 1915 reported that the number of weekly 
workmen’s tickets was 2,900; Furness Railway Handbill, Tuesday, 1 October 1918 stated tickets were issued at 
a reduced rate and available in workmen’s carriages; Dearle, N.B., An Economic Chronicle of the Great War for 
Great Britain and Ireland,1914-1919, (London, Oxford University Press, 1929), p.33 notes on 29 March 1915 
English cheap bookings were cancelled excluding those for relatives visiting men in camps 
339 The Barrow News, Saturday, 10 July 1915; The News, Saturday, 4 August 1915   
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numbers of guns and workers greatly increased.340  Yet another matter was the 
extended platforms for longer workmen’s trains at Dalton and an extra platform at 
Barrow Shipyard Station where associated new crossovers and signalling works were 
needed.341  As more passengers were carried to the shipyard and armaments works, 
train services were altered to suit the working hours.    
Number of Workmen 
1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 
744,000 1,000,000 2,377,000 3,167,000 3,061,000 3,160,000 1,995,000 
Table 8 - Furness Railway Wartime Traffic Figures342   
In December 1916 the REC asked all railway companies for proposals for 
significant reductions in services to convey the increase in materials, men and 
supplies to the front.343  From 1 January 1917 the Furness Railway produced a 
revised timetable including extensive passenger cuts and the closure of one station 
(Table 9).344 Passenger luggage allowance was drastically cut, seat reservations 
discontinued and passenger fares increased by 50 per cent (excluding workmen’s, 
season traders’ and zone tickets) while all travel advertising ceased.345 








Departures from Carnforth 12 13 9 8 
Coniston branch 4 4 3 3 
Kendal branch 5 5 2 2 
Lakeside branch 7 7 3 3 
Piel branch 5 6 4 3 
Table 9 – Furness Railway ‘Passenger’ Service Reductions 
                                                     
340 Barrow Records Office, List of Factories Built or Enlarged Since 1914, date of Howitzer Shop plan 21 July 1915; 
date of Howitzer Shop Extension plan 22 September 1916 
341 Furness Railway Directors Minutes, 10 June 1915; The News, Saturday, 2 October 1915, an industrial army of 
1100 workers were travelling from Dalton each day 
342 Robinson, P., Cumbria Railways Vol. 11, No.3, The Wartime Crisis on the Furness Railway, August 2013, p.95 
343 Furness Railway Directors Meeting 9 Mar 1917 
344 Robinson, P., Cumbria Railways Vol. 11, No.2, The Wartime Crisis on the Furness Railway, May 2013, p.146 
345 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 24 February 1917, the immediate result was that during January 1917 the 
company conveyed 49,818 passengers fewer than in the corresponding month of 1916; Dearle, N.B., An 
Economic Chronicle of the Great War for Great Britain and Ireland 1914-1919, (London, Oxford University Press, 
1929), p.116, fare increases, luggage limitations, and travelling restrictions were general throughout the country 
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Previous to the changes trains were run during the short July 1915 holiday to 
Newcastle, Scotland and other districts at ordinary fares.346  Also in what seemed a 
gesture of goodwill in the summer of 1916, long distance tickets were issued to allow 
short term visits to see relatives on munitions work at places like Barrow.347  Part of 
the changes included the withholding of railway vouchers usually issued for holidays. 
This led to further workers grievances in August 1917.348  The changes had the 
desired effect however as ordinary passenger numbers fell drastically while 
workmen’s numbers remained consistent (Table 10).349 
 1916 1917 Percentage Change 
Passenger (ordinary) 558,385 379,378 -32 
Passengers (workmen) 769,765 771,522 - 
Tonnage 1,141,261 1,226,387 +7 
Passenger train miles (ordinary) 131,724 96,548 -27 
Passenger train miles (workmen) 32,829 26,226 -20 
Goods train miles 166,541 189,935 +14 
Table 10 - Change in Passenger Traffic 1916-17 (first three months only) 
The effects of alterations and reductions was to make the housing situation 
more acute, and in consequence of the withdrawal of trains to and from Ulverston, 
business people relocated to Barrow to arrive at work on time.350  For armaments 
workers resident at Greenodd the curtailments on the Lakeside branch meant a ten 
mile round trip either on foot or bicycle to catch the workers trains at Ulverston.  In 
September 1917, the Billeting Board attempting to relive Barrow’s overcrowding 
proposed investigating Dalton and Ulverston where accommodation was 
available.351  This proved difficult as workmen did not want to live at a distance 
especially as there was a deficiency of railway accommodation.  Although an 
                                                     
346 Liverpool Echo, Friday, 30 July 1915, there is no mention of railway vouchers 
347 The Burnley News, Wednesday, 16 July 1916 
348 CAB 24/21/94, Report of the Ministry of Labour Week Ending 1 August 1917  
349 Robinson, Cumbria Railways Vol. 11, No.3, The Wartime Crisis, p.89, no explanation is provided why the 
number of workmen passengers increased slightly in 1917 but the rail mileage fell substantially 
350 CAB 24/23/59, July 1917, Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest, No.2 Division – North-West Area, 
Supplemental Report for Barrow-in-Furness District 
351 CAB 24/27/30, 26 September 1917 Inadequacy of Housing Accommodation at Barrow 
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experimental cheap and adequate train service was tried in December 1917 to 
encourage workers to live at Coniston it provided little relief being too distant.352   
 The Furness Railway also owned the docks where wartime trade was largely 
confined to imports of iron ore from Spain and Algeria while oil imports became 
important business.  Unloading was achieved by hydraulic cranes supplied with 
water from the docks and therefore maintaining dock levels and security was vital.  
War put a stoppage to large imports of pulpwood timber which led to the closure of 
the Barrow Pulp and Paper Works allowing transfer of the remainder of the labour 
force mainly to Vickers.353  General merchandise trade by steamer between Barrow, 
Liverpool and Belfast ceased, preventing a varied supply of produce arriving by the 
shortest route.354  The distribution of foodstuffs was now supplied to Furness and 
West Cumberland by the railway which was not as efficient as by sea.  The removal 
of coastal shipping indeed disturbed the established order, effecting a complete 
reversal of circumstances under which active competition had been carried on 
between railway and coastal shipping services, the lack of competition allowing the 
REC goods managers to consider and approve emergency rail rates on the outbreak 
of war.355   
  Diverting sea traffic to rail added a huge load to the railway system.  This 
could have been massively increased if the Furness Railway chairman’s proposal in 
early 1915 of discussing with the Liverpool dock authorities the possibility of 
diverting traffic from congested Liverpool to Yorkshire by the Furness docks and 
Midland Railway had gone ahead.356  The goods and mineral traffic conveyed over 
the railway during 1916 was exceptionally heavy, and difficulties were experienced 
both in regard to engine power and wagons, particularly the latter.  Pre-war plans 
had concentrated on the demands of mobilisation for a short war, but the war of 
attrition led to a massive increase in manufacturing facilities overwhelming the 
wagon supply.   As early as February 1915 the Furness Railway suffered from the 
                                                     
352 Yorkshire Evening Post, Monday, 17 December 1917 
353 The Manchester Guardian, Friday, 23 July 1915, the firm had tried holding onto its workers and a dispute 
arose when a numbers of girls gave notice to apply for work on munitions, the girls were told they could not 
leave without clearance cards although they had already left their employment 
354 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 30 August 1919 
355 Furness Railway Directors Meeting, 14 June 1917 
356 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 20 February 
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hold-up of wagons awaiting discharge owing to congestion caused due to the rush 
of Government traffic.   At the commencement of 1916 serious congestion existed 
at Vickers causing the Inland Transport Branch which was employed in the 
supervision of conveyancing by rail to relieve the situation causing the average daily 
discharge to be increased thus releasing large numbers of wagons.357   
As orders increased for war munitions the Barrow and Workington 
steelworks absorbed the entire output of ordinary iron for smelting causing local ore 
supplies to be supplemented by foreign ores.  At Barrow docks, increased cargoes 
of iron ore caused problems of storage, transport and manpower.  During October 
1915 the Furness Railway received complaints of wagon shortages from the local 
iron and steel companies which was impeding the importation of raw material.358  In 
particular the limitations of Maryport harbour in dealing with larger iron ore vessels 
meant supplies came through Barrow.359  Also when the unloading of iron ore for 
the Carnforth Iron Works was prevented by the silting up of Heysham harbour the 
ore ships were diverted to Barrow adding to the rail transport problem.360    This 
traffic engaged a large number of wagons while tying them up in consequence of 
the longer haulage, the common usage of wagons amongst railway companies only 
coming into operation in 1917.361  The Furness Railway also hired numbers of 
wagons, and with assistance from the LNWR and MR Companies the large volume 
of traffic was worked satisfactory.362   
To prevent congestion of ships in the docks and improve the unloading of 
iron ore cargoes, which needed experienced dockside labour, agents who were 
usually shipping firms were appointed in the ore ports to accelerate the rate of 
discharge and lessen demurrage charges.  These special agents reported to the 
Overseas Transport Department on the conditions of port labour or any other 
matters relating to the discharge of cargo.  In the late summer of 1916 a Port Labour 
                                                     
357 OHMoM Vol. VII, The Control of Materials, Pt. V Transport, Storage and Salvage, Ch. I, Overseas Transport, 
p.27, the Inland Transport Branch was also responsible for conveyance on the roads and canals 
358 Andrews, The Furness Railway, p.217, with the intention of relighting more furnaces in 1916 the Furness 
Railway Goods Manager recommended hiring 200 open wagons with bottom doors and installing temporary 
hoppering to make the wagons suitable for carrying ore    
359 Andrews, The Furness Railway, p.216, during the first five months of 1917 199,008 tons of iron ore passed 
through Barrow Docks of which 46,706 tons was for Workington 
360 Derby Daily Telegraph, Thursday, 20 January 1916 
361 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 24 February 1917 
362 Lancashire Evening Post, Friday, 16 February 1917 
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Committee consisting of representatives of the Admiralty, the War Office, the Port 
Authority, and one member of organised labour was instigated at Barrow.363  
Coincidentally port occupations were declared work of national importance 
enabling the Board of Trade to grant certificates of exemption from military service.   
In early 1917 a transport workers battalion arrived at Barrow which also 
formed part of the Barrow Garrison quartered at Cavendish Park Military Camp.364  
The battalion was only called upon to assist dockside labour in maintaining the flow 
of traffic through the port or handling foreign ore supplies at the iron and steel 
works.365  The organisation of dockside labour was also enhanced by the 
introduction of large mechanical grabs as labour saving devices.  While seeing 
improvements they were not always satisfactory.  With four ships with iron ore for 
Workington awaiting unloading in Barrow Docks, it was said: ‘even if they were 
worked day and night as London proposed, it would require 600 wagons to carry 
6,000 tons per day, namely twenty trains a day’.366  Notwithstanding, the effect of 
improvements during 1917 was the saving of 1,000 days in shipping time, equivalent 
to 30 additional voyages between Barrow and Spain. Indeed the average import of 
iron ore per month at Barrow nearly doubled from 27,000 tons in 1913 to 52,000 
tons in 1918.367 
  The privately owned Barrow tramways on which workers relied was both 
irregular and unprepared for the additional traffic.368  The tramways’ manager 
stated there were few towns where conditions made it so difficult to secure 
regularity of service as the lines passed over two lifting bridges and on route there 
                                                     
363 Lancashire Evening Post, 22 August 1916, the Barrow Committee representatives were Lt. George Wescott, 
Mr. T Jackson and Mr. S. Lowry (organised labour), Mr. A. Aslett (Furness Railway);  
364 Lancashire Evening Post, Friday, 25 August, 1916, a local government committee was formed at Barrow of Lt. 
G. Westcott, Mr. T Jackson, and Mr. A. Aslett (FR), battalions were chiefly composed of men formerly employed 
as dockers  and were used to supplement not supplant civilian labour when there was a shortage involving delay 
to shipping - the 15th (Transport Workers) Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment was based at Barrow; H of C 
Debate 05 August 1919 vol.119 cc177-8 – Transport Workers Battalions 
365 CAB 24/21 Port and Transit Executive Committee – Transport Workers Battalions; 
366 This is worthy of further research as the number of ships in Barrow docks could have been caused by the 
introduction of the convoy system causing the difficulties of discharge to be increased as the ships arrived in 
fleets instead of singly, the interval between arrivals however was extended 
367 Lancashire Evening Post, Friday, 6 December 1918, Barrow held records for discharging ships during the war 
- in September 1917 3,150 tons were unloaded in 21.5 hours, during October 1917 the output from all iron ore 
steamers was 1,888 tons a day 
368 Postlethwaite, H., Transport in Barrow-in-Furness, (Glossop, Venture Publications, 2013), p.9 
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were seven level-crossings.369  Partly due to the infrequent and bad tramway service, 
lodgings in the town any distance from the works were unpopular.  In June 1910 four 
large 96-seater double-decker tramcars were provided to help cope with the 
increasing numbers of shipyard workers during rush hours.370  Notwithstanding, 
shipyard shift-changes were described as chaotic as men clambered up the outside 
standing and sitting everywhere, it being impossible to collect half the fares or for 
women to find a place.371  Though the war placed restrictions on expansion, 1915 
saw the doubling and extending of the track along the main road into town and a 
shuttle service dropping off workers at the town hall near Vickers’ works.   However 
these additions had been consequent on getting and retaining drivers and 
conductors including women.372 Such was the shortage that weekend labour from 
the shipyard were employed as conductors and drivers.373  Complaints continued 
and in November 1915 the ASE Secretary wrote to the Council drawing attention to 
the inadequacy of the tramway service particularly at the early morning and 
lunchtime peak hours.374  By early February 1916 Barrow Council had allotted £400 
per annum to the British Electric Traction Company in the understanding immediate 
improvements were made.375  The introduction in May 1917 of two tramcar trailer-
cars to meet the exceptional heavy munitions traffic especially at peak times proved 
to be of great value.376  The problems of local transport were caused by the hugely 
increased population trying to board a little improved pre-war system, further 
compromised by workers shift patterns.  Increased electricity costs for the trams’ 
prime mover was handed on to the users, while disruptions to the system meant 
                                                     
369 Cormack, I. L., Seventy-five Years on Wheels – The History of Public Transport in Barrow-in-Furness 1885-1960, 
(Cambuslang, Scottish Tramways Society Publications, 1960), p.24 
370 Ibid. p.22, they were also used to carry passengers too and from the pier for the excursion steamers before 
the war terminated the services  
371 OHMoM, Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Ch. VI Special Housing Problems, ‘Barrow’, pp.47-48 
372 Barrow Record Office, Letter from Barrow Labour Exchange, 1 April 1915 saying the Labour Exchange would 
provide substitutes where men or women were required: road men, tramway men, council clerks, meter 
inspectors etc.; Lancashire Evening Post, Tuesday, 16 October 1917 reported on an accident in July involving a 
Miss Griffiths the driver of an electric tramcar 
373 Cormack, Seventy-five Years on Wheels, p.23; Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday 5 April 1917, on the 
previous Sunday a fatal accident occurred, Mrs. Hutchinson was the appointed driver but as she was suffering 
from cramp when the accident happened, Harold Veale who was appointed to such work, was driving it. Veale 
(18) was an apprentice fitter employed on the tramcars at weekends 
374 Barrow Council Minutes, Highways and Lighting, 15 November 1915 
375 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Tuesday, 8 February 1916 
376 Cormack, I. L., Seventy-five Years on Wheels – The History of Public Transport in Barrow-in-Furness 1885-1960, 
(Cambuslang, Scottish Tramways Society Publications, 1960), pp. 24-25, the trailers were built to order 
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workers walked, a cause of frustration and a contributing factor to late arrival at 
work.377    
The Inland Transport Department for which all transport came within its 
purview established certain principles.378  To avoid labour wastage, material and 
vehicles, no individual or company was allowed to institute a new motor-omnibus 
service unless necessary for munitions workers or other government war service.379  
At Barrow omnibus numbers were low and under supervision regarding running 
times, speed, routes, numbers of passengers and vehicles on the road.380  Penalties 
were such that their operation was seriously limited nevertheless in 1915 a service 
started between Barrow Town Hall and Dalton with extensions to Ulverston.381  
Their small numbers however were decreased when an omnibus was destroyed by 
fire in January 1916.382   
The strain of long factory hours was often aggravated by living, or rather 
sleeping in overcrowded and noisy lodgings and for some extended hours of travel 
to and from work.  Most Vickers’ men were working an eleven-hour dayshift and 
thirteen-hour nightshift while some men, chiefly shell-makers, were working two or 
three hour’s overtime on top of normal hours.383  Workers were not adverse to the 
call for more effort as members of one union put in on average 87 to 90 hours a 
week, 80 per cent above the ordinary working week.384  In one emergency men 
worked continuously from early Friday morning until Saturday teatime.385  Men 
                                                     
377 BDSO 7-1 Minutes of the Barrow Labour Party and Trades Council Minutes from 1914, on 8 May 1918 the 
Trades Council complained to the Ministry of Munitions asking them to take steps so that no loss of labour would 
arise through the inability of the men to get to work by failure of the Barrow Tramway System  
378 OHMoM, Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V Provision for the Housing of Munitions Workers,  Ch. V The 
Transport of Munitions Workers, p.41 
379 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 2 March 1916, the advisability 
of running a motor from the Town Hall to the Shipyard Gate was put forward by the ASE Committee to the 
Directors of Vickers 
380 Barrow Council Minutes, Highways and Lighting, 14 January 1916; Cormack, I. L., Seventy-five Years on Wheels 
– The History of Public Transport in Barrow-in-Furness 1885-1960, (Cambuslang, Scottish Tramways Society 
Publications, 1960), p.36, only three licences were issued so the service would have been limited 
381 Barrow Council Minutes, Highways and Lighting, 10 January 1916;  
382 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 15 January 1916, a motor omnibus belonging to Barrow Tramway Co. was 
destroyed by fire near Furness Abbey last night.  The bus was the last from Ulverston to Barrow and there were 
only four passengers, it is supposed a passenger discarded a match igniting gases which had collected in the 
bottom of the compartment, there was a sudden outburst of flame and fire spread to the petrol supply 
383 Shadwell, Drink in 1914-1922, p.189; Evening Telegraph, Monday 31 May 1915, by May  some relief was 
provided when Vickers workers were given the last Sunday of each month off, Sunday cricket was allowed at 
Vickerstown to allow war workers to obtain quiet recreation in the open air 
384 The Times, Saturday, 20 March 1915; Roberts, E. A. M., Working Class Barrow and Lancaster, p.13 one 
respondent kept a diary and recorded in one week in 1915 he worked 110 hours  
385 The Barrow News, Saturday, 27 March 1915 
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were also meant to work through holidays.  No cessation of work was seen at Easter 
1915 and though Whit Bank Monday was allowed it was not general as men worked 
to deliver contracts.386  Some relief it was realised could be found through relaxing 
Sunday labour.  
 
Sunday Labour  
Vickers was in the unusual position of working for two masters, the Admiralty 
and the Ministry of Munitions, which placed them in a difficult position regarding 
Sunday labour.  The Admiralty had taken action in April 1915 when the home 
dockyards and contractors were ordered to discontinue Sunday labour on 
shipbuilding and engineering work except in emergency, since ‘recent experience 
had shown that over a long period more work would be done without Sunday work 
than with it.’387  In July 1915 the Admiralty further informed the contractors that 
‘systematic’ Sunday labour was to be discontinued on hull work, though urgent fleet 
repairs and items employing small numbers of men was permitted.388  Discontinuing 
of Sunday labour by the Admiralty caused Vickers to complain of dissatisfaction 
amongst its workforce regarding the loss of earnings and the difficulties of enforcing 
the rule.  This caused the Admiralty to write to the Ministry of Munitions in October 
1915 explaining their desire to put a complete stop to Sunday work and drawing 
attention to difficulties caused by its constant use by the Ministry of Munitions and 
War Office for munitions production.  The Ministry was likewise asked to take 
definite restrictive action on behalf of controlled establishments as isolated 
employers could not take an independent line.   
Having started Sunday work on grounds of necessity, Vickers found it difficult 
to discontinue, partly through exigencies of completing contracts and partly because 
of anticipated or actual difficulties over wages.  Skilled workmen after all had left 
their families and come to Barrow attracted by high earnings with increased 
overtime rates which covered the cost of keeping two homes.  Stoppage of Sunday 
work with double-time might despite the leaving certificate cause men to go 
                                                     
386 The Times, Friday, 21 May 1915 
387 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. III The Control of Working Conditions, Ch. VI The Control of Hours of 
Labour, 1916-1919, p.95 
388 Ibid. 
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elsewhere leading to decreased output.389  Others were not able to support families, 
as one man complained that through cessation of Sunday work he was unable to 
support his parents on 35s per week.390   
Numbers of employers were against working on Sundays on administrative, 
economic, religious and social grounds.  Supervision was difficult to arrange and 
imposed a severe strain on foremen, deputies not being easy to find, while double 
pay for Sunday work made it expensive often leading to bad time-keeping and 
slackness.  Trade union officials warned that men were getting fed up, nervous and 
irritable, the report on Sunday labour confirmed this adding boredom was a cause 
of defective output.391  It was therefore strongly urged by the HMWC that Sunday 
work should be confined to cases of emergencies and necessity.   
Suggestions were made to work all day Sunday and play Saturday as the men 
or at least the great majority of them were not church or chapel goers and could 
amuse themselves in a way Sabbatarian prejudices prevented on Sundays.  In the 
same way it was represented on behalf of women munitions workers that a Saturday 
holiday gave opportunities for shopping.  When the Government eventually gave 
notice that Sunday work was to be avoided where possible, many Vickers men 
stayed away Saturday afternoons to get fresh air and in some departments as many 
as 90 per cent absented themselves.  This retarded important munitions work 
causing disorganisation and interference with weekend work, the issue also had to 
be dealt with by the Munitions Tribunal.392  Nonetheless the day of rest was Sunday 
and by May 1915 Barrow munitions workers were given the last Sunday of each 
month off for rest and recreation.393   
As pointed out Sunday work should be confined to cases of emergencies and 
necessity.  When efforts were concentrated on the 1916 offensive and its support, 
the pressing need for output was grounds enough for limiting and cancelling 
                                                     
389 Committee on Employment, 1658/13; CE 439/13 
390 Sheffield, Telegraph, Tuesday 16 November 1915, 
391 Manchester Guardian, Thursday, 6 December 1915; Vernon, H.M., Industrial Fatigue and Efficiency,(London, 
George Routledge and Sons, 1921), pp. 115-116 Vernon said Sunday labour was industrially uneconomical, not 
only because of the physical strain involved but by the monotony of continuous work unrelieved by any 
relaxation 
392 Dundee Evening Telegraph, Wednesday, 6 October 1915; The News, Saturday, 9 October 1915 
393 Dundee Evening Telegraph, Monday, 31 May 1915, The Liverpool Daily Post, Tuesday, 30 November 1915 also 
reported munitions girls were getting off one Sunday in three 
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holidays and reintroducing Sunday labour.   On the one side the HMWC urged the 
necessity of diminishing Sunday labour while the manufacturers and Ministry Supply 
Departments wanted increased output insisting on the importance of utilising as 
many ‘machine hours’ as possible.  Where labour on munitions work could not be 
stopped firms were asked to drop one Sunday shift or employ weekend relief 
labourers, such relief shifts were provided for a short time at Barrow at the end of 
1916.394   
Where the intention to stop Sunday work was explained to workpeople 
labour trouble was reported only in isolated cases.395  In some cases increased 
weekday overtime, on which the trade unions had withdrawn all restrictions partly 
met the Sunday stoppage, while in others the loss of Sunday work was a general 
excuse for wage demands.396 Sunday labour thus raised a number of issues, the 
demand for production by the employer, the desire for wages for workers to 
maintain their living standards, against the need for rest and Sabbatarian concerns.  
Certainly the long hours being worked without breaks contributed to the unrest 
which was to come. 
  
Conclusions 
 This chapter has focused on the changes which came about due to further 
expansion of the war industry in Barrow and the need for control in the interest of 
increasing efficiency and therefore output as provided through the Ministry of 
Munitions Act.  Arguably as employers the Act assisted Vickers who were struggling 
to complete contracts through a lack of skilled manpower caused by the loss of key 
men.  The leaving certificate although generally said to be a major cause of 
complaint helped in securing Vickers men.  The Munitions Tribunal was an important 
negotiating tool and it has been seen that the Chairman was unlikely to release men 
as long as Vickers needed them whilst at the same time demonstrated common 
sense in its operation.  It is realised that the Tribunal cases were mainly related to 
                                                     
394 OHMoM, Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. III Welfare: The Control of Working Conditions, Ch. V Hours of Labour 
1914-16, p.109 
395 OHMoM, Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. III Welfare: The Control of Working Conditions, Ch. V Hours of Labour 
1914-16, p.102 
396 Manchester Guardian, Wednesday,10 November 1915 
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the shipyard and iron and steelworkers and not to the shell shop workers’ where the 
methods of production were mainly repetitive and the conditions more conducive 
to health and wellbeing.   
 The published White Paper regarding the loss of hours to bad timekeeping in 
the northern shipyards including Vickers, coupled with reports on drink, although 
largely unfounded, was reason enough to form the CCB.   The drink restrictions did 
improve timekeeping but there were other contributing factors including the work 
of the Munitions Tribunal and unrestricted overtime.  The major problem was the 
shortage of manpower.  More work however could have been completed if Vickers 
men were able to work a three-shift system.  This was never a possibility as there 
was inadequate housing and accommodation for the additional men.  What is 
evident is that while Vickers provided houses for its workers there would never be 
enough.  However the Ministry of Munitions while providing good quality housing 
for its inspectors and examiners failed to supply proper accommodation for its men 
and women munitions workers.   Accommodation for single females was mainly 
provided by suitable lodgings or through the use of hostels founded and run mainly 
by voluntary effort.  It was only when the Labour Exchange threatened to prevent 
further women coming to Barrow that the Ministry took action. 
 The huge demand of industry for utilities meant the public had to go without 
some of the necessities and comforts of life while the Government rescheduling of 
coal transportation added to Barrow’s woes.  The railways saw massive expansion 
in both freight and passenger transport and the removal and rescheduling of trains 
services was further cause for Barrow’s problems.   Barrow tramways were basically 
a failure, not having the capacity for transporting the increased numbers of workers, 
whilst little extension or improvement was made to the system.  The transport 
system was not assisted by the government limitations placed on the use of 
omnibuses.  In the docks the conditions of war prevented normal sea trade, largely 
transferring effort to the import and unloading of iron ore for war production.    
 Long hours of work without breaks and the conditions of work had a wearing 
effect upon the workforce.  Although Sunday labour was introduced to complete 
contracts, its removal made little difference as was quickly re-instated when the 
need arose for additional war munitions.  Vickers problems can be related to the 
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lack of workers’ housing preventing enough workers forming an adequate shift 
system, which would have gone a long way to preventing the wearing down of the 
workforce.  However, it is doubtful if enough houses could have been built and 
whether Barrow’s infrastructure could have coped.  Taken back a step further, it 
might be argued that the firm had been forced to take on more work than it could 
cope with.  What is clear is that many of the problems of Barrow were government 
instigated which were left to the towns industries and citizens to resolve.   
In the next chapter it will be seen how improvements in welfare and health 
were introduced at national level in the interest of increased munitions production, 
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CHAPTER 4: INCREASE IN PRODUCTION AND THE CONFLICTING NEEDS OF ARMY 
AND INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
This chapter is mainly concerned with the competing demand for the increased 
production of armaments and the calls of the Army for manpower covering the period 
1916 and 1917.  It will show that the continuing and ever-increasing demands led to 
ever more drastic changes, firstly in the resorting to further skill dilution required for 
the expansion of gun production.  In the interest of increased production and 
completion of contracts, further dilution was attempted by Vickers following on the 
successful introduction on the Clyde and Tyne, but in endeavouring to introduce 
dilution without supervision the outcome was one of unrest bringing the shop 
stewards into conflict with the state and its eventual grudging acceptance in certain 
departments.  The limited dilution achieved at Barrow was therefore only a partial 
victory for the state and employers as future dilution in the shipyard would be in 
conciliation with the trade unions rather than introduced under the Ministry of War 
Acts.   In providing the huge gun and shell increases great demands were made for 
iron ore for the production of pig iron and thereafter steel demands necessitated high 
pressure work against time against a background of labour shortage at the Barrow 
Iron and Steel works.  Demands were also made on the railways as further men, 
material and munition were needed at the front. 
Barrow was not only competing with other industries but with the Army for 
the manhood of the country at a time of increasing production.  The response of 
Vickers and the engineering unions it will be seen was one of reluctance and 
obstruction in allowing skilled men to be attested and conscripted.  Likewise the 
process of substitution was closely monitored in the selection of such men.  With the 
end of voluntarism and the introduction of compulsion the likely outcome was trade 
union grievances in view of the promises made concerning the protection of skilled 
men.    
Both dilution and substitution brought more women into Barrow raising issues 
of hours, wages, health and welfare.  The large numbers of women available for 
munitions work allowed them a shorter working day unlike the men.  The problems 
thus turned to those of different shift patterns which Vickers and the Ministry of 
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Munitions were at odds over and women’s accommodation.  The introduction of 
women munition workers brought a strengthening of women’s unions and the 
question of wages which was inhibiting their recruiting and affecting their subsistence. 
Following the introduction of women the Ministry looked to the control of their wages 
and welfare.  A widespread system of intervention into conditions of labour in the 
interests of efficiency was also taken by the Ministry bringing in measures aimed at 
increasing the output and the internal and external wellbeing of labour under 
abnormal conditions, particularly for females.   
 
Increase in production and the problem of dilution 
Construction of vessels was seriously delayed by labour shortages due to men 
joining the Army and being taken up by the Ministry.  The Admiralty could therefore 
not afford further interference.1  The Admiralty was only able to concentrate labour 
on urgently required vessels and in 1916 Vickers employed all available men on K-class 
submarines.  Men were transferred such as brass-fitters from the field carriage 
department who were allowed to carry out submarine brass-work as long as a record 
of change of practice and assurance they would be returned was received by their 
union.2  The transferring of men while assisting the employer could create problems.  
Moving one shell-shop worker to the submarine department caused a loss of wages 
and on requesting a leaving certificate from his new department he was told to 
continue working as he was needed there.3   
The competing demands of Admiralty, Ministry and Army were exacerbated in 
a place like Barrow and complicated by the role of unions.  The Admiralty informed 
the Ministry they would encourage dilution provided efficiency was maintained, the 
rate of output remain undiminished and any skilled labour released utilised to increase 
productivity at Vickers.  In view of the first two conditions the Admiralty argued it must 
be the authority to govern what measures of dilution should be introduced where 
output was destined directly or indirectly to their work, which effectively excluded 
                                                     
1 Report of Conference between the Admiralty and the Ministry of Munitions 1 June 1916, MW 105290/7 
2 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 10 August, 1916, fitters were 
urgently required for six K-class submarines, the ASE argued the problem was not lack of fitters but lack of 
management 
3 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 1 March 1916 
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Vickers from the Labour Department Dilution Section.4  In mixed firms where the 
Admiralty and the Ministry of Munitions had interests there was thus a demarcation 
of responsibility where dilution was concerned.  
In early 1915 the trade union leaders had agreed to the principle of dilution 
under the Shells and Fuses Agreement, however discontent reigned at Barrow.  While 
there were men in favour of dilution they were unlikely to air their views publicly.  
When the secretary of a Barrow branch of the United Machine Workers Association, 
fearing a strike, wrote three anonymous newspaper articles pleading for loyalty to the 
dilution agreement they failed to have the desired effect.5  The man’s opinions ended 
in a widely publicised slander case and his standing down as union secretary.   
Large numbers of guns, extra howitzers and ammunition were required, while 
fighting increased the need for repairs causing damaged guns and carriages to be 
returned to Barrow.6  During early 1916 heavy howitzers were badly needed and 
Vickers were asked to increase production.7  The firm was also responsible for three-
fifths of 9.2in gun orders and unless they could cope it was possible that this work 
could be sent elsewhere.8  A number of these guns were held in stock for a foreign 
power, while an order for three more was received, but delivery was delayed for the 
howitzer work.9  Needing to complete this urgent work Vickers proposed taking men 
from the Airship Department where materials were light and processes repetitive, 
ideal for women and unskilled men.10  Attempting to introducing dilution under the 
Ministry of Munitions Act, the firm asked the engineering trades to cooperate to which 
they replied they would not negotiate unless skilled operatives retained control of the 
                                                     
4 OHMoM Vol. IV The Supply and Control of Labour 1915-16, Pt. IV The Process of Dilution, Ch. V Dilution, p.96, It 
was agreed on 18 October 1916, that inspection and dilution in shipyards and shops engaged on marine engine 
work should be conducted solely by Admiralty officials   
5 Manchester Evening News, Wednesday, 27 February 1918, William Oldfield the secretary of the UMWA was 
ordered to pay £35 to Joseph Tyson, ASE chairman who was said to have slandered him at a dilution meeting in 
1916 
6 OHMoM Volume X The Supply of Munitions, Pt. I Guns, Ch. V Manufacture and Repair, p.73  
7 Ibid. p.72, September 1914 Vickers told to proceed with 16 9.2in Howitzers, a further 16 were ordered in October, 
in May 1915 Vickers asked for further orders to keep their capacity employed and a third order for 16 howitzers 
was given, July 1915 Vickers was realised as manufacturer, the first order for 120 howitzers was followed by a 
continuation order 
8 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 15/16 June 1916, in the Old Howitzer 
Shop 6in. Howitzers made in other places came for final overhaul and finishing after final tests 
9 Ibid, p.73 
10 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 20 July 1916 
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work.  Although a local Labour Advisory Board was available to assist dilution, the 
engineers ignored the Board preferring their own Joint Trade Dilution Committee.11    
When Vickers introduced forewomen to airship work several local union 
branches opposed the changes and warned if further changes were introduced 
without agreement an independent inquiry or arbitration would be demanded.12  
Vickers also intended introducing females to lathes in the NPHS.  In response the shop 
stewards said that they would consider further dilution until all available manpower 
was utilised.  Moreover members would refuse to teach dilutees.13  Vickers were 
adamant and started females on the NPHS machines and after a reasonable time 
intended applying dilution throughout the works.14  The engineers threatened hostility 
and refused to cooperate as they felt dilution was unnecessary and therefore 
requested an immediate enquiry.15  It was also resolved that if further dilution took 
place there would be a strike and a proposal was made that engineering 
representatives meet with Lynden Macassey, Chairman of the Government 
Commission for Dilution of Labour to discuss the situation.16   
Claiming that further dilution was being introduced to skilled work in the 
Admiralty Shop without union consent the engineers and allied tradesmen led by the 
shop stewards struck without notice and demanded that all females on the NPHS 
machines were removed before starting negotiations.17  The strike for some, however, 
was seen as unpatriotic:  
 
                                                     
11 OHMoM, Vol. IV The Supply and Control of Labour 1915-1916, Part I Labour Supply, Ch. IV Munitions Labour 
Supply Committee, p.81; Aberdeen Journal, Monday, 20 March 1916 
12 BDSO 57/1/7, 16 March 1916 
13 BDSO 57/1/7, 29 March 1916, evidence was placed before Vickers of slackness in departments and in some cases 
walking about cards being issued including the Airship Department BDSO 57/1/7, 2 April 1916, at a Joint Trades 
mass meeting the decision was taken on behalf of the organised workers to refuse to work the dilution scheme 
until all available male labour was employed to capacity and progress men and fixers were back on the tools, the 
same resolution was reiterated at a mass meeting on 13 April 1916 
14 BDSO 57/1/7, 26 May 1916;  Vickers must have seen their opportunity as in normal times partly through 
preference and partly for fear of upsetting male workers and disrupting production through industrial action, they 
were reluctant to employ women  
15 Ibid.   
16 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 28 June 1916, Macassey would only 
see the unions with whom agreements were made but in the interest of peace he saw the shop stewards 
committee 
17 Evening Despatch, Monday, 3 July 1916; Lichfield Mercury, Friday, 7 July 1916, 5,500-6,00 engineers came out 
over alleged dilution, turners in the Admiralty Shop were pressed to do work in the NHS and did not know who was 
going to operate the lathes they had left, when a deputation tried to find out they were refused access to the 
manager 
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‘what shall be said of men like those at Barrow who are ready to stop 
work for a week rather than allow skilled work to be done by unskilled 
persons.  The report of the proceedings at Barrow may be read 
alongside the record of heroism by our troops and will be read with 
disgust and with gratification that the authorities put their foot down 
declaring the strike organisers would be dealt with under DORA’.18 
  
Macassey on arrival at Barrow made clear the Government’s intention to 
introduce dilution as on the Clyde and Tyne.19  Although the ASE executive advised the 
men to return they refused.  However the strike was cut short under threat of 
proceedings being taken against the instigators and those taking part.  While the strike 
was illegal, no sanctions were applied to discourage such action and the men returned 
under the conditions they had left.  Following prolonged discussions and certain 
guarantees, dilution was grudgingly accepted in certain departments starting with the 
airship shed.  The Women’s Worker proudly pointing out that ‘girls were climbing 50ft 
ladders acting as holders up for riveters’.20   
When the Government Commission for Dilution was dissolved by the Ministry 
of Munitions, Macassey noted ‘they did not like an outside authority achieving what 
it had previously failed to do’.21  Notwithstanding, the same results were not achieved 
at Barrow as on the Clyde and Tyne where several thousand women were employed 
under dilution.22  The failure was down to Vickers in attempting to introduce dilution 
under the Munitions Act.  In the end an agreement was made that would suit all 
parties and prevent further unrest which meant that dilution would only be 
introduced in certain departments with the consent of the engineers and their 
supervision.   
In October 1916 Macassey met with the local representatives of the Admiralty 
and Ministry of Munitions regarding the organisation of labour in Barrow’s 
                                                     
18 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Monday, 3 July 1916 
19 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8  
20 Womens’ Worker, October 1916; Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 
10 July 1916, dilution was proposed in the Airship Shed, Admiralty Shop, Shell Repairs Department and Ordnance 
Gallery; Liverpool Echo, Tuesday, 27 June 1916 reported women had traditionally been doing cutting out, gumming 
and stitching work in the airship shed 
21 Macassey, L., Labour Policy False and True: A Study in Economic History and Industrial Economics, (London, 
Thornton Butterworth, 1922), p.268 
22 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 2 September 1916 
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‘shipbuilding industry’.23  To increase production the Government now aimed at using 
all Barrow shipyard trade resources before introducing any innovations, while the 
Government departments concerned were anxious to conclude agreements in 
preference to introducing dilution under the Munitions Acts.  The intention was to 
adopt every type of tool wherever calculated to improve production, and introduce 
semi-skilled male labour and women into shipyard trades when imperative.  Maurice 
Kirby notes opportunities to employ women in shipyards were limited and it is 
significant most female recruits were directed to the engineering shops engaged in 
repetitive production of light simple components.24   
Coincidental with the October 1916 Barrow shipbuilding meeting it was 
reported that with labour forthcoming Barrow would commence building many 
merchant craft.25  The provincial press including the Liverpool Echo reported ‘land had 
been purchased from the Furness Railway with a frontage of 1,500 feet allowing 
slipways for up to fifteen standard design vessels’, this however proved to be 
speculative and the scheme never went ahead.26  The Echo further reported that 
women and girls were being taught engineering work with trade union consent to 
assist in producing engines for merchant steamers.  Engines however were built 
predominantly for submarines and reports confirm that women were employed on 
machines in the Submarine Engine Department.27  Furthermore women and girls were 
labouring in the Vickers shipbuilding fitting shops.   
On 11 January 1917, Macassey was appointed controller of shipbuilding Labour 
and four days later the powers of the Ministry of Munitions over shipbuilding and 
marine engineering establishments were transferred to the Admiralty.  Macassey 
returned to Barrow in March 1917, but on this occasion to address workmen’s 
representatives on the importance of accelerating production.28   
                                                     
23 North-Eastern Daily Gazette, Thursday, 12 October 1916, Admiral C. W. Barlow the local Admiralty representative 
and Mr. J. E. Baker representing the Ministry of Munitions 
24 Constantine, S., Kirby, M.W., Rose, M.B., (eds.), The First World War in British History: Industry, Agriculture and 
Trade Unions, (London, Edward Arnold, 1995), p.57 
25 Coventry Evening Telegraph, Thursday, 12 October 1916,  
26 Liverpool Echo, Thursday, 19 October 1916, Vickers Launch Books, only two standard cargo ships were built by 
Vickers, War Master launched May 1918 and War Ruler completed in May 1919 
27 North West Daily Mail, Saturday, 7 December 1918, possibly diluted females in the Admiralty Shop previously 
mentioned; OHMoM, Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. III Welfare: The Control of Working Conditions, Ch. VI Hours 
of Labour 1916-19, p.117; Evening Telegraph, Friday, 29 August 1919 
28 The Lancashire Evening Post, Friday, 16 March 1917 
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In the prevailing conditions activity was now at its greatest throughout the 
Cumberland and North Lancashire iron and steel industries.   
 
Steel Production and Iron Ore 
 In servicing the war activity the iron and steel industry faced problems of 
manpower shortage and long hours in maintaining production.  With furnaces in full 
production it was difficult to include iron and steel makers in holiday arrangements as 
rest periods could only be taken when furnaces were shut down.  The Government 
needed all the pig iron possible but output could only increase when additional 
furnaces were put into blast and men found to work them.  At Barrow the steelworks 
were now wholly concerned with making steel for munitions of war while commercial 
work receiving little attention.29  There was adequate production of the grades of ore 
required for furnaces on special iron, but a shortage of ordinary iron ore for ordinary 
furnaces.  The Barrow and Workington works were absorbing the entire output of 
ordinary iron ore for smelting which caused local stocks to be supplemented by foreign 
supplies.30  Efforts were therefore made to enlarge the output of iron by increasing 
the production of hematite ore from native pits.31   
To increase output mine owners were guaranteed profits while iron ore 
masters agreed to change from a two to a three-shift system provided the Ministry of 
Munitions supplied the necessary labour.32  An increase in wages for iron ore miners 
was granted attracting a steady migration of men from non-ferrous to iron ore 
mining.33  Additionally the Ministry advised using men from the slate mines while 
others were ordered to return from munitions work at Barrow.34  Due to many men 
having joined the army from the ore mines the War Office undertook to return men if 
                                                     
29 Leeds Mercury, Saturday, 10 March, 1917, insufficient labour was seen all round and women workers were being 
employed at Barrow Steelworks; Barrow Records Office, BDB 9A 6/11 Letter to Ministry of Labour Barrow, 3 May 
1917, Employment of  Women in Steelworks – lists operations women were carrying out in different steelworks   
30 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 28 July 1917, the greater part of low phosphorous iron was going to Midland 
and Scotch users while the bulk of ordinary iron was absorbed by Barrow and Workington steelworks; Barrow 
Records Office BDB21 7/1/87  
31 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Wednesday 27 December 1916, to secure ore supplies the North Lonsdale 
Company set about searching for deposits in Cumberland and the Lindal Moor district of Furness 
32 OHMoM, Vol. VII The Control of Materials, Pt. II Iron and Steel, Ch. II, Iron Ore and Pig Iron, p.37 
33 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday 22 April 1916 
34 OHMoM, Vol. VII The Control of Materials, Pt. II Iron and Steel, Ch. II, Iron Ore and Pig Iron, p.37, in December 
1917 hundreds of Scottish miners were started at Hodbarrow but this was not a success as many drifted back to 
Scotland 
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their names were provided, while instructions were made to recruiting officers not to 
take miners.35  Though the ore output from the North Lancashire and Cumberland 
mines decline during the War, the decline was retarded to some extent by the increase 
in the numbers of miners and therefore economised foreign ore tonnage arriving at 
Barrow.  At the Barrow Hematite and Steel works stoppages occurred occasionally 
causing men to be transferred to other departments often on labouring jobs at half 
wages leading to requesting leaving certificates.36   
 The conflicting requirements of industry and the Army continued.  Neither the 
Ministry nor the Admiralty could carry out their programmes without retaining large 
numbers of men of military age and fitness while the Army had to maintain the 
number of divisions at strength and provide for expansion of the war through further 
recruitment.   
 
Army Recruitment and Substitution  
In the spring of 1915 it was realised voluntary enlistments could not be 
sustained and the upper age limit was raised in an effort to maintain numbers.  In July 
1915 the National Registration Act was introduced as a Government stocktaking 
exercise to organize resources for munitions production.  Apart from this general 
objective the War Office was anxious to know how many men were available for 
military service in view of their ages, occupations and where they lived.  Grave 
objections to compulsion existed but voluntary recruiting was providing only 20,000 
of the 30,000 men required by Kitchener per week.37  If the National Register showed 
men were available after supplying the country’s services, objections to compulsion, 
it was argued, should not prevent Kitchener taking the men he wanted.  However 
voluntarism was given a last chance under Lord Derby’s Scheme.  Under this scheme 
men between the ages of 18 and 41 were encouraged to attest a willingness to 
                                                     
35 Ibid. in October 1915 when discussing increasing output from the large Hodbarrow mines by altering working 
methods, it was found the manager and many miners had joined the Army and as many as possible were released; 
Barrow Records Office BDB 21/6/10/2 list 386 men between the ages of 18 and 36 returned from the Army to 
Hodbarrow in October 1916 
36 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 26 January 1917, a rail-straightener was put on half pay as a labourer when 
alterations were made in his department, seeking increased pay he asked for a leaving certificate which was 
granted and he transferred to Vickers;  plant broke down, modernisation occurred and furnaces were shut down 
due to iron ore shortages  
37 OHMoM, Vol. IV The Supply and Control of Labour 1915-16, Pt. III The Limitations of Recruiting, Ch. II The Derby 
Scheme p.32 
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volunteer on the understanding that the younger men would be taken first and all 
single men taken before married men.  Those wishing to join the colours immediately 
would be allowed to, the remainder would be attested and divided into groups to be 
called up when required starting with the unmarried men.   
There was resistance to the scheme at Barrow when Vickers took the position 
that even un-starred men could not be spared and told workers to ignore the appeal.  
Most Barrow men waited until the last minute when there was a rush to meet the 
extended closure deadline. 38  Of 19,000 men eligible for service at Barrow 3,182 were 
unattested, and of 15,818 attested (starred and un-starred), 8,001 were single and 
7,817 married.39  The Mayor as a supporter of the war pointed out in his New Year 
Speech that all eligible council employees had attested and the results at Barrow were 
satisfactory.40  Following the reopening on 10 January, 1916 attestation was light, the 
total at Barrow being approximately 50 in one week.41  In a final appeal for men to 
attest before the Military Service Bill became operative the mayor said: ‘to his mind 
our line of duty is so clear that I cannot understand the mental condition of anyone 
who holds back.’42  All male single British subjects who since August 1915 had either 
become resident or employed in Great Britain were now subject to the provisions of 
the Bill.  When two Canadians having completed their contracts at Vickers asked the 
magistrate to sign their passport declaration form, he refused, as they had attested 
and they were told to go before the Military Service Tribunal. 
The Military Service Bill introduced on 16 January 1916 was a tacit acceptance 
by the government that the voluntary Derby Scheme had failed to generate sufficient 
new recruits.43  The Act now imposed conscription on single men aged 18 to 41 but 
men employed in essential work were not to be taken, the local Military Service 
                                                     
38 Manchester Guardian, Wednesday, 13 December 1915, The last day of attesting was 11 December 1915 but was 
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Appeals Tribunal deciding which workers were essential.44  While part of the wider 
initiative of maintaining and replenishing the army Tribunals existed to accommodate 
local concerns.45  The Barrow Military Appeals Tribunal met initially to deal with 
applications from the first four Derby Groups of which approximately 2,000 were 
attested men, the vast majority being in starred or reserved occupations.46   
The tribunals continued on a statutory basis and the first under the Military 
Service Act was held at Barrow on the 22 February 1916 when the Mayor presided.47  
Appeals were made by employers for their men, many were tradesmen urging that 
their men were indispensable as they were looking after munitions worker’s needs.  
Generally, temporary or conditional exemption was given dependent on men’s 
situations at work or home reasons provided varied with applications made on moral, 
medical, family and economic grounds.48  For those unhappy with the decision of the 
local tribunal, appeals could be made to the Lancashire County Appeals Tribunal.49  
Where previously slackers and shirkers were conspicuous by their absence now they 
were seen everywhere, one fitter pointing out that men came from Manchester to 
Barrow to avoid joining the army.50  When Barrow men were given exemptions many 
neighbours did not understanding why and were apt to write anonymously to the 
tribunal.51  With the need for more soldiers the government turned its attention to 
industry and the protected men.  
                                                     
44 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 17 January 1916; OHMoM, Vol. IV The Supply and Control of Labour 1915-16, 
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In late November 1916 the Ministry of Munitions agreed to withdraw 
protection from all semi and unskilled men in government establishments and 
controlled and badged firms.  Only men under 31 would be called up and substitutes 
obtained where necessary.  In January 1917 the War Cabinet decided 50,000 men 
engaged in munitions works should be made available for general service by the end 
of the month.52  Lists of men classified in employer’s registers as semi or unskilled 
were forwarded to recruiting officers before medical examinations were carried out 
to determine those fit for general service.  Delays were seen, the main cause being the 
pace of medical examination a matter clearly illustrated at Barrow where 12,000 men 
were to be examined.  A medical board established in early 1917 examined 1,700 men 
in three weeks, a rate at which examination would conclude in May.53  The Barrow 
ASE interviewed the Medical Board and Recruiting Officer regarding the position of 
their members in possession of exemptions cards and the unnecessary trouble they 
were being put to.54  The Recruiting Officer stated that it was from the point of view 
of organisation that men were being called for examination, but the officer was told 
this could best be served by members presenting their trade cards.  There was thus 
no necessity for men being medically examined seeing they were exempt from military 
service and the shop stewards were told to warn members of the matter.  Clearly there 
were problems of getting men out of Vickers, as the Military Representative said: ‘we 
cannot get the young ones, let alone the old ones’.55  Changes were made and medical 
examination was made possible by new local Ministry and recruiting offices and by 
taking away the right of refusing medical examination which now included starred 
men.   
Substitutes were required to replace young semi and unskilled men passed fit 
for the army.  These were to be obtained from army reserve munitions workers and 
men exempted from military service by the military service tribunals or recruiting 
officers, provided they undertook work of national importance.56  On 10 March 1917 
it was reported at Barrow that several hundred substitutes would commence 
                                                     
52 CAB 24/6/33 War Cabinet, Munitions Output and Recruiting, Memorandum by Lord Derby 
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55 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 10 March 1917 
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immediately.57  Release of semi-skilled men however required care and sufficient time 
to allow for training.  No question other than whether the physique of the substitute 
was adequate for the work was considered and only one substitute was offered for 
acceptance.  The scheme was therefore unlikely to produce men of the qualities 
required in many branches of munitions and shipyard work.  Additionally, the 
Admiralty would only allow substitution on the understanding that their 
representative would decide how far substitution was necessary and who could be 
released. 
Men rejected as unfit for service were often put on work of national 
importance with little knowledge of that work, tribunals generally being unqualified 
to decide the technical points at issue.58  In this respect Marwick described 
‘substitution’ as an attempt to release the able-bodied by the employment of the less 
able-bodied.59  At the Barrow Military Tribunal the tradesmen were more guarded.  
The NAUL Secretary sitting on the Munitions Tribunal pointed out that substitutes 
were being sent into the shipyard displacing experienced men of low medical 
category. However this was disputed by the Military Representative who said 
substitution was only proceeding in the shell shops and clerical areas.60  The fact that 
the Barrow Military Tribunal would not say where men were specifically being placed 
led to refusal by the Secretary to agree to substitution.  While the District 
Commissioner under the National Service scheme was powerless to deal with the 
shipyard, he pointed out that gamekeepers, cloth-makers and others were displacing 
valuable Barrow workmen.61   
Rather than accommodating community needs the wider initiative of 
maintaining and replenishing the Army took further toll of Barrow’s services.  
Reserved occupations came under threat, at one tribunal the gasworks manager 
appeared in five appeals, while exemptions were requested for fourteen men in the 
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59 Marwell, The Deluge, p.79 
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highway department, eleven being agreed to.62  Corporation appeals for five men in 
the health department resulted in two being adjourned, one exempted until later, one 
to be ‘substituted’ and one to be called up later.63  While females filled many jobs in 
the town the Barrow Cooperative advertising for male assistants and boot repairers 
asked for men of non-military age.64   
This all came at a price, namely the magnitude of work in investigating whether 
men were protected, investigating complaints, arranging inspections and medical 
examinations and finding substitutes.   However, nothing less could secure for the 
supply departments the labour for their work and satisfy the critical attitude which 
the War Office and country adopted towards some million men exempted from 
military service.   The needs of the Army were not just for manpower but munitions 
and the production of shells.  At Barrow thousands of women had been brought into 
the town to work on munitions, the problem was not one of a shortage of workers as 
seen on the manual side but the operating of shift systems.  
 
Working Hours, Shift Systems and Women’s Unions 
Before the outbreak of war, work in engineering shops was normally carried 
on under a single-shift system with the provision of overtime and night work when 
required.  The campaign for increased output required a double-shift system, normally 
of twelve hours each and by the end of 1914 the nightshift at Vickers was said to be 
almost as large as the dayshift.65  Preventing a three-shift operating at Vickers was a 
shortage of skilled workmen, and the difficulty of housing extra numbers of workmen 
in an already overcrowded town.  The urgent demand for output made it difficult to 
arrange the change-over of shifts so as to ensure a complete Sunday rest.  Whenever 
continuous Sunday labour could not be stopped by shutting down for 24 hours, 
weekend relief labour was provided and this occurred at Vickers, Barrow for a short 
period at the end of 1916.66      
                                                     
62 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday, 6 December 1917 
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With the introduction of women into munitions work efforts were made and 
encouraged by the Ministry to adopt a three eight-hour shift system.67  The surplus of 
women ready to work on munitions made it possible to provide three shifts at Vickers 
but congestion of lodging and railway accommodation was restricting their 
importation.68  The Health of Munitions Committee recommended where the supply 
of women was governed by the difficulties of housing and transit every effort should 
be made to overcome these before a two-shift system was adopted.69  A temporary 
order was thus issued prohibiting importation of more women into Barrow until 
proper accommodation was provided.  In response a local Advisory Committee on 
‘Women’s War Employment’ under the authority of the Board of Trade was formed 
due to the pressing necessity for further lodging accommodation.  The Barrow Labour 
Party stated that accommodation had hardly been increased and conditions were 
deplorable, especially considering the moral welfare of women workers and favoured 
sending a deputation to the Ministry asking for a subsidy to meet the increased 
housing demand.  The Council decided against a deputation, the Mayor stating the 
Health Committee, Vickers and Ministry of Munitions were dealing with the question.  
A solution was found through the positive reaction of householders to the Mayor’s 
appeal for accommodation for women munition workers and by the provision of 
women’s accommodation in public buildings.70  Three buildings were thus taken over 
by the Ministry of Munitions and adapted and managed by Vickers to provide 
accommodation for 160 women.71   
As far as male workers were concerned a shortage of workmen and the 
difficulties of supervision, as well as the problems of housing and transit to a large 
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extent, excluded eight-hour shifts from practical consideration.  Firstly there was 
inconvenience caused to foremen and tool-setters, since there was insufficient skilled 
labour available for separate supervision of three shifts.  Indeed this had caused 
women munitions workers who as ‘labourers’ or as ‘skilled’ tool-setters and turners 
to work with men on two shifts.72  It was therefore on account of their fellow workmen 
that the Ministry was compelled to ask the Home Office to sanction thirteen-hour 
nightshifts for women at Barrow.73  Long hours were thus one of the penalties ‘some’ 
women paid for invading men’s work.74  Secondly the difficulty of working two 
different systems simultaneously meant even if women workers wished for a short 
working day, men were anxious to work and earn for a full twelve-hour shift.  It was 
also difficult synchronising the coming and going of two different sets of workers and 
either the shift patterns had to be serviced by the railways or changed to suit the 
railways.  Vickers thereafter submitted a timetable to the Ministry illustrating the 
extreme inconvenience of the scheme of work in force at Barrow, with men and 
women on different shifts.75   
The threat of introducing twelve-hour shifts by Vickers prompted one woman 
to write to the Woman Worker complaining that two long shifts would be injurious to 
the majority of girls and not increase output.76  The girls, she said, would be too tired 
to put the same energy into their work and did not think the Ministry of Munitions 
could be justified in sanctioning such a scheme.77  It was reasoned most women 
attracted into munitions work were unaccustomed to factory life.  For example one 
Barrow shell worker asked to be released due to poor health.  She had stuck it as long 
as she could, but needed to go back to her profession as a confectioner for a rest.78 
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Conversely some women workers opposed the eight-hour system because a twelve-
hour system would give them increased wages in an expensive town.   
Previously Vickers had attempted to make economies by using one girl to 
operate two machines, this proved both unpopular and unproductive whilst causing 
physical strain.  Machines were operated under protest leading to a number of women 
being dismissed for not adopting the scheme.  For one fifteen year old girl dismissal 
had a devastating effect as her mother’s husband and a son were ill and the family 
dependent on her income.79  Capacity diminished.  Women capable of producing 32 
shells on one machine per shift produced less operating two machines, and this 
effected earnings, as they were expected to produce twice the number of shells for 
the same bonus.80   Further, on the occasion of Vickers adapting machinery at Barrow 
for a new class of work it became necessary to partially close a department for a short 
period, causing women to be stood down.81  As a result, the National Federation of 
Women Workers (NFWW) Secretary reported to the ASE that 600 to 700 females had 
been discharged.82   Vickers admitted they had asked for official permission to change 
from a two to a three-shift system, but stated their action in regard to closing the 
department was not due to this proposal.  The Ministry in turn warned Vickers not to 
make arrangements on the assumption permission asked for would be granted.83   
There was also a social aspect as different shift patterns had the effect of 
upsetting home life, for where families were lodging shift workers meal and bed times 
spread themselves over night and day.84 Housework expected before and after an 
eight-hour shift was neglected and in some cases mothers’ were so fully occupied on 
munitions that children’s cleanliness suffered.85  Further there was the inconvenience 
of the hours of coming off duty, especially for those on nightshift while complaints 
were made by landladies and hostel managers over the variable hours at which the 
three-shift workers left and returned. 
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The practical and domestic difficulties were illustrated not just at Barrow but 
notably at Erith, and the Huddersfield and Leeds National Shell Factories.86   In 1916, 
Vickers and the two national factories requested and obtaining reluctant government 
consent to change from a three-shift to a two-shift system.87  Such changes were only 
sanctioned after full inquiry by the Home Office, and on the acquiescence of the 
majority of employees in the extension of their working day.  To what level a two-shift 
system for women was introduced at Barrow is difficult to ascertain, however the 
Women’s Welfare Officer pointed out that the organisation of cloakrooms were 
determined by whether a two or three-shift system was worked.88   
By the autumn of 1916 the Barrow branch of the NFWW boasted some 2,000 
members the number being boosted by women coming from the textile industries 
where organisation existed.89  Whilst the ASE could provide little in monetary terms 
when Federation funds ran low, it gave cordial approval and support to the 
Federation’s organisation of munitions workers and WTUL.  As Cole notes, the 
relationship worked better in some places than others and a considerable amount of 
concern remained within the ASE that Federation members had the potential to 
damage their long-term workplace position.90  At Barrow support was provided to the 
Federation, but the temporary nature of the relationship was never far from some 
engineers thoughts.  Typically there was criticism of a local agreement between 
Vickers and the Federation which had been concluded without local representatives.  
One ASE member stated it was prudent to know whenever the women’s union were 
in conference with employers, not because he supported the women’s position, but 
because it was vital to protect men’s long term interests.91  At the Barrow Commission 
on Unrest the local ASE secretary said: ‘he had no fear regarding restoration of pre-
war conditions as female labour was not a paying proposition in the business of 
engineering’.92  He did not think women generally would oust engineers and believed 
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they would be more prudent than to attempt it nonetheless concerns were voiced 
when women dilutees were retained in Barrow’s factories whilst men were seeking 
employment.93   The changes in which it was necessary to adjust wages however 
affected women more than men.   
 
Wages 
The Ministry of Munitions was mainly responsible for the industrial 
employment of women and thus control of their wages.  The problem of women’s 
wages were very different from those of men munitions workers.  The latter had trade 
organisations and in shipbuilding and engineering the principles of collective 
bargaining and standard rates of pay were firmly established.  Some women had taken 
up wage earning for the first time, being moved by patriotic impulse, while many more 
had deserted domestic service for greater freedom and wages offered by munitions 
work.  Although good wages could be made there were exaggerations on this score.  
Women munitions workers were receiving a living wage not rolling in wealth.  As Alice 
Wycherley remarked ‘whilst Vickers was a medieval vision of hell far worse was the 
continual shortage of money’.94  Until rates were scheduled, women doing jobs not 
previously carried out by men were paid at rates agreed between employers and 
unions in the districts.  When debating the fixed rate for women and girls working on 
shells at Barrow the ASE admitted there had been no district rate pre-war.  Rather pay 
varied according to progress made and ability shown.95       
Where women were to perform skilled work it was particularly important they 
should get the full wage rates as this was the basis of security in regard to the 
engineers’ position after the war.  In October 1915 the Ministry issued a circular 
stating women employed at ‘men’s work’ should be paid 20s for a normal working 
week and those doing ‘skilled men’s work’ or piecework should receive the men’s rate.  
Although the Minister’s keynote was equal pay for equal work the 20s a week was 
below that of the unskilled labourer in practically all engineering districts.96  Initially 
the circular was issued as a ‘recommendation’ to controlled establishments, therefore 
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not obligatory.  The ASE had also caused the Ministry to issue the circular to controlled 
establishments as a Statutory Order in February 1916, while promising cooperation 
with the Ministry’s dilution policy.97    
With the introduction of dilution came the questions of female hours and 
wages.  A lot of women however introduced on men’s work did not displace or replace 
men, but started on new machines in new shops.98  The Barrow ASE Meeting Minutes 
for 28 June 1916 noted that delegates from the Women Workers Union attended and 
stated ‘they were out on grievances regarding changes of girl’s hours and pay and 
asked for ASE support’, but the engineers flatly refused.99  A Special Arbitration 
Tribunal was held in July with the girl’s represented by the NFWW.100  They contested 
they were engaged in men’s work for which their male counterparts received 26s a 
week, but were only paid 18-20s.  The NFWW protested against this system of 
deduction as it encouraged employers to put young girls on heavy work on grounds of 
economy.101  The Tribunal accepted Vickers who argued that women’s wages were in 
line with the Ministry circular and the war gave rise to the need for economy in the 
cost of producing munitions.102  From the employer’s standpoint it was hard to refute 
paying low wages as young girls cost more in wasted material and supervision than 
their elders.103  Stories of underpaid women persisted. 
In August 1916 women moved from Darlington to Barrow on the 
understanding they would be guaranteed 20s a week and receive at least 28s when 
on machines.104  On arrival they found as Vickers was working 45 hours they were 
entitled to 16s 11d, and the 28s was paid to women whose work was determined by 
                                                     
97 Woollacott, On Her Their Lives Depend, p. 113 
98 Barrow District ASE Minutes, Barrow Archives, BDSO 57/1/8, 20 June 1916, girls on machines in the New Howitzer 
Shop were rated at 20s while some machine men transferred from other departments were 2s below the rates 
which should be paid on the NHS machines  
99 Daily Herald, Saturday 15 July, 1916, reported the strike was over dilution 
100 OHMOM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. II The Control of Women’s Wages, Ch. III Men’s Work in 1916, p.22; 
BDSO 57/1/8 Barrow District ASE Minutes, Barrow Archives  
101 Barrow District ASE Minutes, Barrow Archives, BDSO 57/1/8, 20 June 1916, reported also that girls in the New 
Howitzer Shop were rated on machines at 20s; girls under 18 employed on men’s work at this time was small, being 
engaged on such as rough shell turning, eventually awards covering the whole of Vickers women employees were 
dealt with by Special Tribunal; Barrow District ASE Minutes, Barrow Archives, BDSO 57/1/8, 23 July 1916, in the 
Shell Repair and Admiralty Shops objections were raised to the heavy structure of the work for females, Vickers 
said work would be simplified and changes made to the lathes to make work easy      
102 LAB 2/420/IC912/1916 – Chief Industrial Commissioner’s Department: Munitions Industries: Arbitration 
Awards. Vickers Ltd., Barrow-in-Furness v National Federation of Women Workers (W.W. Mackenzie) 
103 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 23 July 1916  
104 Daily Herald, Saturday, 26 August 1916 
 157  
the rate fixers.105  The flat rate of 20s a week was based on the usual working hours of 
the district for men in engineering establishments, which was 53 hours.  Women were 
thus entitled to 45/53 of 20s (16s 11d).106  Although Vickers found and paid for their 
accommodation, neither hours nor pay could be changed to meet Barrow’s high living 
costs and the women returned home.  The Ministry were left with no choice but to 
maintain its ruling that payment in such cases must be made at a proportional fraction 
of 20s.  In late December 1916, however an amending order provided for a weekly flat 
rate of 20s for 48 hours or less, ranging to 23s for 54 hours to women munition 
workers.107  
Cathy Hunt notes that decent lodgings in Barrow could not be found for less 
than 15s or 16s per week and for women’s hostels during 1916 the charge was 14s 
while at the manageresses and forewomen’s hostel 18s per week.108  The living tariff 
for munitions workers indicates single men were paying 18s 6d per week for board 
and lodging in hostels, 4s 6d more than women, reflecting pay differences.  These 
prices to an extent had a levelling affect, as in one local village persons taking boarders 
reduced their charges from 27s per head per week to 18s 6d in order to compete with 
Vickers’ tariff.  The assumption therefore that women munitions workers were 
prosperous has little foundation in reality and for single women only by working longer 
or harder under a task related scheme were they able to survive.  Even after 
government intervention women still struggled on the wages provided.  For families it 
was possible to keep pace, even outpace inflation, but it involved trade-offs.  Either 
men worked extensive hours which was to the advantage of the employer or women 
entered the workforce.  Meanwhile the men’s wages system had been subjected to 
unprecedented strains particularly the cost of living.  
In July 1916 a 3s advance on time-rates was granted to unskilled and semi-
skilled men in the engineering trade in the Barrow district by the Committee on 
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per house, while pre-war accommodation ranged from 5s to 6s 6d 
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Production, but an advance of piece-rates was refused.  This advance was regarded as 
war wages, and recognised due to the abnormal conditions prevailing.109  The 
paradoxical effect of improved wages on increased efficiency and output however 
tended to be a greater loss of time among pieceworkers than the less wealthy time-
workers.  Employers’ concern was that increased advances to pieceworkers would 
lead to more irregularity and lost time.   
In late 1916 the skilled engineers met Vickers over pay due to demands made 
on men in food costs and clothing, items maintaining men in efficiency.   The ASE 
believed Vickers were in a position to pay more as their work was high class and 
organised to ensure good results.  Vickers agreed men needed to be fed, but surmised 
they were receiving enough, as if they needed to earn more they were not taking the 
opportunity.110  Proof was evidenced by lost time and Vickers would not provide more 
wages for fear of further restricting output, the engineers pointed out men were 
getting increased wages because of overtime which benefited the firm as it increased 
output.  Vickers indicated the statistics showed poor timekeeping representing a loss 
of 10 per cent of effective strength, and the increased cost of living was more than 
covered by wages.111  Further Vickers wanted the ASE to agree to calculating overtime 
after 53 hours rather on a daily basis, they felt compelled to ask for cooperation as 
timekeeping showed little improvement.112  In 1917 the practice of periodical hearings 
and national awards including the provision to meet the cost of living was adopted 
this drew sharp criticism from employers thereafter, with complaints of overly 
favourable awards to the unions and lack of consultation with employers.113    
While wages rose considerably, inflation and high rents counter-balanced such 
improvements.  Although the relationship between wages, rents and prices is difficult 
to analyse, Todd asserts that evidence from the Commission of Enquiry, the Labour 
Party and Trades Council, and the Barrow press suggests 'that many families did 
experience real hardship during the war'.114  This reflects Bryder's warning on the need 
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110 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 5 October 1916, pre-war engineers 
were earning from 44s to 50s per week and in September 1916 averaged 75s per week 
111 Ibid. 
112 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 5 October 1916 
113 McIvor, Organised Capital, Employers’ Associations and Industrial Relations in Northern England 1880-1939, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.154 
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to differentiate between the incomes of workers in different sectors, and the 
difficulties experienced by servicemen's families trying to survive on army pay 
remittances.115   
As the questions of industrial fatigue, hours of labour, and matters affecting 
the health and therefore efficiency of workers arose in munition factories and 
workshops the HMWC was established.  The terms ‘health and welfare’ however were 
not originally destined for the shipyard or male munitions workers, often working 
under greater stress, but whose trade unions provided in theory the power to take 
care of their own working conditions.   
     
Health and Welfare  
Conditions had changed drastically at Barrow as skilled and unskilled workers 
flocked in from all parts of the country.  Housing accommodation was difficult to find, 
transport became more congested and employment of increasing numbers of women 
workers affected further transformation, while urgent work necessitated putting in 
long hours.  Previously night work for women had been abolished and for boys was 
rare, now it was common.  Hours had been reduced in many workshops now increased 
hours were being worked while overtime and Sunday labour became for a time 
universal.  Yet concurrent with these backward steps were ideas of providing 
workshop amenities in the improvement of industrial and social conditions.  If the 
worker was subservient to the machine it was believed advancement of workers 
themselves could add to their efficiency creating greater output.116   Keen interest was 
thus shown into the report of the HMWC appointed to consider and advise on the 
question of industrial fatigue, hours of labour and matters affecting the personal 
health and efficiency of predominantly women workers in ‘munitions workshops’.   
The Committee realised questions of canteen provision, individual employee 
welfare, housing and transit as seen in Barrow were the chief influences affecting 
industrial efficiency in munitions works.117  These appeared more important than the 
                                                     
115 Bryder, L., The First World War: Healthy or Hungry?, Historical Workshop Journal (1987), 24(1), p.144; Roberts, 
Roberts, E., Working Class Barrow and Lancaster, p.23 families of soldiers at war suffered considerable hardship 
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116 Aberdeen Journal, Saturday, 17 August 1918 
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immediate or technical environment in which work was carried on while problems of 
materials shortage, building labour and transport all stood in the way of new ‘welfare’ 
accommodation or housing.   
With the intention of providing for women workers and young person’s 
comfort, efficiency and health to a higher standard than that of the Factory Acts a 
Ministry Welfare Section was introduced.  This section extended the policy of the 
HMWC to controlled establishments by moral persuasion and supply of special 
facilities and information.  While improvements were made for female munitions 
workers, shipyard conditions were said to be bad, lavatories, cooking arrangements, 
hot water and litter were all complaints at Vickers.  Typically men protested about bay 
doors being left open in winter and smoke and black-lead getting into their lungs, 
while others complained of damp conditions inside submarine tanks.  The Barrow 
Munitions Tribunal reports are full of complaints of men being off through bad 
working conditions, at one tribunal a Vickers officer said: ‘men were asking to go into 
the shell shop for the better conditions there’.118    
 Where females were employed the HMWC was unanimous that a suitable 
system of welfare supervision should be administered by an appointed officer.119  The 
officer was to be of good standing and education, having experience and sympathy, 
while tactful and sensible in her dealings with others.120  Dorothee Pullinger, a 21-year 
old engineer could hardly be expected to meet all these conditions, but as Simmonds 
says ‘in a flick of the wrist’ she was appointed lady superintendent at Vickers’ works 
at Barrow.121  As women’s supervisor she believed the aim of her job was the morale 
and physical welfare of her young female workers, supplying them with ‘home care 
and comforts’ as part of a ‘big family’.122  Pullinger in fact was the internal Welfare 
Officer as a Miss Phillips is mentioned as the ‘Outside Welfare Officer of the Ministry 
                                                     
118 Barrow News, Saturday, 12 February 1916 
119 Newcastle Journal, Wednesday 12 January 1916 
120 Edinburgh Evening News, Saturday 8 January 1916; Hunt, The National Federation, p.89, the Welfare Supervisors 
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122 Woollacott, A, ‘Maternalism, Professionalism, and Industrial Welfare Supervisors in World War I Britain’, op, 
cit., pp. 29-56  
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of Munitions’.123   The Official History also notes that by June 1918 the work of the 
external and internal welfare officers at Barrow was amalgamated.124  Conflict existed, 
particularly between trade union officials and welfare officers appointed by 
employers.  Union activists were sceptical of the motives of welfare officers employed 
to 'look after' the interests of women workers, fearful that they might direct women 
away from trade unions and persuade them to accept the paternalism of the 
employer.  But in truth through the provision of leisure activities and entertainment 
there was less need for women to seek union activities.  
The character and tone of work however depended largely on the thirty 
forewomen who referred to Pullinger in matters of discipline, slack work or bad 
timekeeping, providing relief to Vickers management and the local Munitions 
Tribunal.125  Indeed little evidence has been found of female workers appearing on 
disciplinary matters before the Tribunal. 126  In contrast criminal cases are more often 
found in the civil court reports.  
The huge increase of women at Barrow meant drastic changes in workshop 
arrangements.  The Times noted that at Vickers there were ten mess rooms where 
workers can eat in comfort and cooks provide meals, whilst rest rooms with qualified 
nurses attend to women taken ill.127  Pullinger provides insight into methods used in 
maintaining efficiency.128  When arranging cloakrooms the most efficient method was 
a check system more costly was a cloakroom for each shift.  Importantly exits were 
provided with easy access to shop floor and road.  Shifts were run in military fashion, 
the signal for one to cease work and another to start, securing continual production.  
Toilet cleanliness was of concern.  Therefore choice of materials and attendant were 
important, although some disapproved time recording prevented idling while allowing 
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access to others.  Half-an-hour was allowed for meals on an eight-hour shift while a 
further rest period of seven minutes was granted.129  Women were differentiated in 
the workshops head forewomen wore white overalls and caps, forewomen were 
distinguished by khaki, whilst workers wore blue with blue or red caps.  On starting 
work the practice was for girls to receive two pairs of overalls, each girl signing a 
receipt showing the cost, which was deducted in instalments and refunded on 
returning the overalls on leaving.  Overalls were exchanged at the stores once a week, 
which was of advantage, especially to workers in lodgings where no washing facilities 
existed or where labour shortages at laundries meant they could not be relied on.   
Social conditions in factories varied considerably but to improve morale and 
increase the contentment of female workers the provision of healthy recreation was 
deemed essential.   Recreation and education was not simply to provide a healthy 
outlet for munitions girls but also to counter the monotony entailed by unskilled, 
mechanized tasks in the workplace.  In an essay on ‘The Young Factory Girl’ Emily 
Matthias explained how the ‘immorality’ of the factory girl could be explained by her 
being ‘drugged by the monotony and long hours of physical labour, and the need for 
strong and sharp stimulus’.130  It was considered the average girl in lodgings was at a 
loss how to spend her spare time, and if not guided was liable to drift into loose 
company.  Girls away from the restraints of home needed to learn where to draw the 
line in their newly found independence.  Joining sports clubs, institutes with sewing 
classes, music and refreshments were thus encouraged.131  Age and family roles often 
affected the time they could spend enjoying themselves away from work.  Leisure time 
was shaped by the length of their shifts, whether they were working day or night and 
whether a push was on at the front demanding increased production.   
The report on Sunday labour highlighted men and women in munitions 
factories were suffering from the monotony of long hours and boredom a cause of 
defective output.  Authorities realised workers’ minds needed to be clear and amused 
if the strain of long hours was to be borne.  The cinema, like public-houses, provided 
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a resort for the large numbers in lodgings who found houses congested.132  A 
development in Barrow was the establishment of cinema shows for munitions 
workers.133  Vickers workers had had their own cinema for some time and this trend 
was expected to be followed in or near the big London shell factories.  At the peak of 
munitions production in October 1916, Barrow had a considerable array of 
entertainment including a large number of establishments showing pictures as 
indicated in Table 11.134   
Establishment Entertainment Periodicity 
His Majesty’s 
Theatre 
Cinema, music, singing and 
dancing 
Nightly 
Coliseum Cinema Matinees, Daily, Twice 
Nightly 
Royal Theatre and 
Opera House 
Stage Plays Nightly 
Gaiety Theatre and 
Picturedrome 
Cinema Matinees, Daily, Twice 
Nightly 
Palace Theatre Cinema, music, singing and 
dancing 
Twice nightly 
Electric Theatre Cinema Twice nightly 
Walney Theatre Cinema Twice nightly 
Tivoli Music, singing and dancing Twice nightly 
Kings Hall Cinema, music, singing Saturdays nights during 
winter months 
Town Hall Music, singing and dancing135 Concerts and occasional 
entertainment 
Table 11 - Barrow Places of Entertainment 1916 
                                                     
132 The Liverpool Echo, Monday, 13 December 1915, Reported Barrow Magistrates had granted a licence to allow 
cinemas to open from 1400 until 2200 to allow men in congested lodgings some resort on Christmas Day  
133 The Manchester Guardian Thursday, 6 December 1915 
134 Barrow Records Office, List of Entertainment Establishments – Public meetings were also held at the Palace 
Theatre which could seat 2,500 
135 Roberts, E., Working Class Barrow, p.61, a respondent said that throughout the war her brother ran dances at 
the Town Hall on Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday afternoon and Saturday evening 
 
 164  
 The cinema’s appeal as escapist entertainment and its importance in 
broadening working-class culture were immense.  Cinema was also a useful 
propaganda tool showing war films, including censored battle scenes.136  For the 
working-class in Barrow, Elizabeth Roberts said the War gave many munitions 
workers’ wages far in excess of what they had previously earned encouraging large 
attendances at the theatre.137  The working-class however were interested in the 
cinema even before the war it did not have the poor reputation of the public house 
and music hall.  Parents regarded the cinema as an innocent and cheap form of 
entertainment and children forbidden from the theatre were allowed to the ‘pictures’.  
The cheapness of this form of amusement created a new audience and the picture 
house became emphatically the poor man’s theatre.138  The HMWC however regarded 
the cinema as the cause of lost time for juvenile workers.139  On the importance of 
adequate sleep and recreation from the physical wellbeing of boys and girls, the 
committee said the temptations of the cinema and street amusement kept them up 
late.  In December 1916 a regulation gave the Government power to close places of 
public entertainment if prejudicial to the production of war material.140  Regulations 
were also in place to prohibit race meetings, fairs and coursing, whippet races or 
similar sports where they were likely to interfere with the production or transport of 
munitions by workers absenting themselves.141  A deputation of women also pointed 
to the need for women police patrols to protect women and young girls and two 
officers were appointed to supplement the Barrow police force which had lost many 
men to the Army.142  Fraternising was discouraged and young men and women who 
stood talking on Barrow’s streets particularly on a Sunday evening were likely to find 
themselves before the petty sessions charged with obstructing the pavement.143   
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What some of the munitions girls wanted was a clubroom as they had become 
tired of the picture palaces and nothing of this nature was supplied at the ‘small 
number’ of Barrow women’s and girls’ hostels.144   This led to the good and wealthy 
fostering a scheme for a girl workers club hut assisted by the YWCA.  Land was 
provided by the Furness Railway while Lord Derby and Vickers subscribed towards the 
cost of the building which was rapidly erected to accommodate some 500 women and 
girls.145   When opened in March 1916 it was officially named the Queen Alexandra’s 
Club for Women’s Munitions Workers.  Donations equipped the hut and rules and 
regulations were made to suit local conditions, while a committee worked and looked 
after the club charging a weekly membership fee to ensure self-sufficiency.146  The 
club with rest and reading rooms provided tea and amusement and a place for 
munitions girls coming from distance to await trains at the nearby station.147  Although 
the foundation of the YWCA was religious it was not thrust down member’s throats. 
The movement stood simply for the principles of Christianity.  The YWCA was there to 
provide good wholesome influences and recreation and help females strive for the 
higher ideal of girl and womanhood.  In this way they were not only working for the 
present but providing strength for the future.   
In January 1917 Barrow Council received a letter from the travelling secretary 
of the Munitions Workers Welfare Committee stating the YWCA had been asked by 
the Ministry of Munitions to erect a second munitions workers club hut.148  The 
conditions in Barrow highlighted by the Unrest Commission caused the Manchester 
Guardian to report on the issue:  
‘The matter was serious’ as it concerned women from Manchester and 
surrounding districts working at Barrow.  These girls had left their homes 
and the institutes of home life to live among strangers under conditions 
which were not conducive to health or decency.149    
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This caught the attention of the committee providing huts, hostels and canteens for 
women wartime workers under the auspices of the Women’s Day Committee of the 
YWCA.  In May 1917 public collections were made in Manchester and the money 
utilised for a Barrow women munitions workers club.150  Land was found close to 
Vickers Works to enable a hut similar to the Queen Alexandra’s Club to be built for a 
further 500 females.151  The opening of the ‘Manchester Club’ as it became known 
took place in September 1917.152   
 A number of welfare provisions were provided for men and boys.  Previous to 
December 1915 the Salvation Army had established a canteen in Barrow, but the 
introduction of industrial canteens were a by-product of the drink campaign.153 The 
Ministry of Munitions allowed capital expenditure incurred by the owners of 
controlled establishments with CCB approval to be written off against current profits. 
Thus owners could introduce canteens at small cost to themselves.154  Hutton notes 
there were sixteen canteens at Barrow accommodating 4,471 persons.155  For use as 
a men’s munition workers social club, the YMCA agreed to the lease of ‘The Stadium’, 
a large wooden building which mysteriously burnt down.156  The oddly named Mangle 
Club, possibly derived from Triangle, the symbol of the YMCA, was used by munitions 
workers soldiers and sailors.  Dinners, teas, concerts and lectures and various forms 
of recreation in addition to writing and reading facilities allowed incomers to relax.157   
Erection of new houses within Vickerstown prompted new responsibilities for 
the owners.  Recognizing the need to provide places of entertainment and leisure 
Vickers erected an alcohol free cinema and variety theatre and a new institute with 
reading and card rooms, billiard tables etc., while land was appropriated for kitchen 
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garden allotments.158  Two model hotels selling food and non-alcoholic drink were 
operated by the Walney Public House Trust Company, the profits being used for 
setting up counter attractions to public-houses.159  There were however dissenters, 
the vicar of Walney for one saying there was a feeling in view of the acuteness of 
housing shortage unnecessary buildings had been erected including a golf house and 
institute financed by Vickers, while a schools were left unfinished.160  Barrow’s clubs 
and institutes also boasted leisure provisions.  The Barrow Working Men’s Club and 
Institute for example, had a large library, reading, writing and billiard rooms and even 
a rifle range.161 
Welfare extended to infant care Joy tends to dwell on the statistics, causes and 
remedies for infant mortality in Barrow rather than the general decreasing birth 
rate.162  As more men were slaughtered it was realised new human lives, which could 
grow up to replace lost adult lives were valuable national assets.163  Barbara Harrison 
argued the primary objective of state intervention was not just to ensure social control 
but reproductive health.164  Increased concern for infant welfare was expressed in a 
number of publicity campaigns, arousing interest in the nation’s babies creating a 
cyclic process, the most extraordinary of which was National Baby Week held in July 
1917.165  Barrow’s week comprised exhibitions, demonstrations, addresses and 
entertainments to arouse interest in the need for reduced infant mortality.166  Opened 
by the Mayoress the Medical Officer of Health provided daily support while Miss 
                                                     
158 CAB 24/23/59 Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest, No.2 Division North-West Area, Supplementary 
Report for Barrow-in-Furness 
159 The Times, Tuesday, 19 September 1916; Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 5 February 1916 the second of 
these establishments, the George Hotel was built in six months during 1916, as well as providing a refreshment 
room with teas, Vickers hedging their bets requested an alcohol licence which was turned down by the magistrates    
160 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday, 12 July 1917; Manchester Courier and Lancashire General Adviser, Monday, 
10 January 1916, two schools were eventually completed although no new ones were started 
161 BD/SO 85/1/4 Minutes of the Barrow Working Men’s Club and Institute, the rifle range was used by the 
territorials as well as the members 
162 Joy, C. A., War and Unemployment in an Industrial Community: Barrow-in-Furness 1914-1926, PhD Thesis, Uclan 
2004; Co-operative News, 2 February 1916 – A Working Woman, took the view: the state wants babies but it is 
only the most ignorant among the working-classes who burden themselves with large families, the wages of the 
bulk of workers are not large enough to admit the proper rearing of a large family, why doesn’t the state look after 
those which are born and die every year for lack of nourishment and warmth? 
163 Baker, S. J., Fighting for Life, (Huntingdon NY, Robert E Krieger Publishing Co., 1980), p.165 
164 Harrison, B., Women and Health, in Purvis, J., (ed.), Women's History: Britain, 1850–1945 (London, Routledge, 
1995), pp.157–92 
165 Dwork, D., War is Good for Babies and Young Children, (London, Tavistock Publications, 1987), p.211 
166 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 9 July 1917 
 168  
Phillips was one of the speakers.167  School girls were addressed and the work of the 
local Voluntary Infant Welfare Committee brought further awareness to mothers.   
Although evidence exists of a child welfare centre, provisions for maternity 
cases at Barrow were inadequate and in many homes impossible to deal with decently.  
Women were reported to be giving birth in one room which was home not only to the 
entire family but lodgers.  Elizabeth Roberts says ‘midwives, some who continued to 
be untrained and unqualified long after the 1902 Midwives Act were sent for.’  Even 
after a 1916 Act demanding more rigorous qualification standards of midwives, 
including six months’ training, attendance to a minimum of twenty births and a written 
examination, problems existed.  One Barrow respondent speaking of her 1917 and 
1918 confinements said: 
The nurse came and she was not fully qualified.  The doctors told her what 
to do and what not to do but she couldn’t read a thermometer, but she 
brought babies into the world.  There were hundreds of women in Barrow 
who’s had to go to the gynaecologist through her.168 
 
It was common for landladies to insist that an expectant mother leave the 
house until the baby was born, and as Barrow did not have a maternity hospital this 
meant mothers had to choose between going to the Workhouse and or to distant 
friends.169  In June 1917 Barrow Council passed a proposal urging the government to 
establish a maternity home free from Poor Law or charity to provide accommodation 
for expectant wives of munitions workers.170  In July it was reported the Welfare 
Department was arranging to take over a YWCA hostel to use as a Barrow maternity 
hospital.171  The October council minutes furthermore state that the Ministry had 
made temporary arrangements for two beds for maternity cases at Miss Williams 
Nursing Home and two beds were set aside at the Nurses Hostel.172  The council 
suggested a public announcement should be made by the Hospital Authorities that 
the four beds were available for maternity purposes.  These provisions however were 
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wholly inadequate.173  For children, there was a dramatic change in the health of those 
at elementary school as the School Medical Officer's report for 1915 demonstrates:   
'No serious cases of malnutrition were observed and the great number of 
cases of slight malnutrition were due to improper feeding rather than 
insufficiency. Improvement can be accounted for by lack of 
unemployment, and higher wages earned by the working-classes in the 
Borough.  There is no doubt that higher wages are benefiting the children 
as regards their general physical condition.'174  
 
Visible health gains continued throughout the war.  In 1916 'no cases of malnutrition 
due to insufficiency of food were noted' and by 1917 'the children were well clothed, 
well-fed and presented a generally healthy appearance.’   
In June 1917 the Corporation were asked by the local Insurance Committee to 
investigate the housing and sanitary conditions in the Hindpool and Ramsden wards.  
Despite not pre-dating the rest of the borough and being only fifty years old, there 
was a higher than average incidence of tuberculosis, but manpower shortages 
prevented inspection.175  In regard of tuberculosis provisions, Barrow Corporation 
from September 1915 had leased a number of beds at a sanatorium five miles distant 
administered by Lancashire County Council.  Additionally two dispensaries were 
opened in Barrow, whilst the Devonshire Road pavilion was used as an isolation 
hospital for acute and advanced cases and by spring 1918 action was taken for the 
compulsory removal of cases that could not be isolated at home.176  However, there 
were no local facilities for children, and though they could be treated at dispensaries 
success was often undermined by home conditions whilst premature return of 
patients to their old environment could result in a relapse.  Environmental factors 
were given consideration and from October 1916 the local Insurance Committee had 
pressed for the establishment of farm colonies to provide after-care facilities, but 
small headway was made.   
In autumn 1917 the spiritual welfare of munitions workers became of concern.  
At Woolwich it was said to be a campaign and at Barrow a challenge.  In both cases it 
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was intended to reach those who through war-weariness and unaccustomed 
surroundings were in danger of slacking their religious duties.  The chief missionary at 
Barrow noted ‘there was something wrong if eighty out of every hundred persons 
were found outside sanctuaries on Sundays.’177  Not only should material service be 
rendered but spiritual, and with the motto ‘You Need God and God Needs You’ the 
religious establishment descended on Barrow.  Various methods were employed to 
drive the motto home: for example open-air preaching by the howitzer shop, near the 
airship shed, in the steelworks, the bye-streets, at the central court of the Scotch-
Buildings housing iron and steelworkers and within the heart of Barrow at Cavendish 
Square.  Every night in the Old Town Hall, save Saturday, an evangelistic service was 
conducted whilst the seven parishes were visited.  Results were difficult to estimate, 
but those understanding the inner mind of the shipyard and workshops said more 
good had been done than was realised.  In reality the mission was an experiment as 
there was a need to discover new and effective means of evangelistic work and seen 
in this light the Barrow challenge was worthy of repeating elsewhere.  The depth of 
understanding of Barrow’s general condition however is questionable.  Following the 
Unrest Report the Archdeacon of Barrow said: ‘though he was not prepared to deny 
bad conditions existed, they were not within his knowledge and unconfirmed by his 
clergy’.178   
Lack of holidays contributed to overstrain at Barrow.  From the outbreak of the 
war with the exception of a day now and again such as Christmas Day and Bank 
Holidays there was no cessation of activity at Vickers. In July 1915 a five day holiday 
was granted and thousands of people, nine tenths sporting War Service badges, went 
home in search of renovation and repair.179  This provided respite in the home for 
some women allowing them a break from looking after lodgers.180  For those 
holidaying locally, Walney Island, Furness Abbey and the seashore villages were well 
patronised as no train excursions were running and the passenger boats were either 
                                                     
177 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday, 20 September 1917 
178 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. VI Special 
Housing Problems, Barrow, p.48, the archdeacon was based in Carlisle  
179 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. III The Control of Working Conditions, Ch. VI The Control of Hours of 
Labour, 1916-1919, p.139, During summer 1915 the MoM issued letters to the small number of controlled firms 
urging them that not more than a week should be taken 
180 Barrow News, Saturday 21 July 1917, traders had been under pressure mainly because of their young assistants 
joining the army, newspaper advertisement generally called for assistants not of recruiting age for shop work 
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laid-up or requisitioned by the navy.  By late 1915 holidays were to be the minimum 
necessary for workers’ health, controlled establishments being urged to take no more 
than three or four days at Christmas and New Year.   
Though workers’ sacrifices were expressed as patriotic, holidays remained 
government concessions at times of national stress and workers were expected to 
make up output loss to justify such concessions.  In 1916 at the insistence of the 
Ministry of Munitions, holidays were both curtailed and postponed following a heavy 
drop in munitions output caused by the Easter break.181  Accordingly the trade unions, 
agreed to postpone Whit-Monday and cancel the annual summer holiday.  Only when 
pressure for output lessened was relief given to the workers and staff of controlled 
establishments.  This required considerable negotiation, and at Vickers holidays were 
approved for late September 1916.  Nonetheless essential work and maintenance 
needed carrying out, additional payments being in accordance with holiday 
arrangements.  For the remainder of the war public holidays returned to a level of 
normality and Christmas 1918 was extended until 6 January, the longest for some 
time.182  What is not generally realised is that shopkeepers and business remained 
open even when munitions factories were on holiday.183  In August 1917 the Barrow 
News reported ‘next week the members of the Barrow Chamber of Trade will close 
their premises for four days and the butchers will close until Friday morning’.  This was 
appreciated by most traders who had been under considerable strain for some 
time.184   
 
 
                                                     
181 Liverpool Daily Post, Tuesday 30 May 1916, agreement was arrived at between Vickers and the men at Barrow 
to continue work with a view to keeping up the output of munitions of war, it was usual to have Whit-Monday 
holiday 
182 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 21 December 1918, the March 1917 twelve day strike and the addition of 
the Easter weekend gave relief to some 6,000 engineers and their tradesmen allowing many to return to home 
outside of Barrow 
183 Fife Free Press and Kirkcaldy Guardian, Saturday, 21 August 1915 noted that regarding the Shop Assistant’s 
Union, the district minimum wage movement had been successful with a considerable portion of the shopkeepers 
in Barrow, where over a £1,000 per year had been added to the wages of the members, besides advances for quite 
a number of non-members 
184 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 6 August 1917, although railway restrictions remained in force for ordinary 
passengers, Morecambe received an enormous number of visitors on the Saturday, many from Barrow.  Lakeland 
had not been so well patronised since the war broke out, munitions workers arrived from all parts of England, 
coaches on the mountain pass routes were crowded and it was difficult to hire boats 
 172  
Conclusions 
Government agencies such as the Admiralty were suspicious of dilution and 
needed to maintain efficiency in the shipyard and the quality of their products.  
However when increased production of large howitzers was needed dilution was 
attempted on the engineering side of Vickers works but was only partially successful.  
Although the engineers accepted dilution on their terms outside the munitions shops, 
any attempts to introduce dilution in the shipyard would be in agreement with all the 
parties involved and only as a final solution. 
Recruitment drives for the Army were often resisted.  In the conflict for 
manpower for industry and the forces, the Recruiting Authorities were supported by 
the public who saw shirkers everywhere.  At Barrow with a shortage of skilled 
manpower both Vickers and the unions objected to the taking of further men and 
were both obstructive and guarded against their removal.  The Derby scheme having 
failed to obtain the numbers need for the Army, conscription under the Military 
Service Act led to the introduction of Military Tribunals.  These allowed local men to 
appeal against the call up on a number of grounds, while protecting the essential 
workers needed for the war effort.  In the need to provide further army recruits  
protection was withdrawn from semi and unskilled workers for which substitutes were 
required.  The provision of substitutes was not a satisfactory system, against which 
the employers and unions were guarded, as they were likely to provide inferior 
workers with no knowledge of shipyard and engineering who needed training and 
supervision. 
Ultimately, dilution brought more single women into the workforce, but they 
were difficult to accommodate.  The imbalance between male and female workers at 
Vickers and the question of accommodation caused Vickers to pursue a two-shift 
system for women as it was not possible to set up a three-shift system for men.  
Although Vickers were given permission to introduce a two-shift system for women it 
only appears to been adopted in certain areas of engineering where women worked 
alongside men. Women had formed unions and had variable support in workplace 
negotiations, but they often struggled to survive on what they earned.  This brought 
about statutory regulation of women’s work which fixed rates for those employed on 
men’s rates.  The step was also taken of laying down standard rates for the payment 
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of women in unskilled or semi-skilled occupations, traditionally performed by women 
in the munitions trades.  For men’s wages the problems of piece-rates remained, as 
little improvement in timekeeping and efficiency would be seen if further increases 
were granted.   
The advent of women, brought about major changes in welfare, although these 
were not generally seen in the shipyard.  While there was concern for the wellbeing 
of women, leisure time was inverse to work time which was dependent on the 
requirements of the Admiralty and the War Office.   Even though welfare existed this 
did not prevent men and women working long hours and relinquishing their holidays 
when the need arose.  For many the combination of long hours and poor housing 
lacking privacy and filled with street sounds meant that sleep was impeded, especially 
for nightshift workers.   Such conditions could only lead to a tired workforce eventually 
becoming an exhausted one. 
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CHAPTER 5: 1917 UNREST 
Introduction 
Russia and France were not the only members of the Entente to experience a 
domestic crisis in the spring and summer of 1917.  Britain underwent its own crisis, 
which culminated in a series of strikes in the engineering industry that called into 
question the willingness of organized labour to continue to accept the leadership of 
Britain's traditional governing classes.  A government which had come to power 
pledged to win the war now had the task of acting as a barrier to a British revolution.  
This chapter addresses the unrest of 1917 as it affected Barrow and the part played 
by the shop stewards movement which had filled the vacuum left by taking away the 
right to strike which greatly removed the influence of the trade unions.    
According to Simmonds, strikes provide clear evidence that in negotiating 
settlements with trade unions the Minister of Munitions failed to acknowledge the 
groundswell of rank-and-file opinion as voiced by the shop stewards.1   Marwick adds, 
the shop stewards developed from minor trade union officials into major spokesmen 
of rank-and-file discontent, deriving their strength from the fact they served with and 
were elected by men from the shop floor.2  Hinton believes that the official leadership 
failed to defend the interests of its rank-and-file in the face of tightening controls, 
therefore becoming increasingly unrepresentative'.3  The difficulty for the Ministry of 
Munitions was negotiating with the army of shop stewards in place of the central body 
of trade unions, particularly in the engineering shops.  As the leadership was unable 
to function properly, the shop stewards furnished a valuable outlet for working-class 
action.  At Barrow although the majority of workers were moderate in their outlook 
and the revolutionary element generally contained, the concern was that the 
unaddressed problems of the town and the national non-recognition of the shop 
stewards by the engineering unions could drive the moderate men into the arms of 
the revolutionary element.   
                                                     
1 Simmonds, A. G. V., Britain and World War 1, (London, Routledge, 2012), p.114 
2 Marwick, A., The Deluge, British Society and the First World War, (London, Macmillan, 1965), p.76 
3 Hinton, The First Shop Stewards’, p.52, 
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The general proposition as to industrial unrest were the same in Barrow as 
reported elsewhere by the Commission of Enquiry but the town had its own special 
problems for which special attention was needed.  It was geographically isolated, it 
had a very large influx of new population coming into the town to work at Vickers, and 
the needs of its citizens were gravely neglected.  Gregory says the Commission for 
Industrial Unrest identified two strands of discontent, the local and specific, and the 
general, noting Barrow had such specific problems that it warranted its own report.4    
This chapter will therefore look at these issues and see what was or was not done to 
alleviate them.     
 
Unrest and the Shop Stewards 
 Since the war began the shop stewards had organised themselves into bodies 
representing the men of several unions instead of being the agents for their unions in 
the shop.  At Barrow a number of factors operated to push the workers into building 
up their workshop organisation independent of the official trade union movement.   In 
late 1916 the Sheffield Workers’ Committee had produced the strike over the 
conscription of Leonard Hargreaves a Vickers skilled man.5  When Hargreaves was not 
returned the local men struck, followed by Barrow the only centre to come out under 
the shop stewards leadership.6  The Barrow strike however ended shortly after it 
started as Hargreaves was quickly returned due to the unrest in Sheffield.   
During February 1917 a similar case occurred at Barrow and the men recalling 
the resolutions passed at the time of the Sheffield strike threatened to place the case 
in the hands of the shop stewards unless the man was released from the army within 
seven days.7  On the sixth day he was returned.  Such acts carried the Barrow workers 
beyond the confines of official action and by the spring of 1917 the formation of a 20-
30 men Shop Stewards Executive representing all Vickers unions put them beyond the 
                                                     
4 Gregory, A., The Last Great War, British Society and the First World War, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2008) 
5 Hinton, The First Shop Stewards’, p.186  
6 OHMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt.1 Release of Munition Workers for Military Service 1916-17, Ch. II The 
Trade Card Agreement, p.37; Murphy, J. T., Preparing for Power, (London, Jonathan Cape, 1934), p.131 
7 Solidarity, March 1917 
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collective control of the skilled unions who alone were represented on the Engineering 
Joint Trades Board.8   
The crisis came over the Premium Bonus System.   In late March 1917 a twelve-
day strike occurred at Barrow over what was alleged to be the systematic cutting of 
the premium bonus time allowance and rate-fixing.9  As the Joint Trades Board was 
unwilling to take illegal action members of the Shop Committee protesting against the 
delay in settlement organised a strike.10  Though the Sheffield Workers’ Committee 
called for a sympathetic strike, they failed as the PBS was unknown to their workers.11  
Meantime a settlement was offered by the Minister of Labour with retrospective 
payment, while the ASE and Employers Federation tried to bring about a settlement.12  
Encouraging women workers to join a union Mary Macarthur (WTUL Secretary) 
pointed out that trade unions did not cause strikes but reduced their number by 
removing the grievances which caused them.13  However in trying to remove the rate-
fixing grievance numbers of women were put out of work causing hardship.14  As the 
women were employed by Vickers, the Ministry refused to entertain the matter, even 
though they had arrived at Barrow from as far as Ireland at their invitation.15  Further, 
Vickers would not provide relief as the strike was caused by the men.   The women 
were left in limbo and the local Ministry of Munitions welfare officer was told to 
consult with the local authorities to see if voluntary effort could mitigate their 
circumstances.16  On the women’s behalf speakers of the patriotic Suffragette 
Women’s Social and Political Union visited Barrow.17  Attempting to get the men to 
return they distributed leaflets and pamphlets and re-prints of letters giving accounts 
of the ravages in France and Belgium, while stating the unrest was entirely worked by 
Germans.18  This made no difference and the men voted overwhelmingly to continue 
                                                     
8 Hinton, First Shop Stewards’, p.187; CAB 24/14/97 The Growth of the Shop Stewards Movement, 31 May 1917 
9 The Times, Monday, 2 April 1917, the strike effected 5850 employees 
10 Hinton, First Shop Stewards’, p.187, since October 1916 Vickers had allegedly been systematically cutting time 
allowances 
11 Hinton, The First Shop Stewards’, p.207 
12 Lancashire Evening Post, Tuesday, 27 March 1917 
13 Marlow, J., (ed.), Women and the Great War, (London, Virago Press, 1998), p.174 
14 Dundee Courier, Saturday, 24 March 1917, the strike was over alleged cutting of the Premium Bonus time 
allowance and affected the naval shell making department where a number of women worked 
15 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 4 April 1917 
16 Western Daily Express, Wednesday, 4 April 1917; H of C Deb 3 April 1917, Vol. 92, cc1110-2110 
17 The WSPU faded from public attention and was dissolved, with Christabel and Emmeline Pankhurst founding the 
Women’s Party in November 1917 
18 Hastings and St Leonards Observer, Saturday 14 April 1917 
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the strike until agreement was reached on the rate-cutting.19  While recognising the 
risk of an extension of the strike the government took the position that there would 
be no bargaining and no discussions until they returned.20  Under the threat of strong 
authoritative measures the men returned on the conditions they had left and a 
Vickers’ agreement that they would confer with the engineering union rather than 
negotiate with the Government.21    
Although work was carried on by Vickers apprentices assisted by the labourers, 
the strike seriously affected output.  Delayed howitzers, gun carriages and 
recuperators and a fall in naval shell output were seen, the interruption in 9.2in 
howitzers and 18 pounder recuperators being particularly serious.22  Considerable 
delay was caused to the propelling machinery and mechanical hull fitting of light-
cruisers, also to submarines under construction and rigid airships, whilst ship repair 
work was delayed.23  Addison as Minster of Munitions made good propaganda from 
the delays informing the press that the June 1917 offensive depended on the strike 
being over.24  The Times amongst other newspapers condemned the Barrow strike as 
revolutionary and unpatriotic.25  The Daily Herald however took the view that the 
blame should be put on the employers, who despite the Munitions Acts had been rate-
cutting.26  The full facts were never reported and the rate-cutting always assumed. 
Therefore those responsible for providing the conditions which produced the strike 
were never censured.27   
                                                     
19 Hull Daily Mail, Thursday 29 March 1917, For resumption 218, Against 2,838 
20 Western Daily Express, Tuesday 3 April 1917; CAB 23/2/28, 2 April 1917, The Barrow Strike, a proclamation was 
made that if the men did not return within 24 hours the shop stewards who brought the men out would be arrested 
under DORA for impeding the production of war material   
21 Dumfries and Galloway Standard, Saturday, 7 April 1917; Hamilton Advertiser, Saturday, 7 April 1917 a ballot for 
and against a conference with Vickers and a resumption of work was taken resulting in a majority of 373 in favour 
of a conference   
22 H of C Deb 03 April 1917 vol. 92 cc1110-2110; H of C Deb 20 March 1917 vol. 92 cc37-8; CAB 24/10/18, 11 April 
1917, The Barrow Strike; OHMoM Vol VI Manpower and Dilution, Part I, Ch. III Dilution on Private Work, p.63, actual 
number were 2 12in., 5 9in., and 8 8in. howitzers, 12 18pdr carriages and 20 to 30 18pdr recuperators – 
‘Recuperator’ was the British name for the mechanism which returned the gun barrel to its firing position after 
recoil 
23 CAB 24/11/23 Strikes: Their Effects on the Construction and Repairs of HM Ships, the launch of Submarine L1 
was put back indefinitely 
24 Birmingham Mail, Tuesday, 15 March 1917 
25 The Times, Tuesday, 3 April 1917 
26 Daily Herald, Saturday, 31 March 1917  
27 Although the newspapers assumed there had been rate cutting it was serious enough for the workers to want 
the chief rate setter to be dismissed 
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In the subsequent settlement a successful scheme without interfering with 
production or control met some of the rate-fixing difficulties.28  The terms arrived at 
included recognition of a Premium Bonus Basis time-rate and referring disputes to an 
appeal section, failing agreement the matter was submitted to the directors for 
decision.29  This principle was applied elsewhere and approved by unions and 
employers while a new clause was introduced to the Ministry of War Act Bill.30  The 
strike Hinton notes, represented the high point of shop steward power in Barrow.31  
However, while Barrow's tradition of rank-and-file independence was reinforced, at 
no point did agreement recognize the shop stewards, or allow access to higher 
management even by the committee specially elected to deal with the grievance.32  
On 3 April 1917 the trade card scheme was abolished on the grounds that 
insufficient numbers of men were volunteering for the army.  It was replaced by the 
Schedule of Protected Occupations, making exemptions the prerogative of the 
National Service Department narrowing the grounds for the exemption of skilled 
workers.  The extension of conscription increased the shortage of skilled labour and 
on 29 April 1917 a Bill was introduced to spread dilution to private work.  This broke 
the Treasury Agreement whereby skilled workers had agreed only to dilution on war 
work protected by legislative safeguards and ministerial promises. The disastrous 
dispute which followed was therefore in protest over the attempt to introduce 
dilution to private work, with the trade card as a secondary motive.33  On 3 May, 
before the Dilution Bill was passed, a Rochdale firm began introducing dilutees into 
private work.34  Though the Manchester district came out in support, extension of the 
                                                     
28 Aberdeen Evening Express, Friday, 27 April 191 
29 Nottingham Evening Post, Friday, 27 April 1917, the terms were agreed to by 2,940 votes to 517 
30 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Part I, The Control of Men’s Wages, Ch. V Payment by Results, p.165, the 
Clause provided for the tightening of the machinery to prevent rate cutting   
31 Hinton, J., The First Shop Stewards’, p.200, as from 5 May the strike became operative against the trade card 
scheme as well 
32 ASE, Monthly Journal and Report, May 1917; Cole, G. D. H., The Payment of Wage: a study in payment by results 
under the wage-system, Trade Union Series No.5, (Westminster, 1918), pp. 137-40 
33 OHMoM Vol VI Manpower and Dilution, Part I, Ch. V Engineers Strike 1917, pp. 92-120, the trade card scheme, 
introduced after the November 1916 Sheffield strike, later replaced by the Schedule of Protected Occupations 
exempted craft union members from military service enraging other unions particularly those representing semi 
and unskilled workers and was responsible for preventing the Ministry from providing its quota for the Army – the 
engineers strike extended across the engineering sector involving 200,000 workers in 48 towns and cities causing 
1,500,000 working days to be lost 
34 Horner, D., Mansfield, N., (eds.) The Great War: Localities and Regional Identities, (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 
Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014) p.144, David Swift in his article says the strikes were responses to the 
irresistible pressure on living standards, the originating strike in Rochdale in fact was over the introduction of 
dilution to commercial work  
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strike swayed in the balance and while the ASE leaders explained the safeguards and 
spoke against the strike policy, the rank-and-file differed.35   
As the engineers strike expanded efforts were made to bring the Barrow men 
out, but through indecision and small ballots they remained in work.36  The strike call 
was never popular and numbers of workmen demonstrated their patriotism by signing 
forms against any cessation of work.  Feeling was such that whole departments 
signified their unwillingness to accept the ballot recommendation of a stoppage.37  The 
strike was on the verge of collapse when the ringleaders were arrested and would 
have ended had not the trade union’s sympathy been largely with these men.  This 
demonstrated that relationships between the shop stewards and the trade union 
leaders were not totally hostile.38  The moderates who had hitherto succeeded in 
maintaining a precarious equilibrium at Barrow were swept aside and 6,000 men 
downed tools, only returning after the charges against the arrested men were 
withdrawn.39  The Barrow shop stewards remained a threat to the Joint Board and in 
June led opposition to the Permanent Committees set up in the dilution agreement, 
but despite government fears no strike action resulted.40  The July ballot in the ASE 
districts on whether dilution into private work should be introduced was heavily 
defeated, Addison resigned and Churchill succeeded him withdrawing the dilution 
clause from the Munitions Act Amendment Bill.41   
                                                     
35 Barrow ASE Minute Book 13 June 1916 to 11 September 1917, BDSO 57/1/8, 29 April 1917, the Barrow ASE 
opposed anything in the way of compromise on the question of dilution in commercial engineering 
36 Evening Telegraph, Tuesday, 15 May 1917, the ballots were not a reflection of the true feeling as less than 2,000 
engineers were affected less than a sixth of their number 
37 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Wednesday 16 May 1917, patriotism was possibly further encouraged by 
the forthcoming visit of the King and Queen to Barrow on 17 May 
38 OHMoM Vol VI Manpower and Dilution, Part I, Ch. V Engineers Strike 1917, p.112 a ballot at Barrow on 12 May 
1,128 voted for and 714 against striking, on 20 May 1,783 voted for and 218 against striking, three days later the 
result was reversed 1,808 against 1,164 for, the number voting as elsewhere was a small proportion of the men 
concerned; CAB 24/14/32 Report from the Ministry of Labour, Week Ending 22 May 1917, the Barrow strike was 
effected as a result of the arrest of the ringleaders followed by a meeting addressed by delegates from Sheffield 
and Manchester 
39 Yorkshire Evening Post, Friday, 18 May 1917, reported 43 howitzers and 30 carriages were delayed; Lancashire 
Evening Post, Tuesday, 22 May 1917,importantly labourers were allowed to work, otherwise would not 
receive out-of-work pay, previously when the joint engineering trades were out and labourers 
unemployed through no fault of their own they received some out of work money, it can be assumed 
this was the result of union funds being depleted following the March strike   
40 ASE Monthly Journal and Report, June 1917 
41 OHMoM Vol VI Manpower and Dilution, Part I, Ch. V Engineers Strike 1917, p.120, there was a majority of 37,906 
against dilution 
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Following the Commission on Unrest in July 1917 the Barrow shop stewards 
turned to the conditions in the town to press their views of industrial and social 
reconstruction.  After the 1917 summer holidays the position at Barrow was outwardly 
normal but restlessness started to increase, chiefly over the unsatisfactory 3s 
engineers award and the treatment of the Clyde deportees.  Attempting to organise a 
general ASE strike for re-employment of the deportees, Arthur McManus claimed to 
have the support of the Barrow and Sheffield shop stewards provided the Clyde took 
the first step.42  In September 1917 the chief subjects of resolutions at Barrow were 
the Billeting Act, income tax assessment and the support of the United Machine 
Workers to resist the further combing out of men for the military.43   
The problem of housing remained and a decision by the Ministry of Munitions 
to construct houses was announced to defuse the unrest.44  During October trouble 
between foremen and forewomen was resolved in favour of the former for which the 
shop stewards claimed responsibility, having offered to support the foremen in going 
as far as threatening a work stoppage.45  The employment by Vickers of 40 non-union 
men attracted the shop stewards’ attention in November with the threat of downing 
tools if they were not dismissed.46   So strong and successful was the pressure applied 
by the unions during the war that of the 35,000 Vickers workers only 60 or 70 were 
non-unionists.47   
Meanwhile 170 Furness Railway workshop craftsmen who were members of 
various trade societies came out over district pay rates and conditions, meaning those 
prevailing in the local munitions works.48  Hoping Vickers men would come out in 
support, the men struck as engineers not railwaymen.  With the backing of the shop 
stewards and the moral support of the shipyard trade unions, the government’s fear 
was that the longer the strike continued the more likely the Vickers men were to join 
                                                     
42 CAB 24/21/94 Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week Ending 1 August 1917 
43 CAB 24/27/39 Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week Ending 26 September 1917 
44 Pepper, S., Swenarton, M., 'Home front: garden suburbs for munitions workers', Architectural Review (June 
1978), pp. 163, 366, described the Ministry of Munitions housing programme as ‘introduced to defuse the crisis as 
a matter of necessity rather than a welfare measure’ 
45 CAB 24/27/39, Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week Ending 26 September 1917  
46 CAB/24/31/42 Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week Ending 7 November 1917 
47 CAB 24/55/100 Labour Position in Munition Industries, 26 June 1918 
48 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 31 December 1917 
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them.49  The dispute was resolved locally and the craftsmen returned after ten days 
without Vickers coming out.   
Barrows rank-and-file movement says Hinton was limited to a ‘rebel element, 
composed of zealous and intelligent men’.50  Failing to capture the Shop Steward 
Executive he says, they formed a Barrow Workers Committee which unlike on the 
Clyde and at Sheffield failed to seize a position of mass leadership.  However the 
unrest commission report provides another view:  
‘men, some young and thoughtless, others young and thoughtful, and all 
infected by a spirit of revolt attempt to remedy their grievances and bring 
about better conditions by calling attention to their wrongs by methods 
of stoppages and strikes which interfere with munitions output.’51 
 
Revolutionary views were not held by the mainly loyal and law-abiding Barrow 
community, while many of the extreme men were said to state their views with 
moderation.52  The low turn outs often seen at ballots were usually representative of 
the younger element, while the majority of men had not sufficient active interest in 
strikes to vote for continuance.  Hinton further points out that failure of workshop 
organisation to acquire negotiating rights at Vickers meant no ‘unofficial’ shop 
stewards organisation could rival the authority of the Joint Board unless the workers 
were on strike.  In the absence of competition between local employers, craft 
unionism at Barrow had developed in an exceptional form, the one-to-one 
relationship between Vickers and the Board preventing full development of direct 
workshop democracy which had explosive results elsewhere.  The capacity of the 
union to contain wartime militancy was therefore related to the overwhelming 
predominance of the dominant Vickers Company.  Overall the Barrow atmosphere 
was patriotic while trade relations were generally harmonious.  An investigation into 
shipbuilding during 1917 disclosed that trouble had been frequent on the Clyde and 
Tyne, occasionally serious on the Mersey and in Belfast, while rare at Barrow, 
Southampton, Hull and Dundee.53 
                                                     
49 CAB/24/35/52 Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week Ending 12 December 1917 
50 Hinton, The First Shop Stewards’, p.189 
51 CAB 24/23/59 Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest, No.2 Division North-West Area, Supplemental Report 
for Barrow-in-Furness 
52 Vickers workers are often quoted as ‘the steady majority’ 
53 CAB 24/67/83 Report from the Minister of Labour for the Week Ending 13 March 1918 
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Simmonds maintains strikes provide clear evidence that in negotiating 
settlements with trade unions the Minister of Munitions failed to acknowledge the 
groundswell of rank-and-file opinion as voiced by the shop stewards.54  The shops 
stewards’ movement generally revolted against industrial conditions and a system of 
industrial control that required remedy.  Agitation viewed as a whole was of a 
movement towards a more human standard of life and broader outlook for the 
working-classes.  In essence the shop stewards movement was industrial and social 
and if workers could be convinced that the government was seeking remedies for the 
existing evils and finding solutions to future problems, then the need for repression 
and likelihood of revolution would disappear.55   
Without government action moderate men were likely to turn to causes they 
had no real belief in, but it was realised that with legitimate recognition of the shop 
stewards’ movement the workman would have a voice regarding his employment.56  
This could be achieved by works committees which would fit into the labour machine 
without dislocating the existing mechanism.  Although it was not expected unrest 
could be allayed by these committees, grounds existed for thinking they would do 
much towards mitigating it.  The Ministry of Labour believed that while the functions 
and constitution of works committees varied, they were the direct representatives of 
the shop floor workers and approved by the Trade Unions concerned.57  They could 
also produce good results, for not only did the workers feel their troubles would be 
properly put forward by their representatives, but in electing them they would 
generally choose responsible men.  In reference to this the Commission on Unrest 
drew attention to the agreement between Vickers and representatives of the Barrow 
Engineers Joint Committee for the procedure observed over the adjustment of the 
Premium Bonus Basis times.58   
In late November 1917, a strike occurred at a Coventry firm over the 
recognition of shop stewards.  The Engineering Employers Federation refused to meet 
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the local shop stewards contending the problem was a national one which could only 
be dealt with at the forthcoming conference of employers and trade union officials.59  
The conference was of huge importance, as it affected the position and powers of the 
employers and the trade unions of engineering workshops throughout the country.  
Although they were aware of the shop stewards’ encroachments, the engineering 
trade unions had generally avoided facing the question of their recognition as they 
were largely the root cause of industrial unrest.  But as demonstrated, without 
recognition a strike could break out wherever the engineering shop stewards were 
powerful.60  Although the ASE was not party to the final agreement it was signed by 
the employers and remaining engineering trade unions.61  While agreement provided 
for the appointment of workers’ shop floor representatives as part of a ‘limited’ trade 
union organisation they were subject to selection and control by the remaining unions.  
In view of the unrest and to address existing grievances and prevent the existence of 
others a Commission on Unrest was formed in the summer of 1917.     
 
The Commission on Unrest 
 On 12 June, 1917 the Prime Minister appointed 24 Commissioners to enquire 
into and report on industrial unrest and make recommendations to the Government.  
Conditions were such that the Commissioners of the North-West Area submitted a 
separate report for Barrow after taking evidence in July.62  In an extraordinary censure 
of bureaucratic procrastination and ineptitude position at Barrow was described as ‘a 
crying scandal’, constituting a terrible indictment against rulers and governors.  The 
Commission commented ‘for the fact Barrow lies in an isolated position and it is 
inadvisable to inform the public through the Press of the evils of industrial life, we 
cannot believe the facts set down could so long have remained actual conditions of 
domestic life in England during the twentieth century’.63  The Manchester Guardian 
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reported: ‘in attracting such attention it meant the question of Barrow had become a 
national question to be answered by the Government.’64  
The Commissioner pointed out that central government regulation did not 
work at Barrow and should be suspended; alternatively common-sense methods when 
dealing with unrest did.  Although local officials were inspired to do their best in the 
circumstances, and likewise in London, evidence showed they were hampered by 
London officials ignorant of Barrow’s conditions and possibilities.  Fault thus lay with 
the centralisation of those with the power to put things right, yet they had largely 
ignored the conditions at Barrow.65  The local Ministry of Munitions and Admiralty 
Representatives however were praised by the Commission for the work carried out in 
maintaining industrial wellbeing through their own initiatives.   
The operation of the Military Service and Munitions of War Acts were cause 
for complaint.  Skilled workers were called for but many were with the colours and the 
feeling was that the War Office should be approached with a view to discharging 
them.66  The feeling was that those who had come into industry since the war began 
should be called up before those who were in when war was declared.  It was alleged 
where men had returned to the engine shops they had been unfairly treated and too 
many pledges had been broken.  It had become necessary after the start of the war to 
convince workpeople, as endorsed by Kitchener, that they were doing National Service 
by remaining in the workshops.  This was remembered and dwelt on by men who 
regarded such messages as promises for all time, even if conditions had changed.   
Much unrest the Commissioners said was caused by the leaving certificate 
which had brought about suffering amongst men who could not improve their position 
but had assisted employers.  While the leaving certificates demise came about in 
October 1917 the outcome was they were replaced by new restrictive rules and 
regulations that mainly relieved the Munitions Tribunals of a large part of their work.67  
                                                     
64 Manchester Guardian, Friday, 31 August 1917 
65 CAB 24/23/59 Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest, No.2 Division North-West Area, Supplementary 
Report for Barrow-in-Furness 
66 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Thursday, 12 July 1917 
67 OHMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. I Munitions of 
War Act, 1917, p.13, sudden dislocation was provided against by making a week’s notice on each side compulsory, 
and prohibiting movement of labour from munitions to private work without the Minister’s consent; an 
arrangement was made by which any man of military age unemployed for more than fourteen days was liable to 
be called up unless proving reasonable cause for unemployment; H of C Deb 26 November 1917 vol. 99 c1624, 
there was a tendency for some men to use their freedom as a lever for securing higher wages, while numbers of 
 185  
Complaints were made to the Barrow Commission by skilled day time-workers that 
their wages were much below those of piece-workers.68  Abolition of the leaving 
certificate made it necessary to readjust skilled time-workers’ wages, otherwise they 
would have moved to more highly paid though in many cases less skilled repetition 
piece-work with the consequence of disorganising munitions work.  In preventing the 
movement of skilled time-workers a 12½ per cent advance was awarded, but it was 
foreseen the settlement would lead to requests from semi-skilled and unskilled time-
workers.  The drawing up of an order, extended the bonus to these workers in both 
the engineering and shipbuilding trades.69  Piece-workers now found they no longer 
had an advantage over time-workers regarding earnings and so a 7½ per cent award 
was announced.70  The piecemeal manner in which the awards were granted increased 
unrest, which only ceased when the awards were extended to the limits of their 
application.  It is arguable that the Schedule of Protected Occupations would have 
afforded safeguard against the migration of skilled time-workers to semi-skilled work, 
even if the 12½ per cent award had not been granted.  What is clear, is that Churchill’s 
Orders proved expensive as the preliminary estimate of increased wages was 
£14,500,000.71    
It was realised men and women were tired, long hours of strain in the factory, 
lack of holidays, overcrowded housing and lodgings deprived of comfort, unpalatable 
food obtained by waiting in queues, limited amusement and recreation, bereavement 
and return of the wounded all produced a nervous irritability.  Long hours had been 
worked for some time and in many cases carried out by older or less fit men, while 
more difficult work than had previously carried out was undertaken by women and 
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girls.72  Although a general limitation of working hours was under consideration during 
the summer and autumn 1917, no large scale action taken until 1918.73   
The unrest commission noted that the isolated position of Barrow made the 
question of food prices a very acute one.  Concerning the food supply, the engineers 
engaged in the production of munitions were in the commissions view worthy of 
similar sympathy in the matter as given to the Army in the field.  The recommendation 
was that Barrow should have a Civil Administrator with the full power to deal with the 
question of the food supply.  While Barrow did not suffer acute distress, the 
importance of economising on food led to a tentative experiment being carried out in 
the Hindpool district.74  The experiment met the demand of a considerable number of 
people in supplying porridge breakfasts at cost price, significantly reducing the 
consumption of bread, the staple diet of most working-class families.75  The scheme 
was observed by the Food Economy Committee (FEC) and while throughout the 
summer months there was reduced demand for porridge, the provision of soup etc. 
was seen as a large scale possibility later.76  By August 1917 the result of food 
shortages at Barrow became such that landladies declined to board further lodgers 
and after charging per head those already in lodgings for the share in the use of a bed 
left them to feed themselves.77  With the Billeting Board seeking lodgings for workers, 
the food question along with rail transport restrictions hardly made their task any 
easier.  Things were no better in January 1918 when workers experienced difficulty in 
obtaining sufficient food to carry out their work, while landladies were on the point of 
giving notice to their lodgers.78 
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The industrial unrest committee pointed to a deep-rooted suspicion of 
profiteering as a primary cause of discontent at Barrow.  Giving evidence, Councillor 
Ellison stated ‘the food question had been badly handled by the Government and 
people had not been protected from unscrupulous profiteers’.79  Fish arriving by the 
harbour or rail was being cornered and sold by individuals at high prices and instead 
of vegetables being brought to market from the neighbouring area and sold at 
reasonable prices they were being privately exploited and sold at unreasonable 
prices.80  It was recommended by the commission that the Food Controller should stop 
food exploitation in Barrow immediately, as owing to Barrow’s peculiar position it 
should be just as easy for him to control the supplies as it was for the profiteers.  
  A Barrow union representative pointed out that food prices were rising so 
high that if the engineers made a united stand and forced a reduction, not only would 
they benefit themselves by the equivalent of a wage advance, but benefit the public 
including soldiers’ dependents.81  Hinton notes that the Barrow Workers Committee 
when discussing whether their delegates at the national shop stewards conference 
should support strike action over wages, urged and agreed food prices should be 
attacked and the wage question left alone.82  Worries over industrial unrest became 
such that the Government introduced a price subsidy for bread in September 1917 
and fixed the wholesale price of meat.83   
Frustrated with waiting for a ministry scheme, Barrow Council established a 
Food Control Committee (FCC) in September 1917.84  The final composition of the 
committee consisted of eight members of the Corporation (one from each ward), one 
representative each of the Chamber of Trade, Cooperative Society, Trades and Labour 
Council, and General Federation of Women Workers, the Mayor as Chairman, and a 
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District Executive Officer or food controller for the district.85  Their job was to 
supervise the registration of consumers, distribute local foodstuffs, set retail food 
prices and institute municipal food services.86  The weekly food allowances however, 
were not to exceed the maximum limits laid down by the Government Food 
Controller.  Importantly the FCC had the power to try and fine cases of profiteering 
coming before them.  The Committee were in fact an extension of the local authority, 
for example when the FCC asked the Council to consider the use of communal 
kitchens, they deemed them unnecessary.87  Instead of the country being covered by 
ad hoc municipal schemes, in December 1917, the Food Controller chose to use the 
local authority apparatus to implement the Food Control Committees (Local) 
Distribution Order.88   
The responsibility for advising the FCC on milk retail prices was the Barrow Milk 
Dealers Protection Society, but wholesale prices until the Milk Order was introduced 
were fixed by the farmer, increasing as production and distribution costs rose.89  
Wholesale milk prices became of such concern that the Barrow trade unions wrote to 
the Food Controller complaining that increases were causing discontent and adding to 
their problems.90  Economic use of milk was not ideal either and it was not realised 
that 90 gallons had been used for ice-cream making.91  In early December 1917 a 
further rise in the price caused a deputation to visit London to meet representatives 
of the Food Ministry and discuss Barrow’s milk. The visit was hardly successful as the 
representatives were told the measures taken to ensure continuity of the milk supply 
was wise and the ice-cream matter would be addressed to ensure sugar and milk were 
used more efficiently.92   
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One of the causes of the rise was transit costs, some 7,000 gallons being 
brought into Barrow weekly by rail from the Cumberland, North Lonsdale and 
Lancaster districts.93  However the supply could be variable, when 2,000 people were 
left short in September 1917 it was blamed on farming system changes and the 
summer drought preventing grass growing for dairy cattle.94 Distribution however was 
prioritised so that less milk went to people without families to provide more for those 
with children.95  The distribution system was not helped by the call-up of Barrow 
dairymen.  When sixteen dairymen appeared before the Military Tribunal asking for 
exemptions, the verdict was that the distribution system should be improved to allow 
them to be released for the army.96    
Before the Milk Order came into force farmers arranged with milk retailers to 
obtain high prices so there was less need to make butter.  To alleviate the shortages 
Barrow dealers travelled to Kendal and bought wholesale butter and other produce 
causing unrest amongst working-class women.  Kendal FCC responded by increasing 
the retail price to encourage farmers to bring their butter to the weekly-market 
instead of disposing it to dealers from Barrow and elsewhere.97  Shortages at Barrow 
continued causing queues for butter and margarine.  About 1 ton of margarine over 
the amount received in normal times was arriving at Barrow but there was still a 
shortage of 2,000lb per week.98  The problem was largely surmounted by controlling 
distribution to retailers and by the amounts that could be purchased as set by the 
FCC.99   Though the Barrow shop stewards threatened a one-day strike in protest 
against queues and inadequate supplies their views were put before the FCC and 
sympathetically met with, the stewards opting to support any action taken by the 
Committee.100  In November 1917 the publication of the new authorised scale for 
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voluntary rationing was welcomed at Woolwich and Barrow.101  The Ministry of Labour 
Report noted that the extremist shop stewards had responded at once to the calls 
made upon them by the Food Controller.102  This was a positive step however there 
were still concerns over the food question.  In looking to unite the workers to produce 
a strike and demonstrate their power Arthur McManus travelled to Barrow in 
December 1917.  In a speech given to the Barrow workers he exhorted them not to 
raise deputations on the food matter to the Government, but wait until they could act 
together nationally to force the issue.103  However, timely recognition of the shop 
stewards as a part of the trade union machinery had satisfied the reasonable element 
preventing them being drawn to the extremists leaders. 
Both shop stewards and women became active in setting up food vigilance 
committees in the Barrow wards for the purpose of focussing working-class demands 
in connection with the food supply and stimulating government and municipal 
activity.104  During early January 1918 a meeting was held at Barrow Town Hall where 
several shop stewards gave an address calling for fairer food distribution.105  A further 
meeting demanded increased food supplies while calling for the necessities of life to 
be sent by passenger trains at goods rates due to the transport breakdown.106  
Resolutions were passed urging the Government to take control of farming and 
distribution and for Barrow to become a proscribed area from which no foodstuffs 
sent to the town should be allowed to other districts.   
Even before the introduction of compulsory rationing, the Barrow FCC had 
asked retail grocers to furnish particulars regarding the issuing of ration cards for basic 
provisions to prevent second buying.  A further meeting followed to promote the 
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ration card with the intention of approving it for issue in February.107   On 30 January 
the War Cabinet finally approved the Order for National compulsory rationing based 
on a ‘scale of rations’ covering bread and flour, butter, margarine and lard and 
sugar.108  The shortage of sugar and its unequal distribution was a grievance in Barrow 
and had caused sugar registration forms to be issued in 1917.109  Bread rationing was 
never enforced but butter, and margarine were limited to 4ozs and lard to 2oz.110   
While there was a beef scarcity in Barrow it was made up by the supply of 
mutton.111  The Ministry Order restraining the selling meat over Christmas 1917 meant 
that only 40 pigs were slaughtered at the Barrow public abattoirs against 400 during 
the corresponding period the previous year.  The Barrow Butchers Association pointed 
out that owners in cottages were slaughtering pigs and selling the pork to neighbours 
and others, and asked the FCC to ensure that the commodity was sold through the 
butchers shops.112  The matter was referred to the Meat Sub-Committee.  Meat 
rationing was introduced by the Government in February 1918 and allocated on the 
basis of monetary value rather than weight.  Those employed on heavy industrial work 
received supplementary rations of bacon, whist others received extra meat in relation 
to wholesale supplies.  Children aged under six were allowed 50 per cent of the adult 
allocations.  Food saving was also taken to the population when a week’s patriotic 
food economy exhibition was organised by the local FEC.113  Mrs. Myles Kennedy 
opening the Barrow exhibition condescendingly said:  
‘she had not come from the Government to ask them to eat less, but eat 
enough to do their arduous and essential work, and still play the game, 
avoiding excesses ensuring nothing was wasted’.   
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To obtain representation on the local FCC the shop stewards and food vigilance 
committee ran four members for the Barrow Cooperative Society Committee, of 
which all were returned, one heading the poll.114  At the end of March 1918 the council 
acceded to the request of the FCC to increase its membership by including 
representatives of the Grocer’s and Butchers Association and the shop stewards.115  
Thus by representation of the different societies on the various committees the 
matter of providing food equitably and at affordable prices was achieved for Barrow’s 
working-classes.   By the end of April 1918 the Barrow landladies were able to obtain 
the commodities needed for lodgers preventing them giving notice. 
Allotments were also an important food source and any vacant cultivatable 
land in the borough was used.116  When the Agricultural Board suggested land in the 
borough should come under the County Agricultural Executive Committee, Barrow 
Corporation were adamant that land issues would be dealt with by its own 
committee.117   
Use of wheat, barley and sugar in the production of alcoholic drinks was 
criticised, as essentially the German submarine campaign produced both a food and 
drink problem.  This was the start of a fraught relationship between the CCB and the 
Ministry of Food, which had encroached on the Board’s territory.  In April 1916 the 
Government passed the Output of Beer Restrictions Act, the first in an extensive 
period of reform concerning restriction of foodstuffs in drink.118  Further limitations 
were placed on beer production and spirits by the Food Controller in January 1917, a 
policy regarded to cause ‘hardly less unrest than total prohibition.’119   The restricted 
amounts of beer on sale were totally inadequate to meet the requirements of the 
public as evidenced by ‘ale sold out notices’ in licensed premises.  Fears grew about 
the sanctity of the working man’s pint, the Daily Express prophesising ‘the pint 
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measure would soon disappear’.120  There were complaints about the amount of beer 
coming into Barrow, it being the same or less than before the war.  The town’s public-
houses were virtually closed.  However the unrest committee pointed out that 
favoured customers were entering the back door drinking their own share and more, 
and where beer was available profiteering was taking place.    
The difficulty in the liquor trade in Barrow was that government had shown 
little interest in the locality and its needs and the working-classes who needed beer 
were never sufficiently consulted.  It was after all the Barrow licensing justices who 
understood the town’s interests.  Although control of the drink trade was intended as 
a contribution to national efficiency, opinion abounded that beer was necessary for 
work especially for blast-furnacemen, and when required men should be allowed such 
a luxury.  Barrow being an industrial town the Unrest Commission recommended that 
it should have a more liberal allowance.  Restrictions were regarded not as the cause 
for unrest but a loss of temper for many beer was not just a beverage but a national 
institution.  One temperate Barrow man said: ‘I have yet to taste my first pint, but it is 
a great hardship that my mates who desire it cannot get it.’121  Matters were not 
helped by the hot 1917 summer accentuating the shortages and in July the 
Government allowed the brewing of a third more beer in return for brewers producing 
a lighter beer.122  The CCB view was that the lighter beer, which was stronger than 
government beer, would check the increased consumption of spirits in munitions 
areas, a habit spreading amongst workers and women.123   
The shortage dragged on into 1918 and loss of temper turned to action when 
men invaded a Barrow public house threatening to help themselves unless served 
immediately.124  It was suggested a card system for men engaged on furnaces, 
smelting and similar work to introduce should be introduced and at the steelworks it 
was proposed to distribute beer through a canteen.  In early June, organised labour 
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was called on to partake in the settlement of the supply of beer to workmen and 
others.  At a conference presided over by the mayor in which the Barrow Labour Party 
took a prominent role it was agreed there should be uniformity in supply, hours of 
opening and closing and pricing.  Forms were issued and an inquiry office opened with 
a view to getting census and ideas of requirements.  It was proposed to introduce a 
beer rationing scheme to secure fair distribution, each workmen being issued with a 
registration card allowing him three pints a day.125  The scheme was a failure and to 
obtain the ration at one public house was unpopular, so the old conditions resumed 
and the little beer available went to first comers.126  Better timekeeping in the 
munitions works was seen, and the greater sobriety led the Barrow Chief Constable to 
conclude that it was not entirely due to CCB restrictions, but the quantities 
available.127 There were however a few licensees who opened their premises on 
Saturday evenings just to alleviate overcrowding.  Charles Duncan believed that if 
proper housing was provided there would be no need for men to visit public-houses.128  
 
Overcrowding and evictions 
Vickers employers by June 1917 numbered some 35,000, nearly double the 
pre-war strength.  Of these 6,596 men and 2,647 women had been imported and over 
5,000 came by workers trains from towns and other small places within a 20 miles 
radius.129  The provision of suitable facilities for the transport of munition workers was 
therefore important in the solution of the housing difficulties, the unrest commission 
received complaints about the deficiency of the railway system, little or no 
improvement being seen.130  The Barrow tramways and omnibuses saw little 
                                                     
125 BDSO 85/1/4 Barrow Working Men’s Club and Institute, at the end of June 1917 the club held a meeting on the 
advisability of issuing tickets restricting the supply of beer, stout, and spirits, the intention was to serve two drinks 
a day to all members also to those members on active service, the 1916 membership was 555 
126 Yorkshire Evening Post, Saturday, 6 July 1918, it transpired that only about 6,000 registration cards were 
rationed-out of 30,000 
127 North West Evening Mail, Saturday, 2 February 1918; Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 8 February 1919, noted 
the Barrow Chief Constables report stated that convictions of drunkenness since 1914 had fallen by nearly 70 per 
cent  
128 Carter, H., The Control of the Drink Trade: A Contribution to National Efficiency 1915-1917, (London, Longman, 
Green and Co., 1918), pp. 72-73 
129 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. VI Special 
Housing Problems, Barrow, p.46; CAB 24/33/16 Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week Ending, 21 
November 1917 
130 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 21 January 1918, due to the transport breakdown the shop stewards called 
for the necessities of life to be sent by passenger trains at goods rates  
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improvement.  In May 1917 licences were renewed and granted for twenty-six 
tramcars and it was recommended they be granted for six motor-buses, four to be 
used regularly with two standby.131  Although improvements were agreed to carry out 
extensions and alterations to the tram depot, the owners warned fewer cars would be 
run owing to further staff decreases.132  The trams and infrastructure were in such 
poor condition that some standards having to be filled with concrete.  Such 
deterioration caused the Secretary of the Engineering Trades Council to write to 
Barrow Council calling their attention to the ‘deplorable’ condition of the tram service 
and asking for steps to be taken to improve matters.133   
The unrest commission heard evidence from all classes on the overcrowded 
condition of the town's housing.  Joy says council records on wartime overcrowding 
are sparse, but disclose they could only 'get an idea' from figures obtained from 
Sanitary Inspectors' random checks, with the admission that only a census would 
provide comprehensive figures.134  Information about wartime overcrowding levels is 
therefore patchy, however with the council being short staffed this is understandable.  
One surviving but undated report from the war years recorded that there was no 
overcrowding in the town's tenement blocks.135  A further file dated June and July 
1917, no doubt stimulated by the unrest commission examined overcrowding in four 
Hindpool streets (Table 12).136  Hindpool was identified as having high-density 
working-class accommodation and the poorest area of Barrow, its dwellings were 






                                                     
131 Barrow Council Committee Minutes, 14 May 1917, Barrow Records Office, there were 52 licenced tram drivers 
and 46 conductors amongst which were women 
132 Ibid. p.25 
133 Barrow Council Committee Minutes, 2 September 1918 
134 Joy, C. A. War and Unemployment in an Industrial Community, Barrow-in-Furness 1914-1926, Uclan PhD Thesis 
p.62  little is revealed of housing conditions in the borough and demonstrates the Corporation's poor recording 
procedures and emphasises problems arising from local statistics; Housing Statistics 1914-1921, Cumbria Records 
Office, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/H BOX II  
135 Housing Statistics 1914-1921, CRO, Barrow-in-Furness, BA/H BOX II 
136 Ibid. 
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Street No. of Houses With two or 
more families 
With Lodgers No. of 
Bedrooms 
Melbourne 72 8 34 3 
Adelaide 35 8 15 3 
Exmouth 48 1 10 2 and 3 
Howe  54 3 26 3 
Table 12 - Corporation Estimate of Wartime Overcrowding 1917 
While providing statistical details, the report fails to provide any meaningful 
correlation of the figures with regard to the level of overcrowding in these properties.  
However, the report does list some individual examples, the worst being the 
conditions at 49 Melbourne Street where 12 adults and seven children were living.   
 






1912 12,902 65,257 5.06 
1913 13,259 68,523 5.17 
1914 13,626 75,368 5.53 
1915 13,983 79,206 5.66 
1916 14,588 85,179 5.83 
1917 14,791 85,048 5.75 
Table 13 - Barrow Housing 1912-1917 
Table 13 provides accommodation and population figures allowing average numbers 
per house to be calculated but does not provide meaningful information regarding 
overcrowding.  Therefore we are left with the evidence of the commission which 
commented: 'no decent person who understands the condition of housing in Barrow 
could do anything but condemn them’.137   Their report detailed nine persons living in 
one room and sixteen in one small house, while a family of a man, wife, two 
adolescents and two children were subletting a bedroom of 12 feet.   
                                                     
137 CAB 24/23/59 Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest - Supplemental Report for Barrow-in-Furness 
District 
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Whilst many contemporaries blame the tenant for housing conditions, poorly 
maintained houses were common, and oral evidence reveals many landlords avoided 
repairs and had no contact with their tenants.138  House-ownership networks included 
some local Councillors who owned and let a string of properties, among these only 
Councillor Dockeray was accredited with frequent repairs, whilst doctors were listed 
among the worst offenders owning 'some horrible houses'.139  The most commonly 
requested repairs were minor but even these were avoided by a majority of landlords, 
thus a common complaint was tenants found themselves 'paying money and getting 
nothing’.140  In the landlords defence joiners, plumbers, plasters and painters were by 
the end of 1917 mainly in the military or on work of national importance.141  Schools 
were also affected.  The Operative House and Ship Painters and Decorators Secretary 
suggested that painting should be deferred until winter owing to the shortage of staff 
through men being called up.142  It was doubtful whether the work could be carried 
out caused by the pressure of work and with half the staff.  It was agreed that the 
greater portion of the work was external, this was cut down to a minimum and the 
internal work deferred until winter.  
Although Hindpool was seen as the poorest area, poverty was spread across 
the borough with a mix of income groups in all housing areas, an unusual situation 
unlike Vickerstown where skilled and unskilled lived in segregated housing and paid 
fixed rents.  Elizabeth Roberts offers further evidence of overcrowding, saying where 
overcrowding existed whole families were packed together in single rooms where they 
lived and slept for which exorbitant prices were charged.143  Surprisingly Vickerstown 
saw overcrowding as one newspaper reported: ‘in Latona Street six men lodgers slept 
in a room, the three beds filled the room such that they had to put their belongings 
                                                     
138 Social History of Barrow-in-Furness and Lancaster 1880-1930, E. Roberts Collection, Lancaster University, 
respondent M1B, 77 
139 Social History, M8B, 19-20 
140 Barrow Minutes of Councils and Committees, November 1916 to October 1917, 4 July 1917, when 2,224 
Hindpool houses were inspected, 369 defective items of plumbing were found and owners served with notices, but 
work was slow due to a shortage of plumbers 
141 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday, 1 November 1917, the Munitions Tribunal Advisory Committee 
recommended that no further joiners be taken for the Army; Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday, 29 November 
1917, reported a shortage of plumbers, it stated that masters and men in Barrow numbered two dozen for a 
population of 76,000 
142 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 18 July 1917 
143 Roberts, E., Working Class Standards of Living in Barrow and Lancaster, 1890-1914, Economic History Review, 
Issue 2,  Vol. 30 (May, 1977), p.318  
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under their beds while in the adjoining room was a man, his wife and four children’.144  
Mobility of labour in Barrow meant there was no power to make a person stay in a 
room for 5s if they preferred half a bed at 2s 6d.145  People heaped themselves up 
unless restrained by force, cellars, attics, kitchens, caravans and railway carriages were 
all inhabited and any family arriving in Barrow was lucky to have the use of two rooms.  
The Barrow Medical Officer of Health only served notices in cases of gross 
overcrowding, many cases were thus overlooked on account of war conditions which 
under normal circumstances would have been dealt with.146   
 The housing shortage kept rent levels high, and stimulated working-class 
house-ownership, largely among skilled craftsmen, some of whom became landlords 
in their own right, letting a string of houses.147  Although the Rent Restrictions Act 
froze rents and banned evictions, this was not extended to lodgings and an owner was 
able to take possession of the property, occupy a couple of rooms and let the rest.  
There was a growing body of opinion that the law was operating unfairly in Barrow 
'people were buying houses to obtain possession and defeating the objects for which 
the law was brought into effect.'148  The existing state of affairs were not made easier 
by the rental disparities for similar classes of houses.  These disparities were a source 
of irritation and discontent arising from the fact that legislature decreed rents up to 
certain specified amounts could not be increased beyond the pre-war figure.  
Restriction however did not apply to houses erected since the outbreak of war and so 
the anomaly existed of identical houses being let in the same district at different 
rentals.   
It should be mentioned that company housing was not exempt from ejectments 
as the proprietors of Vickerstown houses on at least two occasions requested 
orders.149 Also as previously mentioned the Barrow iron and steel works obtained 
                                                     
144 Manchester Guardian, Wednesday, 29 August 1917; the Latona Street houses at Vickerstown are small two 
bedroom houses, these men would have been hot bunking and the room continuously occupied as they would 
have been on different shifts 
145 Hull Daily Mail, Saturday, 1 September 1917  
146 Barrow Chief Medical Officer's Report, 1917; Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 21 November 1917 
147 op. cit. Joy, War and Unemployment, p.71 
148 At Barrow, the buyer paid a deposit as little as £10 or £20 to the seller and the balance of the price converted 
to a mortgage repayable by weekly instalments of an amount considerably in excess of the previous rent   
149 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 2 November 1918, in April 1916 the Magistrates granted an ejectment order 
after the tenant had left the house in possession of lodgers, possession of a house tenanted by a J. Macfarlane was 
also applied for explaining Vickers built houses for their workmen, and one was let to the defendant who was no 
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orders to eject non-munitions workers to regain possession of their housing.  
Nonetheless the vast profits to be made from letting of rooms stimulated the housing 
market, creating a rush to buy, and requests for eviction orders.150  Although orders 
were served in some cases the total numbers were not high and where orders were 
granted arrangements were often made for the incoming tenant to take in the 
outgoing tenant, a policy that aided the homeless but aggravated overcrowding.151   
Even with a lack of working-class justices there was unease, some Barrow 
magistrates being on the point of resignation.  The bench felt compelled to question 
the moral right of the law to turn people out of their houses.152  ‘We acknowledge the 
Magistrates and County Court are called upon to deal with difficult matters’, said the 
unrest commission, and these courts are being brought into disrepute, not so much 
by their decisions as by the law which shackles them in making sensible and humane 
decisions’.153  The extent of magistrate’s demoralization can be gauged from the tone 
of the resolution forwarded in conjunction with one of several requests for an 
interview with the London authorities: 
The Justices gravely fear, unless some steps are taken to give them power 
to refuse ejectment warrants, and ameliorate the sufferings of a very large 
number of the working-classes, industrial unrest is likely to ensue, with a 
possible accompaniment of strikes and rioting; the justices therefore 
desire to impress on HM Government the extreme urgency of the 
matter.154 
 
Despite the magistrates' humane interpretation of the law, which kept evictions 
to a minimum and deferred eviction orders in the County Court, property owners 
turned to the High Court where tenants were unable to fight due to the high cost.155  
                                                     
longer employed on munitions having left Vickers in June 1917.  Having sub-let the house to a soldier cook, it was 
now required for a Vickers workman 
150 Barrow-in-Furness Minutes of Council and Committees, November 1916 - October 1917, Ejectment Orders, 30 
July  
151 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. VI Special 
Housing Problems, Barrow, p.49; from 1915 until the Commission on Unrest in 1917 out of 88 cases 42 orders were 
made Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Saturday, 4 December 1915, whether the 42 evictions included non-
munitions workers from the Steelworks Company housing is not known    
152 Barrow Guardian, Saturday, 25 August 1917 
153 Commission on Industrial Unrest 1917 
154 Minutes of Proceeding of a Conference etc. (PRO Mun. 5/97), op cit Englander, D. Landlord and Tenant in Urban 
Britain 1838-1918, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p.244; Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday, 17 February 1916, 
tenants could appeal to the High Court against ejectment orders which could be suspended until the next court 
when landlords were summoned to appear   
155 Barrow News, Saturday, 1 September 1917 
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Although small in number it was the type of ejectments which were irksome.  Intensity 
of feeling stemmed from Hindpool where Belgian refugees had bought houses, 
subsequently applying for High Court orders to evict sitting tenants.156  It was evident 
some Belgian munitions workers intended settling in Barrow and it was reasonable 
they should be comfortably housed.157  They could hardly be blamed for buying houses 
as this was the only way of obtaining tenancy indeed people not engaged on munitions 
work had bought houses where ejectment orders were granted.158   
What was bothersome though was that Belgians were said to be turning out the 
very people who helped provide homes for them when they arrived at Barrow.  A local 
magistrate told a Ministry of Munitions Commissioner ‘there will be Satan’s row if 
Belgian people are allowed to buy houses and the working-classes in Barrow are 
turned onto the streets.’159  These were not cases of aristocracy turning out 
democracy, but of the working man turning out working man said the magistrate.160  
One Labour Councillor said: ‘Hindpool was ablaze, and if the Government did not take 
immediate action something would happen’.  That something he conjectured would 
be a shipyard strike, he himself was prepared to use ‘physical force’ and go to gaol if 
required.161  Though the Belgians become the scapegoats for unrest by the end of the 
war their numbers were halved by the transfer of workers and their families to other 
parts of the country at different periods.162 
Evictions were of concern to the Barrow Poor Law Guardians, who emphasised 
to the Government that widows with sons at the front and old people with munitions 
workers as lodgers were being forced out of their Hindpool houses with nowhere to 
go and would need Workhouse accommodation.163  The Board protested against 
Government inaction, calling on them to stop further proceedings for evictions.164  
                                                     
156 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 22 August 1917 
157 No doubt workers having to keep two homes were in the same predicament  
158 Cumbria Archives, Belgians in Cumbria during The First World War, Belgians were earning good wages and some 
lived in the better town for example the Van Der Scheuren family lived at 36 Lord Street one of the best parts of 
Barrow. Wages from 1 August 1917 were between 43s and 55s per week inclusive of the 8s war bonus and the 
working week was 53 hours 
159 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday 1 September 1917, the ejections causing the problems appear to have been 
at Byron Street, Hindpool 
160 Minutes of Proceedings of a Conference on the Making of Ejectment Warrants at Barrow, 7 September 1917  
161 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Thursday, 30 August 1917 
162 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 21 December 1918, number quoted are between 400 to 500 
163 Ibid., the Workhouse was part of the problem, there was no more room as the military had taken part of the 
institution over as a hospital 
164 Manchester Evening News, Wednesday, 29 August 1917 
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Further demands were made by Barrow Council who called the Ministry of Munitions 
attention to the acute housing position requesting immediate action to prevent 
people being made homeless.  The Barrow magistrates viewing evictions as of extreme 
emergency, proposed sending a deputation to Winston Churchill the Minister of 
Munitions to press for a change in the law to vary the days of grace from 30 to three 
months or until the end of the war.165   
Remedy was found in DORA, empowering Churchill to declare any district 
where munitions work was being carried out a special area.166  The week previous to 
Barrow being declared a special area, Churchill informed the Barrow Trades and 
Labour Council of his intention to invoke the new regulation as soon as possible.167  
The effect of this premature announcement along with the impolitic reticence of the 
magistrates, who since returning from London had remained silent, became evident.  
The silence of the magistrates on such a subject of great interest had allowed the 
government to take credit for stopping the evictions.168  Swenerton also suggests that 
government housing policy announcements were used to improve its own 
credibility.169  
By late September 1917 those evicted since the attention of the Ministry was 
drawn to the matter were rehoused in requisitioned unoccupied dwellings.170  On 1 
October, Barrow and its neighbourhood were constituted a special area, meaning 
henceforward no ‘munitions workers’ could be ejected as long as they paid their rent 
and observed the conditions of residency.171  The Increase of Rent and Mortgage 
Interest (Amendment) Act introduced in April 1918, by providing that an owner who 
bought his house after 30 September 1917 could not either for his own occupation or 
the occupation of someone in his employment turn out a tenant made it unnecessary 
                                                     
165 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday 22 August 1917; Liverpool Echo, Saturday, 8 September 1917 the 
deputation met Churchill on 7 September 1917 to discuss ejections and housing conditions in Barrow 
166 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. VI Special 
Housing Problems, Barrow, p.48 
167 North Western Daily Mail, Saturday, 22 September 1917; Liverpool Echo, Friday, 21 September 1917 information 
also came to hand that ejectments were to be suspended when following the dismissal of an application the 
magistrate intimated the Government meant to take action in the matter  
168 North Western Daily Mail, Saturday, 29 September 1917, CAB 24/27/30 Inadequacy of Accommodation at 
Barrow, 26 September 1917 
169 Swenarton, M., Homes Fit for Heroes (London, Heinemann, 1981), p.72  
170 CAB 24/27/30 Inadequacy of Accommodation at Barrow, 26 September 1917 
171 Coventry Standard, Friday, 26 October 1917, the Order-in-Council was made on the 29 September and Barrow 
was the only munitions district immediately made a special area 1918  
 202  
to schedule further areas.172 The Act however failed in that it could not be applied 
retrospectively so did not apply to those cases which have already taken place.  On 2 
October 1917 the War Cabinet decided a scheme for 1,000 houses was to go ahead 
and while construction was ongoing something had to be done to alleviate Barrow’s 
overcrowding. 
 
Housing and Billeting 
 At Barrow the housing situation was not created by the war, although 
undoubtedly aggravated by it.  The provision of dwellings had by no means kept pace 
with industrial expansion and the shortage of housing was in 1914 a grievance of 
sometime standing.  The war intensified existing housing problems, many areas 
experiencing severe overcrowding, whilst living conditions deteriorated further as 
scarce resources and inflated prices inhibited repairs.  The housing campaign initiated 
at Barrow was not limited to the particular problems of munitions workers, the trade’s 
council being amongst the first to call for an extension of the regulations to embrace 
all workers rather than those engaged on war production.  It was the continual house-
building delay which aroused agitation, assisted by the Barrow Labour Party who had 
been advocating for years for a municipal scheme.  Many councillors in fact were 
property owners letting out houses, and it was in their interest to vote against such a 
scheme.  Feelings were at a high pitch, with Councillor Ellison leader of the eight strong 
Labour Group on the Town Council in demanding the building of houses warned ‘if 
they did not get them by peaceful persuasion they would get them, make no mistake’.   
In pursuance of supporting their claim for immediate housebuilding the 
Barrow Labour Party set up a bureau to compile a list of house applications.173  People 
registered with particulars and conditions in their current accommodation in 
apartments, along with their rent and living difficulties to provide statistics in support 
of the claim for additional houses.174  The enquiry closed when 1,000 housing 
                                                     
172 H of L Deb 14 March 1918 vol. 29 cc445-9, Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Amendment) Bill; OHMoM 
Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V, Ch. III Housing Schemes, p.30 
173 Hull Daily Mail, Saturday, 1 September 1917 by this date 900 applications for houses had been made at the 
offices of the Barrow Labour Party 
174 Sheffield Daily Telegraph, Thursday, 23 August 1917, when the Labour Party Offices opened on the 20th for 
taking names of those wanting houses, the place was besieged, a large number of which were women whose 
husbands were at work   
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applications were received, the number of houses suggested the Government build in 
the district.175  Meanwhile, the Poor Law Guardians, Women’s Labour League and 
other Barrow public bodies by petitioning the Minister and raising the question in 
Parliament over whether immediate action was being taken in view of the Industrial 
Unrest Report eventually produced results.176  On 10 September it was announced a 
Ministry representative was being dispatched to Barrow with orders to prepare a 
scheme for the construction of temporary or permanent houses with immediacy to a 
total of 1,000‘ if necessary’.177  The Medical Officer of Health pointed out 1,500 houses 
were needed for the permanent population and a further 1,500 if the war population 
was to be properly housed and it was the Ministry of Munitions responsibility to build 
them.178 
 The knowledge that the overall demand for houses was transitory, and on 
conclusion of hostilities Barrow’s population would return to the pre-war figure, 
offered little inducement to private enterprise to embark on a scale of building 
commensurate to immediate needs.  Nor in the current climate and with restrictions 
on borrowing were the Barrow authorities able to conduct a large housing scheme. 
George Barnes, Labour MP, suggested the limitation imposed on the LGB on 
sanctioning loans over £500 should be changed to allow loans for housing purposes in 
special districts like Barrow.179   The LGB who had no power to buy land or build 
houses, turned a deaf ear to any application for money to provide houses there would 
eventually be no need for.  As Barrow was purely a munitions centre the LGB remained 
unconcerned and had no intention of intervening between the Ministry of Munitions 
and local authority regarding housing.180  While the unrest commissioners were 
impressed by Vickers’ efforts, they stated there was no evidence that the Government 
                                                     
175 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 1 September 1917 
176 H of C Parliamentary Debates (1917) XCVII. 1594 
177 Liverpool Echo, Saturday, 8 September 1917 
178 Yorkshire Evening Post, Wednesday, 29 August 1917; BRO, MOH Annual Report, Barrow-in-Furness Accounts 
Book 1917-1918 
179 CAB 24/23/58, 18 August 1917, Reports of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest – Barnes had 
connections with Barrow having worked in the shipyard for two years, he was also General Secretary of the ASE 
before joining the ILP  
180 CAB 24/27/30 Inadequacy of Housing Accommodation at Barrow, 26 September 1917 
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or the municipality had taken any practical steps to deal with the housing problem and 
strongly recommended the War Cabinet take the matter in hand.181   
The mayor denied the blame for ‘a housing scandal’ as called by outsiders, 
could be laid on the Corporation.182  Putting the case before the people, he argued 
whilst the unrest commission heard evidence from all social groups, 'the Corporation 
was never formally asked to appear before the Commission'.183  He claimed the 
findings were based largely on one-sided statements of minority groups, each 
pursuing their own agenda, and he was anxious to restore the balance.  He denied pre-
war overcrowding was sufficient to warrant a municipal building programme and 
believed private enterprise could have met the demand, stating the Corporation was 
not prepared to saddle the town with a huge building debt for wartime overcrowding 
which was seen as a temporary problem.  He argued in addition to the wartime scarcity 
of manpower and materials, Vickers had commandeered the districts’ brick supply.  
Further laying the blame elsewhere, he argued the Commission was at fault for 
suggesting the Corporation was negligent, the government was the guilty party and 
Barrow's housing scandal a fabrication.   
With a single blow, the Commission undermined any claim to civic pride and 
municipal authority by stating unequivocally that the conditions to which the working-
classes were subjected were unacceptable and unjustifiable.  This caused considerable 
ferment and Labour Councillors seized on the issue, stating 'The Corporation was 
responsible for having failed to realise its duty in the provision of adequate housing 
for the people'.184  Councillor Ellison emphasised the need for pressing the issue and 
finding strength through numbers and unity, arguing 'until the common people were 
prepared to organise politically to the same extent as they had industrially they would 
remain oppressed'.  Significantly rather than blame the Corporation he rhetorically 
blamed the Barrow working-classes for allowing these people to sit on the Council.185  
                                                     
181 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Tuesday, 7 March 1916, Barrow Council had discussed providing houses 
for its own workmen in 1916, but due to increased building costs were prevented from going ahead without 
Government assistance 
182 Lancashire Evening Post, Tuesday, 4 September 1917 
183 Barrow News, Saturday, 8 September 1917 
184 Barrow News, Saturday, 8 September 1917 
185 Barrow News, Saturday, 15 September 1917 
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Despite the potency of the issue, housing reform would lose its impetus and the 
attempt to radicalise the working-classes was unsuccessful. 
The provision of new houses which had been open to debate was decided 
upon.  Barrow’s climate was unsuitable for temporary buildings, but to save time half 
the houses would be single-storeyed concrete buildings of semi-permanent character 
designed to last 30 to 40 years.186  However, it was impossible to obtain a rent which 
provided anything approaching a full economic return on outlay.  Rents of the semi-
permanent types sanctioned for Barrow in October 1917 were fixed at 9s 6d for a 
three bedroom bungalow and a two bedroom at 7s 6d, representing a return of 52 
and 45 per cent on capital.187  The Treasury protested against such low rents, but on 
Ministry assurance it was impossible to obtain a higher rental the scheme went 
ahead.188   
Whilst the work of construction was ongoing something had to be done to 
mitigate the unsatisfactory housing conditions that prevailed.  The Central Billeting 
Board (CBB) held a local inquiry at Barrow on behalf of the Ministry and met with 
conflicting testimony both on overcrowding and the amount of lodging 
accommodation available’.189  The Billeting Board considered the real need was for 
houses rather than further exploitation of lodgings.  Nevertheless a billeting officer 
was appointed and local committees set up at Barrow and Ulverston supported by 
local investigators.190  In the course of the investigations the only opposition 
encountered was of mistrust on the part of workers regarding compulsion provided in 
                                                     
186 H of L Debate 07 November 1917 vol. 26 cc905-5, an immediate decision was taken there should be a 
considerable building scheme initiated at Barrow, half of permanent buildings and half of semi-permanent 
buildings, to get over the immediate difficulty, in effect a wartime measure 
187 OHMoM Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. II Housing and 
Administration, p.15; Roberts, E., Working-Class Housing in Barrow and Lancaster 1890-1930, Transactions of the 
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188 CAB 24/27/30, 26 September 1917, Inadequacy of Housing Accommodation at Barrow – the rents were to vary 
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189 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. VI Special 
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190 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 1 September 1917, Charles Duncan MP for the borough on a recent visit 
inquiring into billeting expressed the opinion the trouble at Barrow was absolutely a housing one; Lancashire 
Evening Post, Friday, 10 August 1917, by this date the CCB had informed the Ulverston Urban and Rural Councils 
and the Dalton Urban Council on the intention to billet munitions workers 
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the Billeting Act, which in no case was enforced.191  Given the power to billet anyone 
engaged on work of national importance while protecting the rights of the 
householder, the Act did not contain provision for billeting munitions workers’ 
families.   
Cost of board and lodging had to be decided upon.  The wartime cost of 
lodgings in Barrow ranged between 8s and 12s per week, exceeding the Billeting 
Board's allowance of 6s.192  Fixed rates based on the market price in the district for 
workers of a class similar to those to be billeted were thus submitted to the CBB.  
Without waiting for the completion of the lodgings register steps were taken to billet 
munitions workers.  By early October it was reported that 4,884 houses had been 
inspected and accommodation found for approximately 523 workers.193  Final figures 
provided by the Official History are quoted as 4,611 persons (4,004 men and 607 
women), but this is an overstatement, as altogether it was hoped additional 
accommodation from all sources might be available for 2,000 people.194   
Despite serious labour scarcity, the first houses were completed before the 
close of 1917 and tenants started taking up occupancy in February 1918.195  In 
November 1917 doubt was expressed as to the wisdom of completing the semi-
permanent scheme as overcrowding was not as serious as first rumoured as proved 
when a bread ticket census indicated 4.5 against 6 persons per house.196   Following 
an interview with Barrow Council in January 1918 the Ministry decided to complete 
the 202 houses started and postpone the remainder, this decision was shortly 
extended to the 500 permanent houses of which 250 were taken in hand.  Reasons 
given were the shortage had probably been overstated, the need was relative as 
compared with other munitions districts, and the difficulties of obtaining structural 
labour.    
                                                     
191 CAB 24/27/30 Inadequacy of Accommodation at Barrow, 26 September 1917, the CCB proposed to  carry out 
billeting by voluntary or if necessary by compulsory means; Lancashire Evening  Post, Saturday, 1 September 1917, 
if voluntary appeals to take in lodgers were not successful then compulsory billeting would be carried out 
192 Barrow Corporation Minutes of Council and Committees, November 1918 - October 1919, General Purpose 
Committee Minutes, 25 November 1918;  
193 CAB 24/27/30 Inadequacy of Accommodation at Barrow, 26 September 1917 stated 413 houses had been 
inspected and accommodation for 139 persons found available; Lancashire Evening Post, Friday 5 October 1917 
194 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. VI Special 
Housing Problems, Barrow, p.48; Woollacott, On Her Their Lives Depend, says additional billets were found for 900 
people 
195 OHMoM Vol. V Wages and Welfare, p.48 
196 Ibid., p.49 
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There were other perspectives the late labour unrest was said to be more of 
the union secretaries than the men; these Secretaries who were not manual workers 
noted their members were taking less interest in the union as their wages increased 
and their spare time was absorbed in overtime.  They saw opportunity in under-
housing for agitation which might lead to higher wages for lodgers in which the 
working-class landlords would benefit.197  It is possible that the Barrow working men, 
who as a rule owned their own houses realised a largescale housing scheme would 
relieve them of their lodgers.  In December 1917 house owners near the new site sent 
a formal protest to the Ministry against the erection of government bungalows as 
likely to depreciate the value of their property not only for letting but selling.198  The 
trade unions representatives, moreover, expressed strong objections to bungalow-
type houses and asked for a guarantee of their demolition immediately after the war.    
 There was no later development of the Barrow housing question.  The 
deficiency of labour caused a delay and a scheme suggested in June 1918 by the 
Corporation and Vickers for houses on Walney Island was refused by the War Priorities 
Committee on the grounds that labour should be concentrated on the buildings 
already in progress.199  The local master builders maintained they could obtain the 
necessary labour if given the Walney contract while the company engaged on the 
scheme were struggling to obtain labour because they were an outside firm.  By 
September 1918, the semi-permanent houses were completed, but progress with the 
permanent scheme was slow.    
 Barrow was spared further overcrowding as when the Government needed 
larger airships Walney Island was deemed inadequate and vulnerable to U-boat 
attack.  Flookburgh fifteen miles away suited the requirements for an airship shed but 
lacked accommodation and it was decided to build close to the proposed site a 250 
house estate.200  In September 1917 the Airship shed was cancelled along with 130 
                                                     
197 OHMoM Wages and Welfare, Pt. V The Provisions of Canteens in Munitions Factories, Ch. VI Special Housing 
Problems, Barrow, p.49; Historic Record/R/346. 2/4 
198 Barrow-in-Furness Council Minutes, November 1917 to October 1918, General Purpose Committee, 2 January 
1918, a further petition was signed by 47 inhabitants and owners of properties complaining against the erection of 
Government dwelling houses opposite to a number of good semi-detached villas 
199 Ibid., p.50 
200 Flookburgh Aerodrome, Diary and Borehole Schedule, Barrow Records Office, Ref. Z1011/1/2, Vickers awarded 
the contract to Barrow builders Rainey who had been involved in the construction of Vickerstown and a second 
firm Parnell.   
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houses and by the end of 1917 the remainder of the 120 houses were complete.201  
Evidence points to the houses being occupied by Barrow workers as in August 1918 it 
was reported a machinist of Ravenstown, Flookborough and his motorcycle passenger 
were involved in a fatal accident with a pedestrian near Vickers works.202  The 
Ravenstown estate to an extent could have relieved Barrow’s housing pressure, but 
further research is needed.    
 The whole issue of Barrow housing is complex.  Indication is that the housing 
problem was overstated and the overcrowding was most serious in the poorest area 
of the town.  Much of the housing and accommodation problem however was of a 
political nature as both the unions and the Labour Party went out of their way to lay 
the blame at the Ministry of Munitions and Barrow Council’s door.  Certainly there 
were class overtones as the working-class landlords saw their incomes threatened by 
the new housing schemes and the loss of their lodgers.  The new semi-permanent 
houses provided some relief but as the next chapter will indicate the problem of 
overcrowding still remained following the Armistice.   
 
Conclusions 
 Problems nationally and locally during the first half of 1917 highlighted the 
unrest in the country to the extent that Government convened Regional Commissions 
on Industrial Unrest.  Barrows problems were such that it warranted its own enquiry.   
Although the major problems of unrest were highlighted by the commission there 
were many other underlying problems which were not brought to light.  Essentially 
the problems of Barrow were Government related caused by the massive expansion 
for the production of shells and guns additional to large workload in the shipyard.  The 
problems of increased production were overcome by the building and extension of 
workshops but the human aspect and its implications were never fully investigated or 
understood by Government. 
Because of its Barrow’s isolation conditions were never publicly reported until 
unrest threatened the production of munitions.  Barrow had special problems and the 
                                                     
201 CAB 24/40/48 Supply of Steel for Rigid Airship Housing Sheds under Reduced Airship Programme, 30 January 
1918 
202 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday 15 August 1918, Vickers had followed on the tradition of Vickerstown 
providing the military names of Jutland, Marne and Somme Avenues 
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wants of its citizens were gravely neglected and emphasised by the labour movement 
and the actions of the shop stewards.  Although it took a special commission to 
highlight the problems and recommend solutions, it was regrettable that the problems 
took so long to come to the attention of government and to be acted upon.  It can be 
argued that the position of the shop stewards at Barrow does not fit into the wider 
historiography in the sense that although they occasionally acted sympathetically with 
other areas they became more concerned with the economic and social aspects of 
Barrow’s working-class people.  The problems of food could have turned to national 
action but this was prevented at Barrow by the local authorities taking it upon 
themselves to deal with the questions of food prices and supply.  This was assisted by 
the vigilance of women’s representatives and the shop stewards and by ensuring that 
the butchers and grocers had a say in the food matter. 
The Commission’s report demonstrates the nature of the housing problem and 
tensions created by the fusion of industrial, social and transport issues.  In Barrow the 
housing issue came to represent levels of social tension providing impetus for relief. 
Provision of housing therefore was seen by the Ministry as a counter-balance against 
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CHAPTER 6: MEN OR MUNITIONS, DEMOBILISATION AND RECONSTRUCTION, 1918-
1919 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the final stages of the war and the continuing problems 
of men versus manpower.  Early 1918 unrest and radical statements however were 
shelved during the spring crisis, only to return in the summer.  While not making an 
extensive analysis of the transition to peace, some general points will be made as 
indicators of how the onset on peace-time conditions impacted on a town geared up 
to war production including the political, economic and social changes caused by the 
return to post-war conditions.     
 In the transition to peace, as before the war, the dependence would be upon 
Vickers to supply work in the town.  Foreign and imported female workers it was 
expected would quickly leave.  Although local efforts were needed to employ 
demobilized female munitions workers, these would be very limited as Barrow’s peace 
industries would not be suited to mass production.  The turnover to peace products 
required a restructuring of Vickers expected to cause temporary disruption of the 
workforce.  While skilled men were wanted elsewhere, they were likely to stay in the 
town as it would be more economical for them to take up labouring jobs rather than 
maintain two homes.  It stood to reason that if many workmen remained at Barrow, 
the housing situation would not be eased or would it be helped if the Ministry 
withdrew from the promised building program.  The pre-war demand for a shorter 
working week was only halted by the war and was to be resurrected, but it needed to 
be viewed in the light of the restructuring of Barrow’s industry.   Similarly, politics 
would be revived with renewed rivalries caused by a split in the Labour Party between 
those who had supported the war and those who were against it.   
 
1918 - Men or Munitions   
At the opening of 1918 new Government manpower proposals were made 
with the intention of taking steps against what was believed to be an urgent problem.  
Withdrawal of Russia from the Alliance had made it possible for Germany to transfer 
troops from the Eastern to the Western Front, and though the entry of America would 
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redress the balance the problem was maintaining forces until they arrived.1  At the 
Manpower Conference summoned on 3 January 1918, the Minister of National Service 
pointed out it would be impossible to maintain the forces in the field unless large 
numbers of men were recruited from munitions and shipyard work.2  Young men were 
to be taken from essential industries and substituted if necessary by men of those 
trades who had fought and been severely wounded.3   
At Barrow a letter from George Barnes, Labour politician and supporter of the 
war raised the question of the attitude of the ASE towards male dilutees.4  The 
response to allowing dilutees to remain in shipbuilding, even if skilled men were 
withdrawn from the engine and munitions areas for military service, was that their 
members would resist any further encroachment until all dilutees were withdrawn.  
Charles Duncan, the Member for Barrow, believed that if the Government put the case 
for manpower plainly before young workmen he felt sure there would be no 
disinclination on their part to join the Army.  The manpower question was a keen topic 
amongst Barrow workers but no unanimous opinion was expressed. Although the 
feeling amongst the older skilled workers was that some of the younger men who had 
flocked to Barrow to escape military service should be taken to the colours, however 
these young men pointed out that they were doing important work.5  The Official 
History notes that the question of protection of pivotal men arose particularly in the 
case of gun equipment.6  In gun shops such as at Barrow essential work was carried 
out by young specially trained men, while work on large calibre guns was so heavy as 
to make substitution by less fit men or women impossible.  While workers belonging 
to other unions in the town showed themselves on the whole prepared to accept the 
new manpower scheme opposition was intense among the younger Barrow ASE 
members.  The general attitude of the Barrow ASE was that no sacrifice would be too 
great to save the engineering union from destruction.7 
                                                     
1 OHMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. III Men or 
Munitions in 1918, p.36 
2 The Times,  Friday, 4 January 1918 
3 H of C Deb 14 January 1918 vol. 101 cc58-134  
4 BDSO 57/1/9, Barrow ASE Minutes, 13 September 1917 to 7 December 1918, 13 January 1918 
5 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Wednesday, 16 January 1918 
6 OHMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. III Men or 
Munitions in 1918, p.52 
7 BDSO 57/1/9, Barrow ASE Minutes, 13 September 1917 to 7 December 1918, 13 January 1918 
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On 20 January 1918 at the National Conference of Engineering Allied Trades 
Joint Committees held at Leeds, a resolution rejecting government manpower 
proposals as unnecessary was passed.8  Encouraged by Woodrow Wilson’s proposals 
for ending the war it was considered peace was possible, and that no further 
consideration should be given to supplying men for the armed services unless the 
belligerents failed to arrive at a settlement.  While the Allied Trades were qualified to 
focus workshop opinion, they only had the power of recommendation to the various 
Trade Union Executives.9  A mass meeting of engineering and shipbuilding workers 
held on the same day at Barrow passed a similar resolution including a decision not to 
accept any agreement arrived at between the trade union officials and Government, 
while national action should be taken to enforce demands.10  The National 
Administrative Council of Shop Stewards and Workers Committees having considered 
resolutions in favour of a national strike decided that the grievances arising over the 
manpower proposals should be left to the union executives.11  The National 
Administrative Council however could not prevent local shop stewards calling men out 
on strike and in some districts there was danger of local trouble.      
Whereas the ASE Secretary notified the Barrow District Committee of the need 
to pin the government to their Protected Trades Schedule agreement, Geddes said the 
engineers were willing to let old men go to the Army and young men remain,  causing 
soldiers’ leave to be cancelled while forcing wounded men to return to the front.12  On 
1 February 1918 a new Schedule of Protected Occupations came into force further 
diminishing the craftsman’s protection.  The Ministry of National Service now had the 
right to cancel exemptions under the Schedule without consulting the unions. 
Importantly the main revision enabled munitions and shipyard workers under the age 
of 23 to be conscripted with the exception of men engaged on hull construction and 
ship repair.13   
                                                     
8 OHMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. III Men or 
Munitions in 1918, p.44 
9 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Monday, 21 January 1918 
10 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 21 January 1918 
11 OHMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Ch. III Men or Munitions in 1918, p.44  
12 BDSO 57/1/9, Barrow ASE Minutes, 13 September 1917 to 7 December 1918, 24 January 1918; M.M. 130, 28 
April 1917,Schedule of Protected Occupations for Men Employed on Admiralty, War Office or Munitions Work, or 
in Railway Shops, 126/VB/6/BR/CO/1/4 Warwick Digital Archives 
13 OHMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, III Men or Munitions in 1918, p.42, to at least age 23 on 1 January 1917, 
Hinton, The First Shop Stewards’, p.39 
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In further considering the new manpower proposals, the Barrow Joint 
Engineering Trades held a mass meeting to which the ASE did not attend.  The 
resolutions though similar to those passed at Leeds were not as drastic and were more 
moderate than those passed by the Barrow shop stewards.14  Part of the resolution 
was that the Barrow men wanted a people’s peace, but if German Imperialism 
prevented this they were determined to cooperate in the prosecution of the war until 
their objective was met.  Alternatively, failing the Government entering into 
immediate negotiations with the belligerent countries, they pledged themselves to act 
with the organised workers of Britain in resisting the manpower proposals.  Although 
the shop stewards condemned the manpower proposals out of hand, resistance was 
blunted by the German Spring Offensive.15  The ASE could not oppose the Government 
and the nation, and on the Executive appealing to the engineer’s acceptance of the 
Bill in a slightly modified form was secured by a slender majority.16   The German 
offensive also put aside any further action for an international peace meeting. 
The more drastic Military Service Bill of 9 April 1918, introduced when the 
German offensive was at its height met no effective opposition and brought a further 
cancelling of exemptions.  But when the Government attempted to extend the WMV 
Scheme in June, as the offensive was being turned back, it aroused a storm of 
protest.17  Detailed proposals including provisions to force men into the Volunteers by 
withdrawing exemptions if they did not join were worked out.18  The proposed 
measures were seen as an attempt to convert the scheme into a form of compulsory 
industrial service.  At the end of June, the Trade Union Advisory Committee were 
informed that nothing in the nature of compulsion had been exercised and it was not 
anticipated that the scheme for compelling men to enrol as WMV’s need be 
                                                     
14 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 4 February 1918; Jefferys, The Story of the Engineers, p.186 says the shop 
stewards held two meeting in Manchester on the 14 and 21 March and decided to call for a nationwide strike 
against the Bill 
15 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday 28 March 1918, the spring offensive caused Barrow workmen employed on 
material necessary for the fighting forces to work through the Easter holidays   
16 OHoMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. III Men or 
Munitions in 1918, p.47; Jefferys, The Story of the Engineers, p.186, the vote was 58,650 ‘for’ and 46,332 ‘against’ 
17 H of C Deb 9 April 1918 vol. 104 cc1351-4; Cole, G.D.H., Trade Unionism and Munitions, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1923), pp. 139-140, 155-156; Marwick, A., The Deluge, p.209 
18 OHoMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. IV Labour 
Regulation and Unrest 1918, p.58, on refusal on enrolment a man could ultimately be called up for military service 
if the right age 
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introduced at this time.19  On 1 July the Government Advisory Committee made a 
strategic retreat, rejecting the scheme and declining any responsibility for the 
consequences of introducing it.20   
Although agitation over the scheme was seen at Barrow and elsewhere, it was 
eclipsed by the announcement of the government’s embargo for controlling the 
distribution of skilled labour.21  The Ministry of Munitions had long been aware that 
some firms employed an undue proportion of skilled labour and were also using them 
uneconomically, while munitions output was hampered elsewhere.  Firms were 
instructed that no further labour of the types scheduled were to be engaged without 
licence of the Ministry.  This was yet another method of industrial conscription 
depriving men of the advantages gained through the abolition of the leaving 
certificate.22  The working of the embargo brought its existence and methods forcibly 
home as was seen in Barrow when the shop stewards denounced the compulsory 
return of men who had travelled to Enfield in hope of finding work, continuing 
agitation until the Ministry paid their travelling expenses.23  While unrest had subsided 
during April and May in answer to urgent demands for men and munitions to counter 
Germany’s supreme effort, with the first signs of the tide turning in France unrest 
reappeared.24 
A strike took place in July supported by the Barrow men’s officials and shop 
stewards in any actions taken on the embargo question at Coventry.  At a conference 
called by the National Engineering and Allied Trades Executive to discuss the embargo 
it was decided work would cease unless the embargo was lifted.25  The Government’s 
announcement that men must work or fight influenced the union officials to leave the 
decisions to the men.  The firm government attitude had the full approval of the 
Barrow general public, while amongst the men’s officials there was doubt as Vickers 
                                                     
19 OHoMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. IV Labour 
Regulation and Unrest 1918, p.60, apparently enough volunteers had come forward and moreover American 
troops were coming over in large numbers and it was expected that the release of men for the Army would proceed 
at a considerable decreased rate 
20 The Herald, Saturday, 13 July 1918 
21 OHoMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 1917-18, Ch. IV Labour 
Regulation and Unrest 1918, p.64 
22 CAB 24/58/69 Labour Position in Munitions Industries, 17 July 1918 
23 CAB 24/59/20 Report from the Ministry of Labour for the Week Ending 24 July 1918  
24 The Second Battle of the Marne of July 1918 was the first sign that the ascendency had definitely passed to the 
Allies 
25 Birmingham Daily Gazette, Friday, 26 July 1918 
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was not affected by the embargo because there was no surplus of skilled men.26  The 
Prime Minister took a hard line against the strikers declaring all men wilfully absent 
from their work on or after 29 July would be deemed to have placed themselves 
outside of the munitions industries.27  Protection certificates would cease to have 
effect and they would become liable to the provisions of the Military Service Acts.   
Work resumed at Coventry and Birmingham and the national conference 
agreed in view of work resumption not to recommend a national stoppage of work, 
advising members to resume or stay at work pending the report of the Committee of 
Inquiry which Churchill as Minster of Munitions had promised.  The circumstances of 
the strike were investigated and the verdict was the Government's scheme was 
justified by circumstances while the method of introduction ought to have been more 
tactful.28   
When the war ended the news was broadcast at Barrow by the sounding of 
work’s buzzers causing men to leave work and crowd the streets while flags were 
hoisted everywhere.  But even in celebration many workers were concerned about 
what did the future would hold. 
 
Industrial Reconstruction   
The key factor in the transition to peace was the sudden removal of state 
action and reversion to reliance on Vickers primarily and Barrow’s other industries for 
continuing employment.  Vickers, Scott says looked towards expansion into post-war 
markets unconnected with wartime products and entered the post-war period with 
confidence.29  Much was done at Barrow during 1918-19 to prepare for and undertake 
the building of merchant ships, and for the manufacture of land boilers and large gas 
engines.  The future of sea and road transport was believed to be tied up in the internal 
combustion engine and Vickers were ideally placed to supply a range of engines.30  
Though a number of submarines were cancelled, delayed or sent to other yards, a 
number remained at Barrow for completion whilst four submarines arrived for 
                                                     
26 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 29 July 1918 
27 OHoMoM Vol. VI Manpower and Dilution, Pt. II The Control of Industrial Manpower 197-18, Ch. IV Labour 
Regulation and Unrest 1918, p.68 
28 Coventry Standard, Friday, 27 September 1918 
29 Scott, Vickers a History, p.140 
30 Vickers continued to make main and auxiliary turbines 
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refitting before going to a foreign station.31  On the warship side the light-cruiser HMS 
Diomede was launched, while work completed on a second and construction on a third 
cancelled. 32   
As the changeover to merchant construction got underway in the shipyard, the 
slipways were cleared of Admiralty vessels.  The inevitable stoppage of work on 
howitzers and the slowdown of Admiralty work, including the transfer of Diomede to 
Portsmouth for completion, caused large numbers of engineers to be laid off or to 
receive notices.33  Anticipating these events, activities were centred on two liners and 
three cargo steamers, while the refitting of numbers of vessels found work for many 
trades.34  Vickers were therefore able to mainly transfer men to commercial orders 
and refitting work, and additionally a new floating dock approved by the Admiralty to 
replace the existing Furness Railway dock.  As trade picked up it was expected more 
work would be found for underemployed departments and additional men.35  
During the war the shell and gun plants had been built at Government expense 
and managed by Vickers, the buildings were light but worked well for the purposes 
intended and could find use after the war provided trade expansion demands allowed 
accommodation.  As for the presses, lathes and boring machines there was little 
chance of their employment as they were virtually worn out.  In turning to peace 
products Beyer, Peacock was prepared to supply drawings to Vickers if they undertook 
the manufacturing of locomotives at Barrow.  Plans were prepared for production of 
300 locomotives a year quoting prices to the government, but there was 
disappointment as Barrow’s prices were found to be higher than their competitors.36  
                                                     
31 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 23 November 1918 reported that Cunard had placed orders for two liners 
which would be laid down immediately  
32 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Monday, 29 December 1919, refitting and repair was being carried out on 
the P&O Mantua and 24 steam-trawlers  
33 Hartlepool Northern Daily Mail, Monday 8 September 1919, CAB 24/89/56 Report from the Ministry of Labour 
for the Week Ending 1 October 1919 the September unemployment register showed an increased by 520 at Barrow 
34 Derby Daily  Telegraph, Saturday, 16 April 1919, joiners and cabinet makers, wages 69s 9d., 47 hours plus 12 per 
cent on earnings, permanent employments; Leeds Mercury, Monday, 7 April 1919, French Polishers required; 
Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 19 August 1919, cabinet makers, ship-painters, shipwrights and red-leaders 
required, Vickers were offering permanent employment for suitable men, 47-hours per week and railway fares 
paid after three months service  
35 Lancashire Evening Post, Wednesday, 27 August 1919, Narragansett was launched for the Anglo-American Oil 
Company while a further order was received for an oil tanker in October 1919 
36 Pigou, A. C., Aspects of British Economic History, (London, McMillan, 1947), pp. 23-24 although Vickers were 
encouraged by government policy which contemplated placing large orders in anticipation of demands, Lord 
Inverforth, Minister of Munitions felt measure of this kind would hold up the return to private enterprise and a 
free market 
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There was plenty of work for repairs and workshop space was given over to locomotive 
work including production of new boilers entailing the installation of new plant for the 
heavy flanging and rolling of boiler-shells.37  Most major rail companies sent 
locomotives for repair and some 280 engines passed through the workshops during 
1919.  At the Cavendish Dock airship shed work was turned over to production of 
flexible pontoons for salvage work.  Men were transferred to produce sewing 
machines, rock and ore crushing machinery for use in road making material and 
cement, and machines for manufacture of rubber tyres and vulcanized presses.38  In 
under a year large changes were seen and the general impression was one of rapid 
accomplishment.  Nevertheless there was insufficient work to absorb all men causing 
Vickers to introduce short time in order that work could be spread over a larger 
number of men, which was only made possible by the payment of unemployment 
benefit in agreement with the government.39   
With the cessation of warship orders the tonnage passing through the docks 
had declined and efforts were made to counterbalance this with the revival of Irish 
and Liverpool shipping trade.40  By the end of the war coastal trade was no longer 
competitive, war having disrupted services many being reduced or suspended, which 
together with government redirection of trade to the railways had resulted in less 
cargo being carried and less income.  Once restoration of these services was seen and 
competition restored, goods and foodstuffs would arrive at Barrow much quicker than 
by rail benefitting both the Furness district and Cumberland.41  While trains came to a 
halt during the National Rail Strike the Furness Railway owned and operated docks 
remained operational as National Union of Railworkers members maintaining the 
hydraulic machinery and dock gates having declined to continue handling shipping 
were replaced by naval ratings.42   
Reconstruction had also gone ahead at the Barrow Hematite and Steel Works 
with the private expenditure of £500,000 since pre-war days.  Once war conditions 
                                                     
37 Scott, J. D., Vickers a History, (London, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1962). P.137 in 1918 the Vickers Directors asked 
Barrow to study the use of the shell shop for the manufacture of locomotive boilers 
38 The Times, Monday, 27 October 1919 
39 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 6 October 1919 
40 Lancashire Evening Post, Saturday, 30 August 1919 
41 Watson, N., Around the Coast and Across the Seas: The Story of James Fisher and Sons, (Leyburn, St. Mathews 
Press, 2000), p.53 
42 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday 2 October 1919 
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ended developments were made in fuel saving and lower working costs, a new blast-
furnace and hot gas stoves were constructed and blowing power augmented, a gas 
cleaning plant was installed and the steel foundries extended to tackle heavy castings 
for cargo and passenger ships.43  Since the Millom and Askam Iron Company had 
purchased the Duke of Devonshire’s shareholding in the Barrow Company it had 
obtained a number of assets to ensure a successful future.44  The Camerton Colliery 
and Brickworks were acquired to safeguard a future supply of quality firebricks for 
furnace linings and additional funding was provided for equipment and business 
development.45  Large numbers of shares were obtained in the Ullcoats Mining 
Company, a producer of high quality Cumberland iron ore, improving the position of 
future Barrow supplies.  A number of areas in Cumberland considered likely to contain 
ore deposits were obtained, exploitation proceeding under the prevailing labour 
conditions.  Additionally the Millom and Askam Iron Company were the largest 
shareholders in the Algerian Ben-Fellkai ore mines which had proved of huge value 
during the war.  Investigation was also made of the company’s collieries at Barnsley 
where there was a large tonnage of unworked gas-coal and once labour became 
available it was planned to increase output from the highest pre-war figure to 750,000 
to 1,000,000 tons per year, a rate expected to continue for 40 to 50 years.46  The 
Bessemer department of the Barrow Steelworks was restarted after standing idle 
since 1915 providing employment for an additional 150 workmen.  With plenty of iron 
available and with improved working conditions output was expected to exceed 4,000 
tons per week.47  The Barrow rail mills returned to a three-shift system and the 
merchant mill foundry and Siemens plant were restarted.   
Notwithstanding all this good news a gloomy future was predicted at the 
annual meeting when the chairman announced once Government control was 
withdrawn and subsidies removed there would be a considerable advance in the price 
of steel and iron.  If wages and production costs remained high and there were no 
protective tariffs against foreign products it was predicted the steel industry could be 
                                                     
43 Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer, Friday, 27 December 1918 
44 Newcastle Journal, Monday, 17 July 1917 
45 Lancashire Evening Post, Monday, 9 December 1918 
46 The Birmingham Post, Thursday 19 December 1918 
47 Lancashire Evening Post, Thursday, 15 May 1919 
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wiped out with few exceptions.48  As war contracts came to an end the steelworks 
plate mills closed down.  The rail strike prevented coke supplies for the blast furnaces 
reaching Barrow causing their damping down and the throwing out of large numbers 
of men.49   Nonetheless by the end of the year trade appeared brighter as large 
amount of business was foreseen for the Colonies, India and home use, while the 
quality of iron ore mined was improved after deteriorating under Government control 
for three years.    
The responsibilities of the Ministry of Munitions towards labour ended with 
the first steps in the demobilisation of munitions workers whilst the realisation of 
possible national bankruptcy caused the cut down of the enormous expenditure on 
defence spending.  Transformation of industry from war to peace conditions also 
involved the dislocation of industries and workshops causing large numbers of 
workers to change their employment, but this was not necessary the case at Barrow 
where it was more one of adjustment.   
 
Demobilisation and Adjustments 
During the last 18 months of the war demobilisation of workers on munitions 
and other war work was under consideration.50  In late 1917 owing to the needs of 
economising shipping tonnage the Government decided that the Ministry of 
Munitions imports could be considerably reduced.  The consequent decrease in raw 
materials made it necessary to revise the 1918 munitions programme, particularly 
production and filling of shell and shell components, explosives and small arms 
ammunition.  Other causes were the closing down of Russian contracts, and changes 
in character of certain classes of munitions.   It was estimated between 100,000 and 
120,000 workers would be dismissed of which about which 30 per cent would be men 
for whom the demand for labour would obviate unemployment on any large scale.51 
                                                     
48 Aberdeen Journal, Thursday, 1 May 1919 
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These men could be accelerated into the colours or found suitable work in shipyards 
and blast furnaces, but it was for women that new work had to be found during early 
1918.52  Aware of labour, unemployment and hardship problems, discharges were 
spread over as long a period as possible and the closure of factories or dismissal of 
workpeople was to take place in areas where the housing problem was particularly 
acute, including Gretna, Woolwich and Leeds but not Barrow.53  Plans were 
interrupted by the German Spring offensive and in response the available supplies of 
materials were restricted to munitions for which the offensive revealed the greatest 
need.  The offensive created the necessity for the rapid reinforcement of reserves in 
guns, machine-guns, tanks, aeroplanes and certain classes of ammunition.  This meant 
no workers were discharged from these classes of production and a fortnight after the 
offensive every gun and shell lost to the enemy was replaced out of reserves without 
depletion to a dangerous degree.   
Demobilisation began at Barrow as 600 workers, mainly married women 
followed by a further 250 left Vickers.54  By the end of January 1919, 5,177 women 
employed on war work at Barrow had been discharged.55  This demonstrates that 
Barrow female munitions workers were never regarded as anything other than 
temporary, agreeing with both Thom and Macarthur.  As Belgians’ contracts 
terminated there was little option but to send them home, the intention was to get 
them out of the country as quickly as possible.  Professor Tony Kushner maintains that 
when the war finished the British government wanted its soldiers back home and 
refugees out.56  They were pushed out of the country, which suited the Belgium 
government who needed people to rebuild their country.  A week after the war ended 
something had to be done with the Belgians, as the unemployment donation would 
not be payable to them and therefore relief was urgent.  Once repatriation began the 
Government needed some authority to collect and pack up refugees to ensure they 
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got to their point of departure.57  As there was no Refugee War Committee at Barrow, 
the War Distress Committee took the job on.   Repatriation was dealt with by the LGB, 
forms completed and refugees told to remain at their address until instructions for 
departure arrived via the shipping controller.  The considerable weight of 300lb per 
head was allowed to be carried, but on no account was furniture included in this 
allowance.  Regular shipping services were quickly organised and the first refugees left 
Millom in January 1919, followed on 2 February by almost all the remaining refugees 
who travelled to Newcastle to be shipped to Antwerp.58  Coincidentally the first twenty 
of 250 Australians left, no doubt happy to go having experienced Barrow’s 
overcrowding and uncongenial working conditions.59  These small numbers however 
made little difference to Barrow’s overcrowding as many had lived outside the town, 
and as mentioned Belgian numbers were reduced by transfer of workers to other parts 
of the country at different periods until there was probably no more than 400 to 500 
left in the area.  
Employment had to be found for those out of work in the town and from 
January 1919 the Ministry of Labour, Barrow Corporation and the Employment 
Exchange liaised to establish relief work schemes, but these were small scale 
enterprises.60  The problem existed of providing employment for some 2,500 
demobilised females in the borough.  The only position that could immediately be 
offered was domestic service for which there was no desire to take up at 10s to 15s 
per week during a period when they were entitled to 13 weeks unemployment 
donation of 25s a week (girls 12s 6d).61  Most women registered as factory hands 
rather than their pre-war employment knowing the labour exchange could not offer 
them factory work and out-of-work pay therefore continued.  Girls offered 
employment who refused were likely to have their out-of-work donations stopped, in 
which event they could apply to the Board of Referees comprising employers and 
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employees.  This board was practically idle at Barrow and there was no attempt to 
press girls into employment they did not seek.  In late February 1919 a demonstration 
was held to bring to attention unemployed women in Barrow whose benefit had been 
extended at the lower rate of 15s (girls 10s).62  Showing their frustration twelve 
unemployed girls were charged with using insulting words and behaviour, the Barrow 
magistrate remarking ‘he had seen an ‘extraordinary’ number of young girls, formerly 
munitions makers’ on similar charges, but worse the girls before him were drawing 
unemployment pay while accosting the men.’63  Labour leaders believed it was better 
for government to subsidise an industry for women in Barrow rather than provide 
benefits as if poorly paid work existed there was fear of some women drifting into 
destitution adding to the Board of Guardians problems.64  Inquiries meantime were 
made in cotton towns to find females work, while there was suggestions of building a 
toy factory and the possibility of aeronautical fabric making, neither of which came to 
fruition.65   
Barrow a heavy industrial town was not able to employ women on work 
requiring light repetitive tasks as those industries aimed at mass markets.66  By March 
1919 Barrow Council was urging the Government to provide employment for 
demobilised female workers. The new Parliamentary Member took this up with the 
Labour Advisory Committee, advising Vickers and other interested parties to hold a 
London conference.67  Vickers however had given consideration to peace products and 
were pursuing the subject, but only in regard to male employment.68   As far as women 
were concerned Vickers had not decided on any developments to provide suitable 
work for women which would not be conducive to difficulties arising between the 
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trade unions and themselves.69  Although Vickers were anxious to assist, as the 
Government was not willing to help financially to promote industries for women’s 
employment, there was little point in a holding a conference unless concrete 
proposals were forwarded.  Whilst Vickers were not planning on recruiting females 
they did retain numbers, indicated by women and girls in the fitting-shop of the 
shipbuilding section being awarded pay rises in August 1919.70  Large numbers of 
females were engaged in the aeronautical department where there was optimism as 
Vickers proposed building airships for trans-Atlantic passengers and goods.71  The only 
way Vickers could continue building such large airships however was to complete the 
Flookborough airship shed, but this project was abandon.72  In September 1919 the 
Government announced that along with gun production the construction of Admiralty 
rigid airships would cease.  Although the aeronautical work at Barrow included a small 
Japanese airship, the cessation of large airship work affected many artisans and the 
only rigid airship design team in the country.73  Women however remained at the 
Walney airship shed until the completion of R80 in June 1920.    
The Barrow Calcutta Jute Company found work for more females once the firm 
the Army returned its men and the same position existed at the Kelllner Partington 
Paper Pulp works where machinery had lain idle during the war.74  The return to work 
was short lived when it was announced in October 1919 that the Calcutta Jute Works 
would shut down affecting 360 workers mainly women, girls and boys.75  Women 
therefore remained disadvantaged in Barrow as no new schemes for absorbing their 
labour were forthcoming.  By the end of the 1919 consideration by the Juvenile 
Employment Sub-Committee of the cases of boys and girls was requested. For girls 
resolutions were passed by the NFWW suggesting the immediate establishment of 
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classes in dress-making, domestic service, nurses’ training and the provision of a 
municipal farm.76  Dressmaking and domestic training were partially provided by the 
Labour Advisory Committee while it was difficult to see how nurses training could be 
provided, provision of a farm on the other hand was a problem of finance.    
Turnover from war to peace in some Vickers workshops could not be carried 
out without alterations causing a temporary loss of employment for some men.  In the 
naval construction works some 700 men mostly skilled workers were out of work at 
Christmas 1918, a figure that would increase or reduce dependent on the pace of 
reconstruction and the rate of army demobilisation.  Instances occurred of men 
coming out of work who had had their homes in Barrow for many years and yet other 
men who had arrived in the war from districts where they were now wanted continued 
working in the town.  Vickers generally paid higher wages than elsewhere and if 
Barrow residents were required to go and work at these places they could possibly 
find hardship in paying for lodgings and also sending money to their wives and families 
to maintain them.77  The position now existed where local men could be better 
declining skilled employment elsewhere and remaining in Barrow working for 
labourer’s pay and sparing additional expenses.  This meant that skilled labour was 
retained in Barrow rather than dispersed.    
It was said many more labourers could be found work than were actually 
employed.  The Corporation Health Committee for example needed men to carry out 
scavenging work in the borough.  Following the demobilisation of the transport 
battalion, 200 men were required immediately for discharging and loading shipping as 
any delays would lead to the charging of demurrage and increased cargo costs.78  Due 
to the wet January weather several local iron ore mines were flooded putting 270 
miners out of work.79  The men were offered work discharging ore, but refused as the 
pay was lower than in the mines and also they were not suited to the weather at the 
docks.80  As the water subsided some miners returned while others who had declined 
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dock work found employment as shipyard labourers.  To overcome the docks 
manpower shortage, application was made for the return of men from the Army.  
Further work was available for 50 labourers at the Ferro-Concrete Ship Construction 
Company which built Admiralty experimental vessels powered by Vickers engines.81  
However by May 1919 it was reported that operations would soon cease at the 
Company’s yards at Barrow.82  Although the turnover from war to peace work was 
progressing smoothly and satisfactorily for finding employment for men, any delays in 
getting out work in hand could prejudice future orders.  Reasonably active attempts 
were therefore made to manage the transition to peace.  Foreigners were moved out, 
male workers were accommodated in other roles, and although there could be short-
term problems, the situation of women was the least successful.   
With the outbreak of war the drive for a shorter working week was shelved, it 
was now revised becoming a matter of priority. 
 
Shorter working hours  
 Eight days after the Armistice, agreement was reached between the 
Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades and employers’ associations over a 
47-hour week, if endorsed by the members.83  This agreement was hailed as ‘one of 
the greatest triumphs of British trade unionism’ as it not only meant a reduction in 
hours but established a standard working week.84  The agreement was endorsed but 
opposition to the acceptance of the 47-hour week came mainly from districts where 
shop stewards were strongly entrenched, including Barrow.85  To consider the 
proposed 47-hour week, a mass meeting of the engineering and shipbuilding 
federated trades unions was held at Barrow.  This was the first time all trades including 
women trade’s union members had been represented at a local meeting. 86  The 
proposed 47-hour week was rejected and a unanimous request made for a 35-hour 
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week at the present rate.  Previous reports showed that the Barrow and Coventry shop 
stewards wanted a 32-hour week, with a minimum weekly wage of £6 for skilled men 
and £5 for unskilled labour.  The demands also included a time limit for acceptance 
failing approval the downing of tools and Revolutionary action were threatened.87   
On returning to work at Barrow on 6 January 1919 a mass meeting was held 
where it was tentatively decided to approve a 47-hour week, while efforts would be 
maintained to obtain a 44-hour week.  Further it was proposed to reduce the nightshift 
from the old hours of 57½ to 37½.88  The new hours were 07.30 am until noon and 
1.00 pm until 5.00 pm Monday to Friday, and 07.30 am until noon Saturday.  Reaction 
amongst the Barrow workforce was varied, some appreciated the later start but others 
were against the long morning without a break.  However for Barrow housewives this 
was a novel experience who found themselves making breakfast between 6.30 am and 
7 am and preparing dinner for noon rather than 12.30 pm.   
On the Clyde the Workers' Committee and other militant groups, trade union 
leaders of the older type, demanded cuts in working hours to protect jobs and wages 
and absorb returning servicemen.89  A Joint Committee of shop stewards, members of 
the Scottish Trades Union Council and Allied Trades Council was set up to organise a 
national strike, which was opposed by the ASE and most other unions.  A manifesto 
was issued to workers throughout the country calling a strike for a 40-hour week with 
no reduction in wages.  Although the Barrow men were dissatisfied with the 47-hour 
week, they considered there was no use one district coming out while others stayed 
in.90  Delegates were therefore sent to the various centres including the Clyde to see 
what was happening, on returning to Barrow a mass meeting of shipbuilding and 
engineering trades was held to hear their reports.91  As opinion was diversified, a 
National Conference was held at Barrow on 31 January in order to arrive at a final 
decision and secure unanimity of action.  At the National Conference between the 
shipbuilding and engineering trades in February it was recommended that all districts 
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adopt a 44-hour week.92  Nonetheless, at Barrow it was agreed to obtain reduced 
hours by constitutional means, and a ballot on the question of a 40 or 44-hour week 
resulted in the majority voting for 40-hours, while electing to continue work pending 
settlement.93  The 47-hour week continued to be worked at Vickers and by August 
1919 recognition of a general 44-hour week was adjourned to allow investigation of 
the economic relationship of production to workhours, and the methods of 
manufacture in shipbuilding and engineering industries in Britain and other 
countries.94   Meanwhile unrest continued and 1919 became a year of strikes. 
 
Unrest 
At an important transition period in making Barrow a leading shipyard for the 
building of merchant and passenger ships, and repairing such ships the Vickers joiners 
with the support of the bricklayers ceased work.  The townspeople generally regretted 
the strike as it meant delay in getting out work already in hand and could prejudice 
the chances of further orders.  The strike was described as one of sympathy with the 
demand for the 40-hour week on the Clyde, but this was denied as on the request of 
the union executives the men came out to enforce the withdrawal of the Premium 
Bonus System.95  The strikers demanded a return to time-rates holding the system was 
a war measure to facilitate production that should be dispensed with and its 
continuance tended to increase unemployment.96  Vickers contended when the 47-
hour week was conceded the system had to be continued, pointing out there was 
plenty of work particularly for joiners and more men were wanted.97  After eight weeks 
the men returned subject to a conference between Vickers and the men’s 
representatives and on recommendation of the officers of their trade unions with the 
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additional threat of withholding strike pay.98  The Premium Bonus System was 
withdrawn as far as the joiners and bricklayer were concerned, but Vickers complained 
of the tremendous loss of output which resulted by replacing the system with time-
work.99  Two serious disputes were to follow, the national railway strike and the iron-
founders and moulders strike, both of which affected Barrow’s major industries. 
Although the Government deployed its wartime emergency powers, soldiers 
being posted at the Barrow gas and electric works, the railway strike caused problems 
for many men getting to and from work caused by the limited railway service.100  The 
absence of early morning trains found hundreds of Vickers nightshift workers stranded 
at Barrow causing men from Dalton and Ulverston to set off on foot while Vickers 
lorries carried men further afield.101  The loss of the rail service meant the halting of 
coal and coke supplies and the gradually damping down of furnaces followed by 
closure of the steelworks.  Even after the strike ended, dislocation continued due to 
the breakdown of rail transport, causing the iron and steel works to place blast 
furnacemen on day-to-day notice.102  Problems of transporting pig iron to different 
parts of the country were experienced through shortage of railway wagons, though 
coke and ore arrived the trucks were found to be unsuitable for carrying pig-iron.103  
Compounding matters further, was that local pig-iron consumption was small due to 
the steelworks remaining idle, in normal times the bulk produced at Barrow being 
consumed in the works.   
On 20 September 1919 a major strike amongst the iron-moulders and founders 
occurred and was not easily terminated, it continued for eight weeks adding to 
unemployment while further reducing the use of pig iron.104  The strike caused a lack 
of castings delaying peace work programmes including work on the new Cunard liner 
and as the works became affected Vickers reluctantly gave men a weeks’ notice which 
was particularly unfortunate for those on part time.  Although several hundred 
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moulders were employed by Vickers, smaller workshops in the borough could not 
continue causing them to discharge workers.105  
Table 14 shows the Barrow monthly unemployment figures for the majority of 
1919.  The figures could be reduced or increased according to the speeding up or 
reconstruction in some workshops, and demobilisation from the army.106 However 
unlike other towns and cities, returning servicemen did not suffer high unemployment 
at Barrow.  This is possibly because Vickers and the Corporation had promised 
servicemen their jobs back on return and compared to other areas Barrow had sent 
less men to the war.  Notwithstanding men’s unemployment figures remained steady 
until late September when they increased to worrying proportions consequent upon 
the railway and moulders strikes.  It must also be noted that the returns ruled out 
those men working part time while receiving out of work donations.  For women, large 
numbers were left out of work following demobilisation, although numbers were 
absorbed when the two major commercial industries reopened.  It may also be 
assumed that others returned to their pre-war occupations or remained at home.  
1919 Men Women Boys Girls Total 
14 March 1,000 3,745 129 340 5,041 
3 April 1,291 4,064 96 249 5,700 
1 May 1,275 3,942 52 271 5,540 
5 June 1,801 2,451 101 301 4,654 
10 July 1,122 1,088 60 282 2,552 
8 August 1,779 847 124 169 2,919 
1 September 996 473 52 155 1,676 
24 October 2,347 338 173 146 3,004 
13 November 2,632 427 231 215 3,505 
19 December 2,782 317 139 123 3,361 
Table 14 - Barrow 1919 Unemployment Figures 
Growing numbers of unemployed began organising, marching and petitioning 
both the local authority and central government, declaring unemployment was 
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government responsibility.107  In November 1919 unemployed men demonstrated in 
front of Barrow town hall where a resolution was carried calling on the Government 
to inaugurate national employment schemes generally and asking for a 100 per cent 
increase in the unemployment donation.108  The corporation supported the demands 
of the unemployed calling on the government to provide work or a level of 
maintenance for those thrown out of work through no fault of their own and warned 
of the distress and unrest that would result from the discontinuation of the 
unemployment donation.109  The prime minister was asked whether the government 
in placing work will regard the special hardships under which towns like Barrow, 
engaged almost exclusively in the manufacture of war material were now suffering 
and would he ensure some clear priority in the allocation of such orders be made 
promptly to enable workers to weather the coming winter.  Lloyd George said the 
Government had devoted attention to such industrial centres and much had been 
done to mitigate the evils owing to the change from war to peace conditions, and in 
consequence there had been little actual distress.   
Dismissing concerns, the Government declared the November Barrow 
unemployment figure of 2,632 men was not abnormal and did not warrant special 
attention, particularly as 1,800 were in occupations covered by the National Insurance 
(Unemployment) Acts and were entitled to unemployment benefit when out of 
work.110  In fact the Government believed there was no abnormal industrial condition, 
apart from the dislocation caused by the iron-moulders dispute.111  But suffering there 
was, and in an ingenious method of increasing membership the Barrow Cooperative 
Society proposed putting £500 aside for distribution among its members who were in 
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distress and would include strikers in the grant provided they consented to becoming 
co-operators.112   
Problems of food supply were caused by the railway strike, the worry being 
Barrow’s isolation from the mainline, the Ministry of Food stated supply was good and 
arrangements in hand for meeting shortages should the strike be prolonged.113  Steps 
were taken to deliver milk by road, while rationing of tea, meat, butter and cheese 
were reintroduced.114  Procuring a local supply of fresh fish was partially overcome by 
the arrival of fishing boats from Morecambe delivering supplies to the quay at Piel 
instead of the railway owned docks.115  Although the railwaymen returned in October 
the iron-moulders remained out and needy cases were met by a Strike Distress 
Committee.116  While there were food shortages, there was no immediate return to 
pre-war drinking hours nevertheless by mid-1919 weekday opening was extended 
until 10 pm which attributed to an increase in the number of convictions for 
drunkenness.  The lifting of output restrictions in June followed by an increase in 
gravity can also be said to be contributing factors to this increase.    
Meanwhile the questions of health and housing remained.  Like the rest of the 
country Barrow felt the effects of the influenza outbreak while the Corporation 
acknowledged 'it was the duty of the local authority to carry through a programme of 
housing for the working-classes'.117   
 
Health 
The massive simultaneous outbreak of influenza throughout the country did 
not come until late June 1918, the first wave reaching its crest in the second week of 
July.118 During the first week of July a large number of workpeople were absent from 
work at Barrow owing to influenza, but there were no stoppages at the large 
establishments or loss of public services.119  The position regarding school children 
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however was so serious that on the advice of the Barrow Medical Officer of Health, 
the Education Committee closed the elementary schools until the last week of 
August.120  In the second week of July a number of deaths from influenza occurred in 
Barrow but the epidemic was now said to have passed its climax and was abating.  A 
second and more serious wave hit Barrow in late October and early November when 
undertakers and gravediggers were overwhelmed and soldiers assisted in digging 
graves and making coffins.  The week the war ended 41 influenza deaths were 
reported in the town.121  
The labour situation was not helped when the final wave of influenza appeared 
in Barrow towards the end of February 1919 causing staff shortages for local 
industries.122  The position was compounded by a coal shortage, firmly blamed on the 
Coal Controller, leaving hundreds of houses without fire and people with influenza in 
danger by not getting the warmth needed.  Although influenza became prevalent 
again it was not as virulent as in 1918.  Three deaths occurred in one week and there 
were a few serious cases under the care of the doctors, some of the latter being men 
returned from the Army.123  In the final week of February 1919 it was reported sixteen 
deaths had occurred within ten days at Barrow, and many cases of illness existed at 
Ulverston where workers lived, however the schools remained open.124  In some cases 
where influenza was the cause of illness it was followed by pneumonia and recorded 
as the cause of death masking the epidemic’s true figures.  Throughout the 1918-1919 
epidemic, people remained resilient, giving and receiving the same advice they had 
followed for the preceding four years, that of simply ‘carrying on’.   
Under the Food Controller the ‘national kitchen’ programme grew out of 
community kitchens, predating the introduction of full rationing.  The Ministry in 1917 
seized on their potential for efficiency, wholesale purchasing and collective 
preparation, reasoning they would help cut waste.125  They offered cheap food for the 
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masses, were run by local workers and funded by repayable Government grants, they 
were not charities and did not resemble soup kitchens for societies poorest.  As late 
as mid-1918, the Ministry of Food was talking confidently of national kitchens 
becoming a ‘permanent national institution’, and in August 1918, the government 
empowered county councils, as well as urban authorities, to open and run national 
kitchens.126   
Acute distress had not been suffered in Barrow during the war and no 
requirements had been seen for community kitchens.  However, a national kitchen 
was opened in the populous district of Barrow Island on 17 March 1919, although the 
restaurant seated 64 persons at one sitting, the chief object was to provide cooked 
food to be taken into people’s homes.127  It was calculated 800 to 1,000 meals per day 
would have to be sold to meet their liabilities, but if not used the kitchen would quickly 
shut down.128  The local vicar viewed it as part of a future they had been striving for 
and of real social and political value, observing working women he was convinced their 
work was never done and they had too much to do, the national kitchen was therefore 
an aid that would provide better meals for many mothers and children.   Although 
Barrow’s National Food Kitchens outdated the Armistice, the Treasury removed 
funding in 1919. 129 
In the autumn 1919 the Barrow School Medical Officer, reporting on a sample 
of 6,667 school children, concluded 'there was indication that numbers of children 
were not obtaining sufficient food due to the bad economic conditions in the homes 
on account of the labour troubles'.130  Joy says this may account for the slight increase 
in deaths from contagious diseases in 1919, but at no stage does she consider the 
returning influenza epidemic in February.131  In the Hindpool district schools a few 
cases of malnutrition due to insufficient food were found, but generally children were 
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well nourished, similar conditions were found on Barrow Island.132  The Barrow 
women’s activist Mrs. Mills, pointed out that malnutrition did not show itself 
immediately as many mothers tried to make ends by giving a little less food and in 
such cases it would take time before the effects were seen.  Attention was drawn to 
the Board of Guardians and Education Committee to consider implementing the 
feeding of necessitous school children.133   To children requiring food the Education 
(Provision of Meals) Act was put into operation providing meals six days per week, 
distribution centres were organised and two-course dinners arranged costing 
approximately 5d per head.134   
Although thousands had left the town to return to their homes and 
occupations in other parts of the country and abroad the housing shortage in Barrow 
remained acute. 
 
Housing and Accommodation 
By the Armistice approximately eight per cent of the work on the new 
permanent houses was complete, and by May 1920 only 132 houses out of 250 were 
available for occupation.135  Important and far reaching decisions regarding workers’ 
housing were therefore needed if the town was to maintain it its industrial supremacy.  
As the cost of building continued to rise, difficulty increased in obtaining an economic 
rent on 70 per cent of the cost of permanent houses as required by the Treasury.136  
In the case of congested places like Barrow the competition of prospective tenants 
made it possible to secure the higher rents, but the danger existed that a claim for 
higher wages would follow and any increase would not be restricted to the tenants of 
new houses, but spread through the whole district, or even a whole industry.   
The Ministry estates were problematic from the outset as both Vickers and the 
Town Council refused post-war possession so ownership was vested in the Ministry.  
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The first area of contention was the Ministry of Munitions’ unilateral attempts to fix 
rents at the extremely high figure of 17s 6d per week for the permanent houses, which 
roused corporation protests at both the figure and lack of consultation.137  In June 
1919, Mrs. Mills said government houses at Barrow were too small, too dear at a rent 
of 17s 6d and hampered with unnecessary regulations.138   
By virtue of being a Ministry funded scheme however, the question of rents 
was a matter of public policy, and whilst the Ministry insisted on the need to charge 
an economic rent to recoup the high building costs, the corporation was adamant that 
it was unreasonable to expect working men to pay such an amount.139  However, 
following the Corporation's refusal to accept even reduced rents of between 10s and 
12s per week, and with over half of the proposed houses not built, the Ministry of 
Munitions announced an end to its building programme.140  This led to the problem of 
large numbers of permanent properties standing empty despite the chronic housing 
shortage.  Following the Corporation decision not to purchase the properties the 
houses were placed on the market.   However when the best offer failed to meet the 
average building cost of £1,200, the properties were withdrawn from sale in July 1919, 
and were still unoccupied in the autumn of 1920. 
Following the loss of the state sponsored initiative, the Corporation's decision 
to proceed with the building of the remaining 500 houses in August 1919 quickly ran 
into difficulties.141  The Housing Commission rejected tenders for the remainder for 
being too high, and despite Council attempts to stimulate the building of working-class 
houses and limit non-essential work, construction was hindered by labour and 
material shortages and the requirement to balance housing needs.142  The Council was 
evenly divided on the housing issue, some councillors were against the entire concept 
while others believed building could not be justified as local industry would never 
again employ such a large workforce.  A further view suggested building should be 
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deferred until costs fell and rents were reasonable.  The pro-housing lobby supported 
building on the grounds of the borough's poor and insanitary conditions, whilst others 
argued for giving people 'decent places to live and not herding them like pigs'.  There 
was a body of opinion, both within the Corporation and from the general public, that 
the problem was the habits of people themselves.  The engineers however believed 
the working-class had the right to live in accommodation that would not prejudice 
their own or their children’s physical conditions.  Despite some change of attitude, 
house-building in the borough fell away rapidly in the post-war period, apart from 
those built by the Ministry of Munitions, the few subsidised, built and completed 
under the 1919 Act however barely equalled the pre-war rate.  Whilst the Commission 
into Industrial Unrest provided the catalyst for a break with the past, condemning the 
Corporation's passive acceptance of appalling living conditions, the Ministry 
succeeded in limiting house building without industrial militancy. 
There was no lessening of demand in the town for accommodation.  Estimates 
differ for the 1919 Barrow population figures, one estimate gives 73,627 a second 
78,000, these figures were a drop from the 1918 population of 83,179 and roughly on 
a par with that for 1915 of 75,368.143  Due to the slow pace of building and releasing 
new houses for occupation demand remained as such that in one instance £10 key 
money was offered on empty four-roomed house, and for the tenancy the owner had 
100 applicants.144  With the renewal of eviction orders there was a call from the 
Barrow Labour Party for the local magistrates to cease granting them and a demand 
that the Government immediately restore the anti-eviction laws instituted during the 
war, and that they remain in operation until suitable accommodation was provided 
for the workers.145  The magistrates also refused to meet a Corporation deputation, 
stating that evictions involved the judicial function of the Justices, whose powers and 
duties were subject to legislation rather than negotiation. Nevertheless the Barrow 
magistrates were alive to their responsibilities and sent a deputation to London on the 
subject of evictions further there is evidence that evictions were only allowed where 
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alternative accommodation was available while others were deferred.146  With the 
withdrawal of the Ministry of Munitions the threat of strike action against the 
Government over evictions was no longer viable.  In June 1919 the Labour Party and 
Trades Council had threatened Barrow Council with grave industrial disorder unless 
the granting of ejectment orders were stopped immediately.147 Strike action did not 
occur and intimidation appears to have been used when two or three property owners 
were threatened during November that if their tenants were evicted those tenants 
would be taken with their chattels to pitched tents in Cavendish Square in the town 
centre, where there would be a public scandal.148  There was no desire to prevent men 
who owned houses getting into those properties as long as there was provision of a 
municipal scheme so that tenants having to leave houses had somewhere to go.  If 
municipal houses were built there would be no evictions, the desire therefore was to 
provide decent houses at reasonable rents.   In fact it is arguable that under a climate 
of reduced prosperity and rising unemployment the demand was increasing for 
cheaper housing.    
Accommodation and conditions under which certain families were living owing 
to new eviction orders being granted or threatened were substandard.  The leasing of 
caravans became a profitable business, a landowner would pay rates for the land and 
lease vans, railway wagons and furniture vehicles, creating small colonies where 
families lived under primitive conditions.149  In April 1919, twenty-eight adults and 
eleven children were living in railway wagons at weekly rents of 7s per wagon with 
one toilet between them.150  Rates were not payable on mobile homes and were not 
affected by bye-laws.  An assortment of structures were generated, some with 
artificial wheels and others with wheels painted on as landowners sought to profit 
from the homeless.  Others lived in wooden huts, one councillor asked members to 
inspect a hut almost in the shadow of the Town Hall, let at 11s 6d per week.151  One 
bed nearly filled it, there was a bacon box for a table and two rickety chairs, conditions 
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he declared were vile, disgraceful and unsanitary.  Not only were makeshift colonies 
tolerated but encouraged.  In October 1919 the Housing Committee had to reconsider 
acquiring Army huts for temporary accommodation in which to house Barrow 
workers.152  A Labour councillor argued that the Council would use the huts as 
alternative accommodation for people turned out of their houses, people who could 
not afford to buy houses.  Further the council surveyor was against purchasing the 
huts, not only on the grounds of health, but because the huts were not fit to live in.153  
Pressure mounted from the Labour Party and Trades Council urging the Council to 
make every effort to ease the hardships caused by the housing shortage while the 
Corporation took steps to deal with the worst abuses, but efforts proved futile in the 
face of increasing homelessness.  The immediate post-war period therefore saw 
continued evictions, increasing numbers of houses standing empty and the expansion 
of 'alternative' forms of accommodation for the homeless.  As the town reverted to a 
changing industrial system with it came a return to traditional politics.    
 
Politics and The General Election 
Joy says that although there was a marked shift towards the left among 
Barrow's organised working-class, this should not be overstated to the exclusion of 
the vast body of the apolitical and non-committed waverers.154  During the war there 
was little evidence of socialist ideology beyond the workplace, and any evidence of 
anti-capitalist rhetoric was largely confined to the Labour Party and Trades Council 
minutes.  Even there, a resolution that the Labour Party should focus on food control 
issues and the nationalisation of key industries rather than act as recruiting agents for 
the capitalists was immediately diluted to express disappointment in the 
government's lack of attention to essentials such as food, fuel and wages, suggesting 
that the Labour Party and Trades Council handled ideology with caution.155  
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The issue of the war deeply divided the Barrow Labour Party into two rival 
factions, the far left 'pacifists' and those supporting the Government in full 
prosecution of the war.156  Vickers shop stewards had become more powerful than 
the traditional union leaders and by 1917 they numbered over a hundred, many 
committed anti-war socialists.157  This was clearly brought to light in early 1918 when 
radical statements were made regarding a people’s peace.  Ideological conflict within 
the Labour ranks was inevitable and in the hierarchy of the ILP Charles Duncan was 
becoming increasingly isolated.  When Duncan appeared at a meeting in the autumn 
of 1918 defending his stance on the war he claimed he spoke for the common man, 
although this was well received there were cries of ‘kick out the Bolsheviks’.  The 
Barrow ASE were primarily responsible for Duncan’s political life but throughout the 
war years became displeased over his internal policies and independent attitude 
which determined them to be rid of him.158   
While the engineers voted against his candidature and other labour candidate 
came forward, they found Duncan foisted on them regardless.  Nominated by the local 
Boilermakers Society and the Barrow Workers Union of which Duncan was general 
secretary he was left to contest the borough on behalf of the National Labour Party.159  
Duncan had not been averse to coming forward under the Coalition ticket, but the 
decision of the National Labour Party to withdraw from the Coalition Government 
compelled him to revise his views.  He now supported the good measures of the 
coalition government and opposed the bad measures, and on trade union and labour 
matters generally he acted with the National Labour Party.160  Tensions ran high to the 
point where in-fighting over the choice of Parliamentary candidate eclipsed all other 
considerations and prevented Labour from offering an effective challenge to the 
Unionist Coalition candidate.  In fact six days before the election a meeting of the 
Barrow Labour Party delegates representing all the allied trades was held to consider 
supporting Duncan, but an overwhelming majority refused their support.161  
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Furthermore it was agreed to take no united action in the contest, and individual party 
members were left to vote as they pleased. 
The split in the Labour ranks provided Barton Chadwick, the Unionist 
Candidate with his opportunity.  He appealed as a Lloyd George supporter and his 
strong point was that it was necessary to have a representative Government to carry 
through peace negotiations and handle reconstruction.  Without the organisation of 
the Barrow Labour Party little time was left to Duncan to create his own election 
machinery and although disadvantaged he had the backing of many Trade Unionists, 
the Barrow Liberals and considerable Irish support.162  The result was expected to be 
close with women playing a decisive part.  Duncan condescendingly said that 12,737 
women out of an electorate of 37,969 in Barrow were ‘given the privilege’ of exercising 
the franchise and he thought he was entitled to some credit with regards to obtaining 
enfranchisement.163  Mrs. Pankhurst was more decisive and visiting Barrow under the 
auspices of the Women’s Party addressed a large meeting where she appealed to the 
women to vote for Lloyd George.164  Every man had a vote and almost every woman 
she said, but warned that women would not allow extreme men to put the country 
into bloodshed.  Totally opposed to war and class supremacy she added ‘there would 
be no Labour Government because women were against it’.165    
Labour narrowly lost its Parliamentary seat, a defeat Duncan rightly attributed 
to Barrow Labour divisions.166  Todd argues it was the extremists’ intention to oust 
Duncan and the strength of their influence within Barrow's Labour Party is 
demonstrated by its refusal to support his candidature at the 1918 General Election.167  
In fact this was nothing new as the Barrow activists had planned to put up Socialist 
candidates against leading Labour members including Duncan at the 1914 general 
election.168  In defeat Duncan commented 'it does seem to be a disgrace to a great 
Labour constituency like Barrow, where probably there is a better organised band of 
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trade unionists than any other part of the country, to overthrow the Labour 
representative and return a Tory ship-owner'.169  Socialist influence and attitudes 
towards the war therefore divided Barrow's Labour Party and brought the once 'well-
oiled machine of a model constituency’ to division and defeat.170   
The Yorkshire Post said the shop stewards at the 1918 election had decided to 
support the Tory candidate rather than stay neutral.171  In this they were displaying a 
certain amount of shrewdness, as if Duncan was returned he would once more stand 
against a Unionist.  In the event of the shop stewards entering the field there would 
be a three-cornered contest with little prospect of success therefore by supporting 
Chadwick they were hopefully clearing the way for a straight fight in the future.  While 
the election was lost for Labour, the shop stewards achieved their objective of 
removing Duncan.  The shop stewards soon found their candidate when Councillor 
Wake was selected by a large majority at the Conference of the Barrow Trades and 
Labour Party in August 1919.172   
In the immediate post-war period, left-wing ideology was low key, and in ‘The 
Northern Beacon’ the organ of the Barrow extremists, ideology and class rhetoric were 
minimal.  For example, the Labour Party manifesto for the 1919 Board of Guardians 
election called for the replacement of the Poor Law with a more humane system, the 
transfer of the care of the needy to the relevant local authority committee and 
prevention rather than the amelioration of poverty.173  Similarly, another article 
expounded the consequences of middle-class control of the council and its inevitable 
failure to meet the needs of all citizens, particularly regarding to the provision of 
adequate working-class health and education. Yet although emphasising social 
divisions and stressing 'the cure is with ourselves' the ideology is non-confrontational 
with no rhetoric of class struggle.174  Instead emphasis was placed on the need for 
non-violent change by ballot and industrial action, but neither such articles nor the 
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damning indictment of the Commission of Enquiry into Industrial Unrest politicised 
the town's working classes.   
There is evidence of frustration with the populace as a whole, who were 
increasingly criticised in the Beacon for apathy, indifference and of having 'as much 
imagination as a grasshopper'.175  Such insults would not endear the left to its 
readership, and despite stressing the importance of the working-class press the paper 
was short-lived caused by a fall-off in readership.176  Nonetheless when the first 
municipal election was held for a vacant council seat in January 1919, just a month 
after the general election, it was convincingly won by Sam Lowry the NAUL adviser, 
increasing the number of Labour council members to nine.177  When municipal 
elections were held in November 1919, out of the seven wards contested, Labour held 
their three seats and gained a fourth bringing their representation on the Council up 
to ten out of 32, the latter figure including eight aldermen.178  This was achieved in 
spite of exceptional opposition by the Conservative and Liberals fighting Labour on 
independent lines and a new organisation the Barrow Constitutional Workers League 
which conducted a campaign against the mainstream Labour Party, who it was alleged 
had captured the trades unions.179  
 
Conclusions 
 Unrest which had grown in intensity as the strain of the war effort and the 
hardships and restrictions created by the exigencies of the war now made themselves 
more severely felt.  No sooner had the claims of all classes of munitions workers to 
share in the 12½ and 7½ per cent awards subsided than a new bone of contention 
arose in the early months of 1918.  The prevailing discontent manifested itself 
principally in the opposition to new recruiting measures and in the demand in some 
quarters to peace negotiations.  Unrest to some extent subsided during April and May 
1918 caused by the demand for men and munitions to counter Germany’s supreme 
effort, but with the first sign of the tide turning in France it showed itself again in the 
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embargo dispute.  Therefore unrest was readily shelved during a crisis, but it was 
quickly resurrected once the worst was over. 
 As the War ended Barrow’s future was determined by the ability of Vickers to 
turn from war to peace products.  The rundown of Admiralty and heavy gun orders 
and the changeover to merchant ship building meant less skilled labour was required.  
Though skilled labour was needed elsewhere, Barrow’s high wages kept men in the 
town often on labouring jobs while female labour was generally dispersed, and for 
those remaining little scope was seen for earning wages previously seen in munitions.  
Return of demobilised men and the employers and trade unions stances further 
prevented female employment at Vickers.   
 The retention of labour and the slow house-building programme caused by the 
withdrawal of the government meant the problem of overcrowding remained.  With 
virtually no unemployment in Barrow throughout the war the problem returned on its 
conclusion and cases of hardship were witnessed by calls for relief and people living 
in temporary and sub-standard accommodation.  The Vickers joiners and bricklayers 
strike demonstrated the trade unions aversion to the payment by results system, but 
on the positive side working hours were reduced providing more leisure time. The 
major strike amongst the iron-moulders was not easily disposed of and continued for 
four months, badly affecting Barrow’s industries.  National strikes in the autumn 
further exacerbated the problems of unemployment and distress, causing men to 
claim out of work benefits and children to be provided with school emergency meals.    
The issue of the war deeply divided the Barrow Labour Party.  Before the war 
it was the avowed intention of the shop stewards to oust the local MP Charles Duncan 
and the need became greater after his pro-war stance.  The strength of their influence 
within Barrow's Labour Party was demonstrated by their refusal to support his 
candidature and Duncan’s loss at the 1918 general election.  The significance of this 
issue was that it was uncharacteristic that a strong labour town returned a Tory MP.  
It also shows the radicalism or politicisation of the workforce, or at least of sufficient 
numbers that could divide support for the war-time MP. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
This research has implications not just for local home front historians but 
general historians.  It demonstrates what local studies can add to the general studies 
by expanding the wider based explanations and by seeing the complex nature of a 
town at war.  By carrying out a case study it has shown how the various elements 
interacted, the broad consensus of engagement in the war and the importance of local 
factors working together to achieve war aims.  In addition to illustrating the distinctive 
nature of Barrow's war experiences the study provides important insights and 
contributes to the better understanding of the impact of war on the economy and 
social dynamics of a single industry town.  This concluding section reviews the main 
themes identified through the thesis of the disruption caused by the war, especially 
relating to state control and the Ministry of Munitions, labour relations, unions and 
organisation of labour, the Labour political movement, the place and role of women, 
and housing, health and welfare.   The main conclusions will demonstrate how the war 
impacted on Barrow, and how it met the challenges and came together to help sustain 
the war effort whilst providing an opportunity to test how far the general 
interpretations from the secondary literature apply to Barrow. The conclusions will 
also discuss the value, and limitations of the local case study as a mode of analysis of 
the home front. 
Before the outbreak of war Barrow’s fortunes were largely tied up with Vickers 
and the big ship policy of the day.  Vickers had succeeded in their efforts to win a place 
among the elite shipbuilders, naval and foreign contracts guaranteeing continuation 
of work and full employment breaking the trend of boom and bust.  Besides 
shipbuilding and marine engineering, iron and steel production formed a large part of 
the town’s industry while the docks provided for materials and much of the town’s 
provisions including food, its major products steaming away from the port.   The rail 
system was essential for the transportation of iron ore, coal and coke, pig iron and the 
movement of workers and passengers.  Barrow’s isolation however meant that its 
geographical links, were both tenuous and vulnerable to external influences, but made 
the town more self-reliant in other ways.   
The vast technological changes in warships not only required design skills but 
craft skills, although increased technological changes were seen in the workshops, 
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long standing trade rules and work ethics tended to frustrate Vickers’ innovative 
methods of production and technical management as noted by Todd.  Trade unionism 
was strong although friction was seen between the ASE and the Boilermakers Society, 
whilst the large number of individual unions and representation of some trades by 
more than one union fragmented the movement.  While a shop-stewards organisation 
existed it had little influence before the war.   Profitable times seen in the pre-war 
years meant neither employers nor employees wanted prolonged stoppages.  
Nonetheless Barrow was not an ideal environment as pre-war housing and 
overcrowding problems existed of which the war would intensify.   
Following the outbreak of hostilities, the rush to the colours and 
unemployment becomes the focal points of historians while ignoring the fact that the 
completion of warships and submarines and the production of naval munitions was of 
first priority.  DeGroot and others see the outbreak of war as bringing general 
unemployment, but this was not the case at Barrow.180  The indiscriminate nature of 
volunteering led to serious trade disruption and disorganisation forcing Vickers to take 
steps to protect their workforce.  Marwick observed: ‘in a war of machines it was at 
least as necessary to look to the supply of machine-makers at home as to the supply 
of machine-users on the fields of battle’.181  Initial manpower shortages were 
overcome by moving men from non-essential to essential work, including those from 
merchant ship builders where work was slack.  Success concerned with the 
continuance of the war however could only achieved by retaining, redistributing and 
expanding the skilled workforce, output being dependent on increasing or 
economising the supply of labour.   
 The Barrow male population were urged to see their duty was at home and 
the thesis has highlighted the disruption caused by men migrating to higher paid work 
at Vickers from other industries and services in the town.  Abundance of work drew in 
unemployed workers from elsewhere but they generally lacked shipbuilding 
experience and were described as ‘of a lower character’.  While sympathy was seen 
for the Belgians their introduction into the engineering and railway workshops was 
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unpopular.  These initial problems of loss, redistribution, recruiting and retaining of 
industrial manpower were further compounded when Vickers accepted huge shell and 
gun contracts as recognized by Scott.182  
 State control and the Ministry of Munitions have been much written about, 
discussing manpower control and improving production efficiency to increase output 
especially by the use of leaving certificates and munitions tribunals.  Historians 
disagree about the intent behind the Munitions Act, but as Rubin points out this was 
a response to the manpower shortage, and also an attempt to discipline labour at a 
time when scarcity rendered the workers powerful.183  Notwithstanding if arbitration 
failed the Ministry had the law and the threat of force behind them.  For workers, the 
most significant provision of the Act was the leaving certificate, generally seen as a 
drastic restriction of normal liberties and the most powerful instrument of industrial 
efficiency.  The balance of power between the employer and worker was mediated by 
the munitions tribunals, and the conclusions based on Barrow is that it was not 
automatically repressive on the worker but was more sensitive and accommodating.   
Study of the Barrow Munitions Tribunal has demonstrated the problems and 
conditions of industry and shed light on how they were addressed in the interest of 
retaining men.  It has been established that difficulties lay mainly in the shipyard and 
iron and steel industries, not in the shell and gun shops.   In matters of discipline fines 
had little effect as offenders made up deductions by high earnings or working 
overtime.  Manpower shortages meant poor workers were retained while protected 
workers previous to the combing out of men for the army had little fear of dismissal.  
Industrial harmony was therefore essential and trade unions were apt to discipline 
transgressors.  This was important when completing contracts, in the interests of the 
steady workers and when negotiating pay rises, particularly with Vickers.  Thus the 
Ministry looked to Vickers and the unions for self-regulation to maintain order and 
efficiency and broadly this worked.  However, it has been shown that in the interest 
of maintaining men under threat of conscription, both unions and Vickers were unified 
in defying authority. 
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Most historians relate women’s experiences with the practices of dilution and 
substitution. Simmonds say the difference between the two is indistinct and the 
subject of some controversy.184  The Shells and Fuses Agreement and the Treasury 
Agreement opened the way to a sharp increase in women’s employment.  In 
‘controlled’ establishments, essential to the ‘production of munitions’, the principle of 
dilution was accepted.  At Barrow, trade union strength was such that union members 
were preferred by employers in the interest of harmony and therefore further dilution 
beyond munitions work was going to be problematic.  Dilution was contentious as 
DeGroot says it undermined the skill differentials upon which the workers’ security 
was based.185  However, the application of dilution to Admiralty work is largely 
ignored.  The Admiralty held that dilution would only be encouraged provided 
efficiency was maintained, output remained undiminished and the skilled labour 
released utilised to increase Vickers’ productivity.  In view of the first two conditions 
the Admiralty maintained it had to be the governing authority to what measures of 
dilution should be introduced where output was destined directly or indirectly to their 
work, effectively this excluded Vicker’s from the Labour Department Dilution Section.    
Following the success of dilution into controlled Tyne and Clyde engineering 
and shipyard establishments, Vickers attempted to introduce further dilution on 
skilled men’s work under the Ministry of War Act.  The outcome was a strike and the 
reluctant acceptance of dilution in certain departments forced upon the engineers by 
the Chairman of the Government Commission for the Dilution of Labour.  Failure to 
introduce dilution on a large scale led to the government meeting with local 
representatives of the Admiralty and Ministry of Munitions concerning the 
organisation of Barrow’s shipbuilding industry.  Importantly government preferred to 
conclude agreement with the shipyard trades rather than introduce dilution under the 
Ministry Acts.  The line was taken of using all shipyard trade resources before 
introducing innovations, while semi-skilled male labour and women would only be 
introduced into shipyard trades when imperative.  This demonstrated that the 
government supported and accepted a measure which encouraged industrial peace.  
The Admiralty took a similar view on substitution only agreeing to its introduction on 
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the understanding that their representative would decide how far it was necessary 
and who could be released.  Study of the Barrow Military Tribunals indicates why such 
a stance was taken not only by the Admiralty but the unions, as most male substitutes 
were unsuitable or unqualified for the work.  Attempting to run private shipbuilding 
and armament firms along the lines of Royal Dockyards and government munitions 
factories was always bound to fail and if government had realised this and addressed 
the private yards problems earlier much unrest could have been avoided.   
 Whilst the war strengthened the local shop stewards movement, 
interpretations of the extent of their powers vary considerably.  Hinton argues that 
Barrow developed in an exceptional form, the relationship between Vickers and the 
Engineering Joint Trades Board (EJTB) preventing full development of direct workshop 
democracy which had explosive results elsewhere.   He maintains that when Barrow’s 
rank-and ‘rebel element’ formed an independent workers’ committee it was never 
allowed to seize a position of mass leadership as on the Clyde and at Sheffield.  Todd's 
study of the development of Barrow's labour movement however asserts quite rightly 
that the shop stewards' became a power of some significance during the war years of 
which the government recognized.186   
Revolutionary views however were not held by the mainly loyal and law-
abiding Barrow community, the extremists tending to state their views with 
moderation.  The Barrow Unrest Commissioners noted ‘though extreme men made 
the point of being loyal to the country’ there was a sense of being pushed beyond 
reasonable limits through lack of representation.  Failure to set up shop committees 
with representation on Joint Works Committees dealing with detailed matters of 
industry were thus likely to drive well-meaning enthusiasts towards the extremists. 
The key elements were a lack of a way for the shop stewards to legitimately put 
forward their complaints, non-recognition by engineering unions and the way 
government had largely ignored the problems of Barrow.  By setting up works 
committees with EJTB representation, partial recognition by the Trade Unions and 
government intervention to provide workers’ housing these problems were largely 
overcome and unrest prevented.  As in many industrial centres, with the collapse of 
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the movement after the war the shop stewards' influence was transferred from the 
workplace to the wider community.  
An examination of political change has provided insights into the ideological 
undercurrents of the period.  The gains made by Barrow’s Labour Party in the pre-war 
years testify to the organisation and backing of the engineering trade unions.  Whilst 
crediting the shop stewards as laying the foundation for a strong socialist movement 
their effect on Labour politics can be seen as acting in a detrimental manner.  The lack 
of funding caused by the withdrawal of the political levy and the realisation that 
Labour parliamentary representation was limited provided an opportunity for the 
socialists at the 1914 general election, but the war intervened.  The issue of the First 
Wold War deeply divided the Barrow Labour Party into two rival factions, the far left 
'pacifists' and those supporting the government in its prosecution.  Indeed, the 
wartime growth of socialist ideology coupled with the extension of the shop stewards' 
influence within the party itself proved particularly divisive culminating in the loss of 
the parliamentary seat at the 1918 General Election.  Although the Barrow Labour 
Party had always welcomed and supported women, enfranchisement failed to bring 
about the anticipated post-war gain.  Whilst these divisions turned the attentions of 
the Labour Party inward and set the pattern for left-wing politics particularly towards 
the latter period of the war, it was municipal politics that provided the main arena for 
the political struggles of these years.  Throughout the war the Labour Party was 
underrepresented on Barrow council and although it made gains at the 1919 
Municipal Elections the party's failure to obtain control of the Corporation was out of 
step with the wider Labour successes of that year.187    
Pre-war females in Barrow had little scope in the choice of their occupations. 
The war therefore brought new opportunities for females but with its own special 
problems.  In the workshops they were continually under the scrutiny of the 
engineering trade unions and as Thom and Macarthur identify women were only 
meantime workers, there for the duration.  The Barrow ASE Secretary endorsed this 
as he had no fear regarding restoration of pre-war conditions once the war was over 
as female labour would not be a paying proposition in engineering.  He did not think 
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women generally would oust engineers and they would be more prudent than to 
attempt it.  Concerns were also voiced when women dilutees were retained in 
Barrow’s factories at a time when men were looking for employment.   
In addition to full employment, the war increased the earnings of many male 
workers, which together with the benefit of a wife's wage, brought a new affluence to 
many working-class families. Woollacott notes it was young, single women with no 
dependents who mostly experienced high wages as offering unprecedented spending 
choices.188  However assumptions that Barrow single women munitions workers were 
prosperous had little foundation in reality, a first-hand account pointed out that only 
by working longer or harder under task related schemes were they able to survive.189  
Alice Wycherley provides further confirmation by stating that: ‘only by working 
alternative shifts and longer hours could she maintain herself.’190 
Following the Armistice female labour was generally dispersed and for those 
remaining there was little scope for earning wages as in munitions.  This agrees with 
both Braybon and Wightman.  The return of demobilised men along with employers 
and trade unions stances further prevented female employment at Vickers.  The 
government in failing to find new work for unemployed Barrow women meant that 
they remained disadvantaged.  Commercial use of wartime munitions methods were 
not seen and females were left with little option but to return to their pre-war trades.  
The impact of war was out of all proportion to anything previously experienced 
by the town's fluctuating economy and the unprecedented influx of wartime 
munitions workers placed the infrastructure of the town under severe pressure.   
During the pre-war years the lack of housing was a problem to industrial recruiting as 
the stock never increased in sufficient numbers to meet pre-war needs.  In their 
defence Barrow Council encouraged artisan housing by private syndicate but there 
were never enough and while unions and the Labour Party were aware of the need 
for working-class housing it was left to Vickers to provide limited numbers.  Although 
the majority of Barrow’s housing stock was no more than fifty years old at the 
outbreak of the War, working-class housing conditions were characteristically poor, 
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and high rents, sub-letting and overcrowding were endemic.  However as a result of 
the town's modernity and its favourable comparison to the stereotyped image of what 
constituted a slum, the prevailing conditions were regarded as acceptable by the 
authorities, and together with the intention of minimising municipal expenditure to 
keep the rates low, provided no stimulus for reform.  However, by 1917 the housing 
conditions in Barrow were described by the unrest commission as a ‘crying scandal’.  
The general commission on industrial unrest also pointed out that housing conditions 
were not only bad in Barrow but in Scotland and Wales.191  Marwick points to 
Glasgow’s poor housing conditions and those in Wales and Monmouth stating: ‘the 
workers were deeply discontented with their housing accommodation and with their 
unwholesome and unattractive environment generally.’192   
Inevitably, the wartime influx of munitions workers had a profound effect on 
levels of overcrowding, but whilst the Rent Restrictions Act pegged rents at 1914 
levels, it offered no protection for the thousands of lodgers in the town.  Consequently 
sub-letting became extremely profitable and stimulated the eviction of sitting tenants 
and multiple occupation at house famine rents.  The Unrest Commission 
demonstrated the nature of the housing problem and the social tensions created by 
the inaction of both Government and the Municipality.  Thus whilst Abrams described 
housing as traditionally providing a reliable indicator of levels of deprivation, in Barrow 
the wartime housing issue represented levels of social tension.193  
Despite the urgency of the situation, the Ministry successfully reduced the 
number of houses to be constructed on the grounds of the temporary nature of the 
demand, the anticipated post-war population fall and unjustifiable expense.  The war 
radically changed the nature of the housing problem, supporting Marwick's assertion 
that participation in the war enabled the working-classes to press their demands and 
improve their living standards.194  However, in Barrow the impetus for housing reform 
was particularly short-lived, and following the demise of the Ministry of Munitions, 
the building programme was abandoned with only half the houses built.  The 
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measures taken by the Ministry of providing a building programme, preventing 
evictions and easing overcrowding by billeting nonetheless represented a political 
response to the crisis by removing the major concerns of unrest.195  While housing 
accommodation was difficult to find, transport became more congested, utilities were 
put under strain and urgent work necessitated putting in long hours.   
Loss of sea trade transferred much of Barrow’s food and provisions to the 
railways while increased supplies of foreign iron ore for pig iron production in the west 
coast foundries increased.  Rail transport was therefore crucial not just for the moving 
of materials and goods but for carrying workers.  Although the Furness Railway 
managed its own systems, they were subjected to the Railway Executive Committee 
orders.  The Transport Order of 1916 was of particular significance, making the 
housing question more acute in consequence of the alterations and reductions to the 
train services.  Barrow’s tramcars were both irregular and unprepared for the 
additional traffic.  The system lacked investment preventing any large scale 
improvement, which combined with staff shortages led to delays and late arrival.  
Travelling facilities thus remained an important cause of unrest, little or no 
improvement being effected throughout the war. 
The role of utilities was important in the production of munitions and the living 
conditions of workers, war not only impacted on Barrow Corporation as a major 
employer, but caused a knock-on effect by reducing local authority activities.  In the 
move towards total war Barrow’s population became involved with war service work 
in support of munitions production as actively encouraged by Kitchener.  As industrial 
production and the population increased so did the demand for utilities which the 
corporation was only able to maintain by excessive overtime of its staff and workmen.  
Until the new gas works became available restrictions were placed on the population 
whilst a prolonged drought and industrial priority in the use of water forced 
constraints throughout the district. Plant improvements needed government 
sanction, rigid control being necessary to cut down plant requirements to an absolute 
minimum and economise power use due to coal shortages.  Barrow’s heavy industries 
required coke and coal, as did the gas and electricity works and any breakdown in 
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supply could cause serious disruption.  The change of coal supply due to the 
government requirement to reduce haulage miles incurred additional costs for less 
efficient coal affecting output for Barrow’s industry and population.   The problems of 
utilities and fuel supplies were therefore chiefly the fault of government leaving the 
corporation to cope as best possible, generally to the detriment of the population.    
Whilst higher wages were being earnt the continuous rise in the cost of living 
meant many had to work overtime, of advantage to industry but harmful to workers’ 
health.  Wartime consciousness of health led to incentives reinforced by legislation 
and an extension of municipal responsibilities in what was an atmosphere of falling 
manpower and worsening conditions in the town.  The evidence suggests that only 
the most serious cases of overcrowding were dealt with, whilst an ageing council 
workforce occasionally assisted by Vickers, provided reduced services to meet health 
legislation.  While there were financial incentives to improve conditions in munitions 
workshops where significant numbers of women were employed, small improvement 
was seen in the engineering workshops, shipyard and the iron and steel works.196   
Further, money was not widely available to the council, the general conditions in the 
town were therefore at variance with the health and welfare of the female munitions 
workers in the factories.    
 Van Emden notes that the relaxing of Home Office rules governing factory 
work, long hours, shift-work and shorter mealtimes became the norm.197   Life was 
made worse by working continuously without breaks, determined more by the needs 
of the front line than the conditions recommended by the Ministry or Factory Acts.  
Working hours therefore increased while overtime and Sunday labour became 
universal and holidays became conditional.  Removal of Sunday labour made little 
difference as it was re-introduced when the need arose.  In many cases work was 
carried out by older or less fit men, while harder work than they were previously used 
to was undertaken by females.  The effect of long hours under heavy conditions led to 
strain and irregularities leading to lost quarters and sometimes days, often wrongfully 
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diagnosed as slackness.  Workers’ health was affected by working in bad weather, 
overcrowding and indifferent cooking in such lodgings as were obtainable.  For many 
men and women poor housing lacking privacy and quietness meant that sleep was 
impeded expressly for night shift workers.  A major problem at Barrow was the 
different shifts patterns.  At Vickers, synchronising shifts in the interests of efficiency 
was opposed by the Ministry as this would have meant women changing to a two-shift 
system.198  Conditions would have improved in the home for married women with 
lodgers, while the removal of one shift of women workers would have eased the 
housing problem.  Adversely women would work longer hours, earnings would 
increase but there would have been greater exhaustion and a drop in efficiency.  
However there is only evidence of shifts being partially synchronised.    
Though drink control was introduced to rid excessive consumption among a 
section of workers as an obstacle to munitions output it also brought about changes 
in habits.  Drink was a sensitive subject in a town where hot and arduous labour was 
the norm and the pint the reserve of working men.  While steps were taken to revise 
the opening hours to prevent men drinking before going on shift, this did not affect 
nearby towns and so control was extended outwards.  The German submarine 
campaign produced both a drink and a food problem causing beer to be diluted and 
output cut leading to shortages.   The greater sobriety seen in 1917 was not entirely 
the result of the CCB restrictions, but largely to the limited quantities of intoxicants 
available for consumption.  Lack of beer was not a cause for unrest but one of loss of 
temper leading the unrest commission to advise that Barrow was a special case 
warranting special privileges.  The government showed little interest in the locality 
and its needs, and the working-classes who demanded liquor were never sufficiently 
consulted.  Nonetheless, what was radical about the CCB, says Robert Duncan, was 
the fact that Board, with its blend of restrictive and constructive policy, managed to 
implement practical reform.199  Notably a valuable health achievement was the 
fostering of the growth of restaurants and canteens as an alternative calorific source 
to alcohol.  Drinking restrictions were also a major contribution to family welfare, as 
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in numbers of working-class households expenditure on alcohol was a cause of 
poverty.  Following the war it was realised that the welfare of the workforce needed 
to be studied and treated in a scientific way if future output was to be improved. 
Barrow’s isolation meant that the food question was important.  According to 
Gregory, in the first two years of the war, food shortages were localized and of 
relatively short duration, as high prices had ‘provided incentives for increased 
supply.’200 But as the war progressed, shortages and inflationary pressure increased, 
and demands for state intervention became more persistent. The enquiry into 
industrial unrest pointed to increases in the cost of living, along with deep-rooted 
suspicion of profiteering, as primary causes of discontent.  While local food 
committees were introduced, shop stewards and women became active in setting up 
food vigilance committees for the purpose of focussing working-class demands in 
connection with the food supply and stimulating government and municipal activity.  
By representation of the different societies on the various committees, the matter of 
providing food equitably and at affordable prices was therefore mostly achieved for 
the Barrow working-classes.  Whilst compulsory rationing, did not mitigate the food 
difficulties it removed the sense of injustice, and to a certain extent that of inequality.  
The impression of the town itself is one of depression with diminished council 
services, housing, utilities and a failing transport system.  Although no new hospitals, 
schools or public buildings were started two schools were completed and a ward 
extension opened at the North Lonsdale Hospital.201  Home conditions for many 
deteriorated, not only caused by overcrowding but by a shortage of materials and 
manpower to carry out repairs.  Yet in these failing conditions there were no serious 
outbreaks of illness or an increase in the mortality rate, even when the influenza 
epidemic visited Barrow industry continued working.  Joy says the health of ‘the 
borough’ improved dramatically during the war years, demonstrating the close 
correlation between income levels and health providing better diets yet the subject of 
worker’s poor health caused by industrial conditions are never broached.202  Most 
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historians agree that the working classes did make material and health gains during 
the war.  However incomes could be affected as demonstrated by Vickers as men were 
moved to lower paid work to complete contracts or they were laid off until new work 
was available.     
The report of the unrest commission noted that the government failed to 
recognise that centralised bureaucracy did not work in Barrow while common sense 
methods did.  Whilst sensible methods were applied by the local representatives of 
the Ministry of Munitions and Admiralty to industrial wellbeing the needs of Barrow’s 
citizens were gravely neglected.  Essentially the problems of Barrow were government 
related exacerbated by the massive expansion for the production of shells and guns.  
The problem of increased production was quickly overcome by the building and 
extension of workshops but the ‘human aspect and its implications’ were never fully 
understood by those in Whitehall.  Where local efforts were made to succeed, they 
were often hampered by London officialdom ignorant of local conditions and 
possibilities.  Barrow’s isolated position and the fact that it was considered inadvisable 
to inform the general public of the conditions of industrial life meant the situation 
went largely unreported.  Even the Report of the Unrest Commission and its damning 
indictment of Barrow Corporation who had done little to alleviate conditions failed to 
radicalise the electorate.  Nevertheless the real threat of industrial unrest caused the 
government to take action.  Indeed, the housing issue and the threat of unrest 
emphasised the urgent measures taken by the Ministry to maintain stability.   
Barrow made a massive contribution to the war in the production of 
armaments, warships, submarines and airships while its iron and steel works and local 
mines produced vast amounts of war materials.  When war ended there was a general 
withdrawal of government from industry and a return to the reliance mainly of Vickers 
with its associated problems.  The rundown of Admiralty and heavy gun orders and 
changeover from naval to merchant shipbuilding needed less skilled labour, yet 
Barrow’s high wages retained men in the town as it could be more economical for 
skilled men to take labouring jobs.  Retention of labour and the slow house-building 
programme meant the problem of overcrowding remained.  With virtually no 
unemployment in Barrow throughout the war the problem returned on its conclusion 
and cases of hardship were witnessed by calls for relief and by people living in 
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temporary and sub-standard accommodation.  In fact the stimulus for change was 
restricted as the continuity of the occupational structure and established residential 
patterns, together with limited change within the workplace suggests.     
A study of the town of Barrow leaves open the opportunities of comparative 
studies with similar areas or singular studies of those areas themselves.  Admittedly 
all local case studies are going to be different in some way and it might be found that 
Barrow is exceptional in its geography and by the role of Vickers.   Although these 
factors alone make Barrow a particularly important case study for the First World War 
they might also provide a potential drawback and the town may be found to be 
unique.   The hypothesis however could be made that all towns producing armaments 
and munitions might be different but arguably they will all show a broadly consensual 
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Appendix A 
Barrow’s War Record 
 The Times, Monday, 27 October 1919 
Taking into consideration the record of production for the Army and Navy 
during the war. Three super-dreadnoughts HMS Erin, Emperor of India and Revenge, 
five light cruisers, HMS Penelope, Phaeton, Cassandra, Curlew and Calcutta, three 
Monitors, HMS Clyde, Humber and Tyne, and over seventy submarines were delivered 
from the shipyard.  Machinery and engines were provided for ten other ships, thirteen 
vessels were converted for use as minesweepers and sixty-barges built for the War 
Office.  The part played by the paravane or otter in the defeating of the mine at sea 
are well known, and 3,200 complete units were supplied from Barrow in addition to 
325 bodies.  Twenty-two Admiralty vessels were repaired at Barrow during the war, 
15in. gun turrets were delivered for HMS Revenge, Valiant, Barham, Ramilles and 
monitors and there was much miscellaneous work.  Three rigid airships, two non-rigid 
airships, 26 kite balloons for the British Government and four small airships for Italy 
were constructed.  In the way of field equipments, Barrow turned out 11,740 vehicles 
for 18 pounder guns alone and also 30,000 tons of howitzer equipments.  The output 
of shells was enormous, and include 6,810,000 completed projectiles ranging from a 
calibre of 18in down to 12 pounder and 9,813,00 partly finished shells. 
 




The little known part played by Barrow in supplying toluol for the production 
of Trinitrotoluene (TNT) is worthy of mention.  The general method was to strip 
Corporation gas of its toluol and benzene content, this reduced the gas illuminating 
and calorific value causing street and shop lighting to dim and domestic gas cooking 
ovens to work less efficiently.   The more efficient method was to produce toluol from 
Borneo petroleum which was first produced at Portishead after the removal of the 
Shell Distillation Plant from Rotterdam.  At the end of June 1915 a second distillation 
plant with half the Portishead capacity was erected at Barrow.   The two plants went 
unreported and it was only after the Armistice that their contribution to the war effort 
was recognised.  Up to the Armistice the Portishead plant produced 18,500 tons of 
toluol while the Barrow plant produced 11,500 tons, a total of 30,100 tons a figure 
almost identical to the total output of toluol of the entire British gas industry from the 
outbreak of war until the Armistice.  This total yielded 60,000 tons of TNT, sufficient 
to produce nearly 250,000 tons of high explosive.    
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Appendix C 
Post First World War Map of Vickers Works and Barrow Docks
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